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OBJECTIVE, SCOPE, METHODOLOGY 
AP^ D ARRANGEMENT 
SCOPE 
The present study is intended to bring at one place, in the form of 
annotations, most of the significant Hterature that are available on 'Political 
Problem of Sri Lanka : (1990 - 2000)'. Although this bibliography is selective in 
nature an attempt has been made to cover almost all the aspect of Sri Lankan 
political problem. 
I am hopeful that this bibliography will be helpful to all those who want to 
know about the Sri Lankan political problem. 
METHODOLOGY 
i) The primary sources were consulted in the following libraries : 
ii) Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh. 
iii) Indian Council of World Affairs Library, Sapru House, New Delhi 
iv) American Centre Library, Kasturba Gandhi Marg, New Delhi 
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v) British Council Library, Rafi Marg, New Delhi. 
vi) Delhi University Library, Maurice Wag.ar, Delhi. 
vii) House of Soviet Culture Library, Firoz Shah Road, New Delhi. 
viii) National Social Science Documentation Centre, (Indian Council of Social 
Research), Firozshah Road, New Delhi. 
The procedure followed in preparing this bibliography was as follows. 
1. The secondary sources were consuhed in Maulana Azad Library, A.M.U., 
Aligarh to find out the location of the articles, these secondary sources are; 
a) Index India (Rajasthati University, Jaipur) 
b) Indian Press Index (Indian Documentation Service Gurgaon) 
c) Guide to Indian Periodical literalwe (Delhi Library Association). 
2. The relevant bibliographical details were noted down on 5" x 7" cards, 
following the ISI, standards. 
3. Then primary sources were consulted in Maulana Azad Library and other 
Libraries. 
4 On completion of the abstracts, subject headings were assigned. Subject 
headings are completely co-extensive to the extent possible. 
5. The subject headings were arranged is am alphabetical sequence of various 
elements. 
6. There is a list of Journals and list of abbreviations. 
7. In the end their respective numbers prepared two separate alphabetical 
indexes. 
ARRANGEMENT 
The material in this bibliogTaphy has been arranged in the following 
manner: 
1. Part first is a brief introduction to bibliography, this has information about 
the scope and methodology adopted in preparing this bibliography. 
2. Part second is brief out lines of the subject. 
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3. Part third is the bibliography, the arrangement here is subject-wise taking 
the subject in an alphabetical manner. 
4 a) An entry is preceded by the subject heading in capitals. 
b) Serial number of the entry in a separate column. 
c) The entry begins with the SUBLNAME of the author(s) in capital 
wards as the entry elements, followed by Secondary Element in 
Parentheses. When the SURNAME of the author(s) is not known 
the entry element is the author(s) name itself, straight. 
d) Title of the periodical is under lined or in italics. 
e) Volume number of the periodical. 
f) Issue number of the periodical 
g) Year of the publication of the periodical, particularly of concerned volume, 
h) Month of publication in the abbreviation form. 
i) Pages of the periodical devoted to the articles 
j) Columns in the form of Roman Small are given. 
k) After all; this whole is followed by the annotation. 
The inclusive notation is used to write the Indo-Arabic numbers - page 
under from 16 to 18 continuously are written e.g. 16 - 8, and discontinuous 
numbers is separated by a comma. A specimen entry is given bellow: 
SRI LANKA, POLITICAL PROBLEM, ETHNIC CONFLICT, LTTE, 
TAMIL NADU^ 
RANATUNGA (Sinha)^ Sri Lanka^  : Frankenstein Exposed. Outlook^ 3^ 5t; 
Dec .^ 22^ 1997 ;^ 45'° 
This paper deals with the militant Tamil movement in Sri Lanka had 
gathered momentum with each passing year. Mrs. Gandhi herself met some of its 
leaders and by July 1983, the ambush on a night patrol of the Sri Lankan Army 
resulted in an anti Tamil backlash in Colombo and elsewhere. The state was set to 
take Sri Lanka from an economic miracle to economics shambles. In India, Tamil 
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Nadu politicians demanded military intervention in Sri Lanka. And when the 
defense minister of the day R. Venkataraman and a Tamilian himself, rejected the 
case DMK legislators said his tongue should be cut off* ^  
1. Subject heading 
2. Author(s) 
3. Title 
4. Periodical Title 
5. Volume Number 
6. Issue Number 
7. Month 
8. Date 
9. Year 
10. Page Number(s) 
11. Abstract 
In the end two alphabetical indexes have been provided. There is the 
author index and title index. These cater to the two other possible entry points for 
search of literature. 
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INTRODUCTION 
SRI LANKA : AN INTRODUCTION 
Physical Features 
Sri Lanka (known as Ceylon until 1972) is an independent island state in 
the Indian Ocean lying 20 miles off the Southern coast of India between the 
Northern latitudes at 5 55' and 9 50' and the Eastern longitudes at 79 42 and 81 
52. The total land area is 65,609.88 square kilometers. The maximum length of 
island is 353 kms. and its widest point it measures 183 kms. Lying some 400 
miles North of the Equator, the islaind is a detached portion of the mainland of 
India, a part of its vast Southern Plateau. 
The Republic of Sri Lanka has parliamentary form of government and is a 
Republic within the common weaUh of nations. A shallow area Palk Strait 
separates Sri Lanka from India; Talaimanner on Sri Lanka's Manner island, is 
only 22 miles away from Dhanuskadion, India's; Pambam island. 
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A line of shoals, or sandbanks, called Adams Bridge, runs between Sri 
Lanka and India immediately South of this point. The capital of Sri Lanka is the 
Port City of Colombo. 
Since gaining independence from UK in 1948, Sri Lanka has been striving 
to secure economic stability a problem accentuated by a rapid population growth. 
The population has doubled in the past 25 years to its present total of about 
13,000,000 and is increasing. This population explosion is the cause of a severe 
food shortage as well as unemployment and social unrest. The economy is 
overwhelmingly dependent upon the export of tea rubber and coconut products 
and is thus subject to price fluctuations that characterise the world commodity. 
Sri Lanka inhabited by varied mixtures of peoples who have immigrated to 
the island at intervals since remote times. The population while consisting of 
nationals of Sri Lanka, is divided into several groups. The two principal linguistic 
groups are the Sinhalese, who generally are Buddhists and number over 9,000,000 
and Tamils who generally are Hindus, numbering more than 2,500,000. Relations 
between Sinhalese and Tamil have deteriorated in recent years, more as a result of 
current economic maladies and historic reasons. 
Sri Lanka is a country of great beauty, with scenery varying from the 
palm-fringed beaches of tis coast to the high lands of the interior, where the 
famous Buddhist Temple of the Tooth is, located at Kandy, once the capital of an 
independent kingdom. The name Ceylon is an English word derived from the 
Sanskrit Simhaladvipa, meaning "island of the Sinhalese". The Sinhalese name 
for the country is laka, the Pali name if Lanka and the prefix Sri is honourrific. 
The Tamil name is Eelam or Ila'nkai. 
i) Landscape 
Like peninsular India, of which it forms a continuation, Sri Lanka is a 
fragment of an ancient Southern continent called Gondwanaland by geologists and 
divided into four Physical Divisions - the Central High Lands, the South West, 
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the East, and The Northern Lowlands. The Central Highlands, which were 
formed by faulting, have some fine scenery. Tide highest point is Pidurutalagaia, a 
rounded peak 8,281 feet high; more renowned, however, is the Pyramidical 
Adams Peak, 7,360 feet high, which lies to the south west of Pidurutalagaia and is 
a centre for pilgrimages by Buddhists, Hindus, Muslims and even Christians. 
The Southern edge of the central massif consists of a rim of steep scrap 
running east to west and curving south ward in. the centre, at one point, called the 
world's end. The scrap wall forms an almost sheer drop of about 5,000 feet. 
The South West region is also mountainous and includes the Rakwana, or 
Buluteta Range, a continuation of the central massif The East consists of an 
undulating plain, dotted with isolated hills. 
The Northern Lowlands region consists of rolling countryside intersected 
by rivers and marked by occasional ridges and isolated hills. In the extreme north, 
the Jafl&ia Peninsula, which is made of limestone, is underlain by a coral reef 
Several offshore islands have the same formation. 
Historical Retrospect 
Ceylon History 
The island of Ceylon has a continuous record of settled and civilized life 
for over two millennia. The content and direction of this civilization has been 
shaped like that of the Indian subcontinent. 
The historic connection betw e^en Ceylon and India was thje result mainly 
of geographic proximity. Geologically an extension of Penisnsular India. 
Early Ceylon 
The island's first human settlers were probably tribes of the parto-antraloid 
ethnic group, a kin to the pre-dravidian hill tribes of Southern India. Remnants of 
these people were absorbed by the Indo-Ar^ a^ns who immigrated fi-om India 
around the 5* century DC and developed into the Sinhalese. The Tamils were 
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probably later immigrants from dravidian India, their migrations being spread out 
over a period dating from early centuries AD to about 1200. 
Colonial Period 
In 1505 a Portuguese feet commanded by Lourence de Almeida was blown 
into Colombo by adverse winds. In 1518 Poituguese were permitted to build a 
ft)rt at Colombo and were given trading concessions. 
After the Portuguese the Dutch took Manner in February 1658 and Jaffna 
in June. In 1665 Dutch expanded to the east coast, and thus controlled most of the 
Cinnamon growing lands and the point of exit and entry in the island. 
In 1796 the British began to move into Ceylon from their base in India, 
They administered the island from Madras. In 1802, Ceylon was made a crown 
colony and by the Treaty of Amians with Franice, British possession of maritime 
Ceylon was confirmed. 
In \9^ century, revivalist movements in Buddhism and Hinduism sought 
to modernize their institutions and to defend themselves against Christians in 
roads by establishing schools to impart v/estem education unmixed with 
Christianity. 
Ceylon Since Independence -1948-1972 
The constitution of independent Ceylon provided for bicameral legislature 
with a popularly elected House of Representatives and Senate partly nominated 
and partly elected indirectly. 
When the first elections were held in 1947, United National Party (UNP) 
chose D.S. Senanayake as Prime Minister and advocated orderly and conservative 
progress. Meanwhile, the country began to face economic difficulties. Addition 
of increasing number of schools dropouts created an unemployment problem. 
The various factors of political and economic discontent converged after 
1955, and a new Sinhala nationalism was unhsashed. In the 1956 elections the 
11 
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UNP was swept out of office; Bhandaranaike's Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) 
was installed in power. By 1965 the tide of Sinhala nationalism had began to 
recede. 
The problem of educated unemployment could not be solved. The SLFP 
formed an alliance with Marxist Socialist Parties and waged a strenuous campaign 
against the government. In 1970 they won a land slide victory and Mrs. 
Bhandaranaike again became Prime Minister. In 1972 Ceylon was renamed the 
Republic of Sri Lanka. 
The complexities of the island's ethnic conflict go deep into the history. 
Sri Lanka's population had from the beginning two ethnic group, the Tamils and 
the Sinhalese. The Sinhalese are from the north and the east of India during the 
third and fourth centuries B.C. About the same time or perhaps a little later, there 
was immigration, in periodic waves, of the Dravidian people from the South of 
India. Still earlier, there were people who had come in from East and West Asia, 
Sri Lanka being a vital point in the sea route linking South-east Asia with the 
eastern Mediterranean. 
Buddhist legends and mythology have the story of Prince Vijaya, who 
founded dynasty of Sinhala\ese kings, 'Sinhala' being the name of a powerful 
tribe of the early Indo-Aryan immigrants from northern India, who went to Ceylon 
in the fifth century B.C. The Indian link gained a special sanctity when Prince 
Mahendra, son of Emperor Ashok, took the message of the Buddha to Sri Lanka. 
The Buddhist chronicle 'MAHAVANSA' from which Sri Lanka's early history is 
traced, sanctified this all. Also traced to Maliavansa is the growth of a second 
current of immigrants from India, this time from the South. According to it, in the 
second century B.C., Tamil invaders reached Southwards and conquered the 
Anuradhapura Kingdom. 
In the South Asian region Sri Lanka waij the first nation to adopt trade and 
exchange liberalisation policies as far back as 1977. Until then, stringent import 
and exchange controls had been in operation in the country. A policy package 
12 
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based on export oriented growth strategy was introduced in 1977. The package 
included a series of policy measures. These policies have been intensified over 
the last two decades so as to further facilitate foreign trade flows, capital 
movements, labour mobility and private sector activities. 
The ratio of net private capital inflows of GDP is around 1.5 percent for 
South Asia, in comparison with 6.5 percent for East Asia. In the case of Sri 
Lanka, the ratio remains around 1 percent. In the preliberalisation period of 1970-
77, the GDP grew only by about 3 percent annually. With the opening up of the 
economy, the GDP grew faster in the post 1977 period and the average annual 
growth rate has remained around 5 percent during the last two decades. 
The growth process has also been adversely affected by the current global 
recession largely as a result of the depressed global demand conditions. Sri 
Lanka's GDP growth rate was down to 2.7 percent in the first quarter of 1999 
fi-om 5.8 percent in the same quarter of 1998. 
Reflecting the faster growth in manufacturing and service activities in the 
post-liberalisation period, increasing employment opportunities were available in 
these sectors. As a resuh, the share of employment in these two sectors rose fi^om 
52 percent in 1981/82 to 62 percent in 1996/97 while the share in agriculture 
declined fi^om 48 percent to 38 percent. 
Widespread availability of employment opportunities benefiting both the 
urban as well as the rural sector, narrowing down of the urban-rural income 
disparity, better targeting of government welfaie schemes for the more deserving 
households and the trickling down of benefits to lower income groups emerging 
fi-om outward oriented economic progress has led to a more equal distribution of 
income in the last decade. The income share of the bottom 40 percent of the 
income receivers increased fi-om 11 percent in 1986/87 to 13 percent in 1996/97 at 
the expense of a decline of the share of the top 20 percent of income receivers 
from 57 percent to 53 percent. Meanwhile, the income share of the middle 40 
percent increased from 32 percent in 1986/87 to 34 percent in 1996/97. This is the 
13 
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first time after liberalisation that showed a favourable income distribution towards 
lower income groups. 
Reflecting the implications of income j^owth, the per capita consumption 
expenditure, in real terms, in creased at a compound rate of 1.7 percent per annum 
over the period 1986/87 to 1996/97. 
The extent of poverty is generally estimated by using a poverty line which 
is defined in terms of a cut-off per capita income required to meet basic needs, 
mainly the minimum calorie intake. Using a reference poverty line of Rs. 471,20 
(monthly per person at 1990-91 prices), the share of population living below the 
poverty line is estimated to have declined fi^om 27 percent in 1985/86 to 22 
percent in 1990/91. More recent studies show that the share has further declined 
to around 19 percent in 1996/97. Thus broadly speaking, globalisation among 
other factors, has positively contributed to poverty reduction in Sri Lanka. 
The unemployment rate declined from 15.5 percent in 1986/87 to 10.4 
percent in 1996/97 due to faster growth of economic activities in the post 
liberalisation phase in Sri Lanka reflecting the beneficial effects of globalisation. 
But an alarming feature is the considerably high unemployment rates among the 
educated youth as noted earUer. 
In the 1960's, Sri Lanka's human development indicators were much 
higher than those of most East Asian countries In the post liberalisation period, 
living conditions were further improved in the country due to an expansion of 
health and education facilities, better housing and sanitary conditions and 
enhanced access to household equipment. 
Demographic and Geographic Characteristics 
Most of the South Asian States have muhi-ethnic character. Many of the 
ehtno-linguistic groups which co-exist in these iJtates have their own customs and 
traditions, which by and large, guide their life styles and influence their behavioral 
norms. The inter-ethnic group cleavage being basically political, the ethnic 
14 
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conflict is mainly the competition for power sharing and its exercise. The 
continued neglect and mishandling of the; initial demands for linguistic 
accommodation and employment avenues often turn the autonomist into 
sectionalist which retards the nation-building process. In South Asia, the case of 
Pakistan, in which the political demands foi' autonomy of East-Pakistan was 
ultimately driven by repression to succession, is an example. 
Sri Lanka had a total population of 19,500,000 in 1997. This population is 
spilt into separate ethnic, linguistic and religious communities, It is spilt up as 
follows: 
POPULATION OF DIFFERENT ETHNIC GROUPS 
IN SRI LANl^ 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Ethnic Group 
Sinhalese 
Ceylon Tamils 
Indian Tamils 
Ceylon Moors 
Malays 
Burghers 
Total 
Population 
= 12690000 
1971 
9388062 
1598940 
718254 
903528 
41877 
39339 
Total 
Population 
= 14846750 
1981 
10983625.65 
1870690,50 
840326.05 
1057088.60 
48994.27 
46024.92 
Total 
Population 
=16755000 
1988 
12395349 
2111130 
948333 
1192956 
55291,50 
51940,50 
Total 
Population 
=19500000 
1997 
14426100 
2457000 
1103700 
1388400 
64350 
60450 
%Age 
73,98 
12,60 
5,66 
7.12 
0.33 
0.31 
The Sinhalese, who form the majority, and are principally Buddhist and 
speak Sinhalese, an Indo-European language, could further be divided into 
Kandyan and low country Sinhalese, a distinction which arose out of the different 
rates at which these two communities develoi)ed during the colonial era. The 
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largest community, the low country Sinhalese, represent the most subject to 
European influence. The majority of Christians belong to this community. Its 
geographical spread is from North Western province to southern province. A 
large part of them live under urban influence, The Kandyan Sinhalese are those 
living and inhibiting the inland area of the Kandyan Kingdom which remained 
independent until 1815. They are almost entirely Buddhist and rural. The Tamils 
are Hindus and speak Tamil. They also could further be divided into Sri Lankan 
Tamils and Indian Tamils. Sri Lankan Tamils believe that their ancestors pre-
dated the Sinhalese settlers. These early immijgrant indigenous Tamils who have 
identified Northern and Eastern provinces as their traditional home lands belong 
to the country in the same way as the Sinhalese. The Indian Tamils were first 
transported to Sri Lanka from India when Britain ruled both the countries 
(between 1850 - 1940). They are concentrated in Central areas of Sri Lanka, and 
are the least privileged of any community. 
According to the 1981 census, Tamils, including persons of Indian origin, 
constitute 95.7% of the population in Jaffna, 89.8% in MuUaithivu, 75.2% in 
Vavunia, 72% in Batticaloa and 63.9% in Mannar. In the Nuwara Eliya district of 
the Central Province the Indian Tamils comprise 47,3% while the Sinhalese are 
35,9%, This is the only district where the Indian Tamils have their highest 
concentration, though they spread all over the island. Sri Lanka has a small but 
significant Muslim population also, categorised into the Ceylon Moors, the Indian 
Moors and the Malays. The Ceylon Moors claim to be the descendants of the 
Arab-traders. The Indian Moors are South Indian traders. The Malay Muslims 
trace their ancestry to South East Asia. The residual population consists mostly of 
Burgees, Dutch and Portuguese. 
Since Sinhalese-Buddhists are politically and socially divided, and are not 
sure of their own strength and cohesion, they tend to regard the non-Buddhist 
minorities, especially the Ceylon and Indian Tamils and Roman Catholics, as a 
greater threat than they actually are. 
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Religionwise Distribution 
Another element which promoted phiralistic character of Sri Lankan 
society, is the reUgion based division of communities. Many invasions and 
foreign penetrations have left Sri Lanka with a highly complex communal 
structure. It is the only country in the world with substantial representation from 
the four major religions of Buddhismi, Hinduism, Christianity and Islam. 
Population of Sri Lanka by religion is as follows : 
S.No, 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4, 
5. 
Religions 
Buddhist 
Hindus 
Christians 
Muslims 
Others 
Total 
Population 
= 12690000 
1971 
8858889 
1925073 
966978 
933984 
5076 
Total 
Population 
- 14846750 
1981 
10364516.18 
2252251.97 
1131322.35 
1092720.80 
5938.70 
Total 
Population 
= 16755000 
1988 
11696665.5 
2541733.5 
1276731 
1233168 
6702 
Total 
Population 
=19500000 
1997 
13612950 
2958150 
1485900 
1435200 
7800 
%Age 
69.81 
15.17 
7.62 
7.36 
0.04 
This shows that Buddhism is the religion of majority in Sri Lanka, 
followed by Hinduism, Christianity and Islam, 92% of the Sinhalese are 
Buddhists, 90% of Tamils are Hindus and 90% of the Christians are Roman 
Catholics. In other words nine out often Sinhalese are Buddhists; nine out often 
Tamils are Hindus; almost all Moors are Muslims; and Christians, although 
constituting the majority of the Eurasian category, from a substantial minorities in 
the other ethnic categories. Whereas in Indiai Buddhism emerged as an urban 
rehgion of a merchant-plebeian group. In Sri Lanka, almost from its inception, it 
became predominantly a peasant religion, and persisted in Sri Lanka even after 
Buddhism had lost much of its influence in India. 
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As in many other independent Third World countries, the scenario has a 
rehgious dimension to it. It is a part of local history that Buddhism has place of 
pride. Tamils are not only historic enemies but also pose religious and cultural 
threats. The paranoid belief that "Buddhism is in danger" is often uttered by 
Sinhalese. Sadly, the Buddhism in Sri Lanka appears to be not of the "Ahimsa 
Paramo Dharma", but of a more violent mutation. 
THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS 
Though the problems of Indian migrants, who include plantation workers 
of Indian origin are different from the problems of Sri Lankan Tamils, but since 
both have joined hands for common cause the problems in general cover the 
Tamil speaking community as a whole. In pairticular, the main political problem 
of the Indian migrants is the lack of citizenship or statelessness 
For about a decade. Federalism, as a model for Sri Lanka, has not worked. 
This statement is essentially based on the foUov^ ing three assumptions: 
i) There is no demand for it from any quarter of the political spectrum 
except the Sri Lankan Tamils who constitute only about 13 per cent 
of the country's population; 
ii) So long as the LTTE calls the shots, devolution of power to the 
Tamil areas means lititle in real terms for it cannot be implemented 
iii) If politics, as it is said, is the art of the possible, it does not seem to 
be in right gear. 
Including the original package of August 3, 1995, we have by now three 
texts of the proposed new Constitution. The other two are of January 1996 and 
October 1977. Of the three, the latest is the mcist comprehensive and provides the 
complete text of an alternative Constitution. If approved, this would be the fourth 
Constitution in 50 years of the Sri Lankan state. 
According to the present Constitution of Sri Lanka, the repeal or 
amendment of the Constitution is possible only through a two thirds majority in 
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the parliament (including those not present). Only thereafter can the Presidents if 
she/he so chooses take the matter to the people for a referendum. Given the line-
up in the parliament no new Constitution can be adopted without the support of 
UNP. The recent threat by the Lanka Sama Samaj Party (LSSP) to quit the ruling 
coalition can fiirther complicate the situation. The critical factor, therefore, is the 
position of UNP in the matter. 
The devolution in Sri Lanka, if implemented, would mean that the Tamil 
parties would rule the North-Eastem Province, even though a bit truncated, after 
all kinds of possibilities are worked out as per the details given in the October 
1997 draft Constitution. 
Other ethnic problems like language education employment and the 
settlement of Sinhalese in Tamil dominated areas are of crucial relevance to the 
Tamil community as a whole. Countries which have succeeded in creating an 
enduring base for genuine national unity in situation similar to Sri Lanka have 
done so only by involving a sound framework of inter-racial justice. The first is 
the sharing of political power and govemmentail responsibility. This has played a 
key role in situations where groups have territorial bases. The second is the 
opportunity for economic development which provides adequate growth and 
employment to each ethnic group. The third is the environment for preserving and 
promoting the cultural integrity of each group. Exactly, the main issues which 
have divided the Sinhalese and the Sri Lankan Tamil communities fall into these 
broad categories. 
Efforts to underplay the factors of history and cultural tradition and to 
bring economic factors to the fore have been made. Marxists and other left win 
writings on the subject emphasise that the conflict over the official language issue 
had more to do with economic advantages, especially for the Sinhalese, who were 
educated in their validity in this argument but proponent of this theory often tend 
to undervalue the strength of ethnic and religious loyalties and to argue that ethnic 
conflict will disappear with the advent of a socialist state. 
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History and tradition resulting in inter-group suspicions have provided 
some barriers to accommodation. The slow growth of economy worsened 
tensions among the groups seeking to share limited weahh and resources. The 
weakness of the political structure and of political organisation no doubt 
contributed to increase the conflict. Multi-racial, multi religious and multi-lingual 
Sri Lanka had known free and fair election with universal adult franchise since 
1931. But soon after independence Sinhala nationalism directed its hostility at the 
Tamil minority, perhaps out of a perceived fe<ir of being swamped by India, the 
big neighbour across the Palk straits. 
The events of 1998 practically extinguished hopes, even for Sri Lankans, 
of an early end to the war that were raised by the election of President Chandrika 
Kumaratunga in 1994. President Kumaratunga brought a new vigor and sense of 
urgency for ending conflict, which she translated into constitutional reforms for 
developing power to Sri Lanka's nine provinces and granting the Tamil-
dominated northeast a fair measure of autonomy. But the opposition United 
National Party (UNP) and the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
have opposed the reforms for widely different reasons and effectively vetoed the 
President's "peace package". Changes to the Constitution have to be approved by 
a two-thirds majority in Parliament and then ratified in a popular referendum, but 
Kumaratunga's People's Alliance coalition has a bare parliamentary majority. 
Problem of Citizenship 
The first major conflict that arose in the newly independent nation was 
over citizenship of the Indian Tamils. The Soulbury Constitution (which was 
drafted by Lord Soulbury in 1948) did not define citizenship of Ceylon. When the 
British left, the island and Sinhalas, Ceylon Tamils, Indian Tamils, Burghers, 
Ceylon Moors (Muslims) and Tamil-speaking Muslims. The majority of the 
island's population was Sinhala on ethnic and language lines and Buddhist by 
religion. Indeed, Buddhism is very much identified with Sinhala ethnicity in Sri 
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Lanka. Kumari Jayawardene, a radical historian who is a Sinhala says this 
ideology assumed that the island was the land of the Sinhala-Buddhists and, 
therefore, all other groups inhabiting it were alliens out to exploit its people. The 
Sinhala-Buddhist ideology flowed from three premises. The Sinhalas were the 
original and true inhabitants of the island and others were usurpers. Secondly, the 
Sinhala-Buddhists see Sri Lanka as a blockaded islands with no one outside to 
look for help. Thirdly, Sinhalese believed that they have a special relationship to 
Buddhism, having been chosen and ordered by the Buddha to protect the faith. 
Due to these reasons, the largest non-Sinhala group, the Tamils, were seen 
as an immediate threat to the Sinhala identity. Among the early enactments of the 
multi-ethnic, but Sinhala-dominated, United National Party's (UNP) government 
were the Acts to deprive most residents of Indian origin of their right to 
citizenship and franchise. Sri Lanka's political leadership contended that despite 
their long residence in the island, the imigrants did not belong to it and had live 
interest in the country of their origin and were, therefore, aliens. But India 
thought they were or ought to be Sri Lankan nationals. 
Thus very early in life of the new state, three laws came into force : the 
Ceylonese Citizenship Act 1948, the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) 
Act of 1949 and the Parliamentary Elections (Amendment) Act of 1949. All three 
taken together effectively removed the vast majority of Indian Tamils from the 
electoral registers. A million Tamil plantation workers who had toiled for the 
prosperity of the island for more than a century were disfranchised. Indeed they 
were robbed of their basic human rights and rendered stateless. The Act of 1948 
provided that citizenship would be determined either by descent or by stringent 
conditions of registration. There was no provision for citizenship by birth or by 
virtue of the country's membership of the British Commonwealth. In this way, 
the Acts of 1948 and 1949 had created a very different situation. The people of 
Indian origin in Ceylon had become divided into different categories such as 
citizens by descent and by registration, people holding permanent residence 
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permits and those with temporary residence permits etc. Both the Indian and the 
Sri Lankan governments also found that because of travel restrictions, the problem 
of "illicit immigration" either way had also developed. 
Further, the Senanayake government disfranchised the 'stateless' 
immigrants, through the Parliamentary Elections (Amendment) Act of 1949, 
restricting voting rights to citizens (They were re-franchised only in 1989). It was 
done because the UNP government feared that the Indian Tamils, if allowed to 
continue as a political force might some day join hands with the indigenous 
Tamils to create a problem for the majority conmiunity. 
The Indian Tamil citizenship issue did not at that time create a rift between 
the respective influential sections of Sri Lankan Tamils and Sinhalese. The Tamil 
congress led by G.G. Pounamblam continued to work as part of the government. 
But gradually the Sri Lankan Tamils feared that it would extend to them in some 
other form. Consequently, a section of the Tamil congress broke away under the 
leadership of S. J.V. Chelavanayakam and formed the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi 
(in strict translation, the Ceylon Tamil State Party) or the Federal Party. He said, 
"Today justice is being denied to Indian Tamils. Some day in the future, when 
language becomes the issue, the same would befall the Ceylon Tamils". His 
words were prophetic. And in the first party convention in 1951, it was declared 
that, "The Tamil speaking people in Ceylon constitute a nation distinct from that 
of the Sinhalese by every ftmdamental test by nationhood". 
Bu 1988, Indian had granted citizenship to 422, 000 people of Indian 
origin. Sri Lanka, in turn was obliged to grant citizenship to 468,000 people of 
Indian origin and also other remaining stateless persons. However, till November 
1988, only 238,000 people had been granted citizenship by Sri Lanka, another 
230,000 were left stateless. 
From the very beginning the problem was complicated. There were many 
hindrances in the implementation of citizenship agreements. Now though this 
problem is almost solved in theory, practically it still remains there. 
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SLFP governments under Mrs. Bhandamaike strictly adhered to the letter 
of the agreement stipulating grant of Sri Lanka citizenship to 4 persons for every 7 
persons actually repatriated to India. However, when the government of Dudley 
Senanayake of UNP (1965-70) belatedly enacted the Indo-Ceylon Agreement 
Implementation Act in mid 1967, this stipulation was changed such that it became 
sufficient to grant Sri Lankan citizenship to 4 persons every 7 persons registered 
as Indian citizens, though staying temporarily in Sri Lanka until the date of their 
repatriation on residence permit. When in 1970, Mrs. Bhandamaike came back to 
power, an amendment to Implementation Act was passed making employment of 
a temporary residence permit overstay, an offence. The UNP government of J.R. 
Jayewardene, once again restored, by amendment of the Act, reciprocity in the 
grant of Sri Lanka and Indian citizenship respectively, retaining the 4:7 ratio. 
Residence permit overstays became a nagging problem for successive Sri Lankan 
governments. Some of the overstays were no doubt caused by delays in payment 
of Employees' Provident Fund (EPF) benefits and gratuity by the Sri Lankan 
authorities. At the same time, Sri Lanka officials have averred that often 
repatriates are not to be found in the addresses given by them, and that large sums 
of EPF are lying unutilized. 
Another outstanding problem was that after receiving applications, it was 
found that approximately 625,000 stateless persons of Indian origin had applied 
for Ceylon citizenship, while only 400,000 persons had applied for repatriation to 
India. In other words, India had a shortfall of 126,000 to fulfill its targets under 
1964 agreement, while the applicants for Sri Lankan citizenship were more than 
twice the number envisaged under the agreement. So, the citizenship was the 
biggest problem for the Indian migrants in Sri Lanka. The denial of citizenship 
for them was dkect attack on their feelings. The core, the very pitch of the matter 
is feeling. Feelings of belonging of association, of sentiments. 
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Sri Lanka is an independent island state in the Indian Ocean lying off the 
South-east coast of Peninsular India. The links between India and Sri Lanka are, 
indeed unique. Besides being neighbours, there is a direct linkage between the 
people of Sri Lanka and India. The two dominant Sri Lankan communities, the 
Sinhalese and Tamil - both owe their origin to India. The Sinhalese came from 
Eastern India thousands of years ago and. the Tamils from South India 
simultaneously. Other group of Tamiils from South India went to Sri Lanka in 19** 
and first half of the 20* century as workers in coffee and tea plantation. Former 
Tamils are called Sri Lankan Tamils, others are Indian Tamils. Although the 
ancestors of both the communities hailed from India, they speak different 
languages, have their own distinctive cultures and follows different faiths. The 
island is small one. The two communities wishing to preserve their individual 
identities have however, over the centuries been in conflict. 
The economy of the country is based on agriculture. Rice is the main food 
crop. Since tea, rubber and coconut are grown extensively, Sri Lanka is a leading 
exporter of these commodities. Due to the close proximity of the two nations, 
whereby India, being an industrialized nation among the world's developing 
countries, is a convenient source of supply for many of the items that Sri Lanka 
needs. 
Strategically also, Sri Lanka is very important. Dr. P. Saran writes, 
"Ceylon is half way house between the East and the West. Its position in the 
Indian Ocean has proved favourable and today Colombo is an important port of 
call for all steamships that cross the Indian ocean from East to West and vice 
versa via Suez Canal". Mr. Senanayake in his statement on defence in the House 
of Representatives also reiterates, "we are in a specially dangerous position 
because we are in one of the strategic highways of the worid. The country, which 
captures Ceylon, could dominate the Indian Ocean. 
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Economical Problems 
In 1977, Sri Lanka was one of the first countries in South Asia to tread the 
path of the market economy. But the '30s saw an escalation in internal strife by 
the Tamil Tigers in the north-east and the Sinhalese rebels in the south. The result 
: the liberation process was put on hold and it only took off after the insurgency in 
the south was curtailed in 1990. 
Now, though the Tamil Tigers are still active, so is the Sri Lankan 
economy. Last year, the economy grew by 5.4 percent, only 0.2 percent below the 
target. Foreign exchange reserves are over Rs. 6,300 crore (SL Rs. 10,000 crore) 
- enough to finance over six months of imports. Foreign investors pumped in 
around Rs. 3,780 crore till November 1993, up fi-om Rs. 126 crore in 1990. 
In 1990, realising that exports would be the mainstay of any reforms 
process, the Sri Lankan Government declared the whole country a fi^ee trade zone. 
This enabled all export units to work in a dut>/ fi^ee environment. Last year, Sri 
Lanka earned Rs. 9,400 crore in foreign exchange of which Rs. 2,520 crore came 
fi-om textile and garments exports and another Rs. 1,890 crore as remittances fi-om 
Sri Lankans working abroad. Tourist arrivals are back to the peak levels of over 
four lakh in 1982. 
All these measures have had a visible impact on Sri Lanka's exports to 
external debt repayment ratio. While its external debt rose fi-om Rs. 14.80 crore in 
1992 to Rs. 1726 crore in '93, the debt repayment ratio is a "manageable" 12 
percent, down fi-om 22 percent in 1985-86. Claims a government official : "This 
is one of the lowest debt servicing ratios amongst all the developing countries". 
The ratio is about 30 percent for India. But the Sri Lankan currency has been 
devaluing steadily, which could partly explain the rising trend in exports. From 
SL Rs. 7 to a dollar in late '70s, the dollar today pegged at SL Rs. 50. 
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Two income inequality phases have appeared in Sri Lanka during the 
1963-86/87 period. First, income inequality declined between 1963 and 1973 
reflecting Sri Lanka's welfare state system. Second, income inequality increased 
between 1973 and 1986/87, particularly within the urban and rural sectors while 
declining in the estate sector after 1973. Intrasectoral inequality contributed more 
than 90 percent of total income inequality in 1986/87. Sectoral differences in 
product specialization, factor income shares, foreign transfers, government 
intervention, and economic performance under the liberalization policies could be 
identified as the main causes behind the income inequality differences among 
sectors. The effects of most of these factors on sectoral and overall inequality are 
empirically examined in this article. For example, on the assumption of fixed 
concentration coefficients, a 10 percent increase in the labour income share in 
each sector" total income will reduce the Gini coefficient by 0.0006, 0.0003, and 
0.007 in the urban, rural and estate sectors, respectively. Furthermore, a lOpercen 
increase in the urban and rural sectors' income share in national income will 
increase the Gini coefficient by 0.005 and 0.004 while the estate sector will 
decrease by 0.001. However, the government has policy options such as the 
provision of foreign job information, promotion of agricultural-based industries, 
and augmentation off its transfers for poor people to reduce income inequality in 
the urban and rural sectors. Attempts must be made to increase estate plantation 
income, not only as a foreign income source, but also as an internal inequality-
reducing instrument. Introduction of a progressive taxation system is necessary to 
reduce intrasectoral income inequality in Sri Lanka, which ust be accompanied by 
the continuation of low intrasectoral inequality to bring the goal of an egalitarian 
society that much closer. 
Income inequality has been increasing in the urban and rural sectors, while 
declining in the estate sector in Sri Lanka since 1973. Although Kuznets 
predicted rising income inequality in the early stage of development, the case of 
Sri Lanka is unique due to central government intervention. 
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Three years before the World Bank embarked on its first structural 
adjustment loan in 1980 Sri Lanka had begun a process of economic 
liberalization. It is therefore on of very few countries that have had nearly two 
decades of reform experience What was achieved has been extensively 
documented to the end of the 1980s The discussion has been detailed and it has 
been very wide-ranging, but why the Sri Lankan reform effort faltered in the 
second half of the decade has still not been adequately explained. 
The presentation is in five sections Section II sets out the theoretical 
standpoint that structures the ensuing discussion, and it is followed by a brief 
outhne of conditions in Sri Lanka at the start of the liberalization process in 1977 
Section III contains an overview of the country's economic policy up to 1993 
Section IV looks at problems encountered by efforts to stabilize the economy, and 
Section V looks at problems of adjustment The last section brings the discussion 
together. 
Stabilization and liberalization/adjustment dominate discussion of 
economic policy in developing countries The orthodox distinction is that 
stabilization has signed to minimize a short-term macroeconomic imbalance 
through the management of the demand side, while structural adjustment boosts 
the supply side realising market forces and through institution changes to increase 
the efficiency of the economy over the medium term Economic liberalization and 
an increasing market orientation are seen as the key of achieving the aims of 
structural adjustment The World Bank and the IMF have additionally sponsored 
stabilization and adjustment, respectively, but during the course of 1980s their 
views have in practice merged and become inter-linked 
Of the two, stabilization is seen in theory to be the first priority, However 
as the macroeconomic environment improves, emphasis is expected to shift to 
economic liberalization and adjustment. Liberalization, it is argued, is more likely 
to suit when macroeconomic problems are of more manageable proportions, the 
economy is less vulnerable to external shocks, and there is a political stability 
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The problem is that this logical progression is rarely attainable. Most countries 
have had to embark on economic liberalization under far more onerous conditions 
- with an increasing balance of payments crisis, low growth, rising fiscal deficits, 
high inflation and some threat of political instability. In many cases, IMF and 
World Bank conditionalities have made external finance contingent on the 
adoption of stabilization program, and liberali.zation and crisis management have 
had to be hand in hand. 
In this situation, when wide-ranging reforms under a structural adjustment 
of age have had to be attempted simultaneously with stabilization efforts, they had 
often creating conflicting demands on economic policy. They have affected 
technical consistency, and they have put pressure on management, administrative 
committees and political support for the government. Reducing the budget deficit 
have in particular proved to be inordinately complex. Nevertheless, theory 
assumed in the different components of a stabilization-cum-liberalization package 
could be implemented consistently and they will logically tend to pull in the same 
assumption. Allowance is made for "gearing problems" with respect to the timing 
and sequencing of a liberalization package, but practical differences that are 
encountered when they are pursued together - problems of political inability, 
overall policy consistency, and institutional i:apacity - receive less attention. 
Hesitancy, digression, or backtracking tend to be interpreted as economical 
mismanagement. 
Indo-Sri Lanka trade has been growing in recent years. In the mid 1990s 
India became the main import supplier of Sri Lanka. Although, Sri Lankan 
exports to India remain small, they have been jjrowing faster than Indian imports 
to Sri Lanka in recent years. The Indo-Sri Lanl«:a Bilateral Free Trade Agreement 
is a further step, by removing existing trade bartiers, to stimulate trade between 
the two nations. While trade brings benefits to both, there is an import competing 
sector in both countries that is still not in a position to face external competition 
fi-om free trade. The agreement allows for a "negative list" to accommodate this 
28 
Introduction 
sector but the preparation of the negative list has proved to be a time consuming 
and intricate exercise. Once the agreement comes into force, the Sri Lankan 
Exports Sector is faced with a challenge to produce goods that are in demand in 
the Indian market. The challenge may be a warm up exercise to face fiiture free 
trade under the South Asia Trade Agreement (SAFTA). 
On 28 December, 1998, an agreement was signed by the governments of 
India and Sri Lanka to initiate a bilateral free trade agreement. This agreement is 
considered as a step towards fast track trade liberaUzation between the two 
countries for selected items of traded goods under either zero tariff or lower tariffs 
than those normally in operations. It is considered further as complimentary to the 
ongoing SAFTA negotiations - where transition to a free trade area is expected to 
begin for South Asia by the year 2001. 
There have been attempts to promote Indo-Sri Lanka trade through a 
formal bilateral agreement since the early 1960s. Trade issues between the two 
countries have also been taken up by the Indo-Lanka joint Commission formed in 
1968. These attempts, however, did not achieve much. In 1991, the Word 
Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) initiated a study to 
explore an operational programme for stimulating Indo-Sri Lanka economic 
cooperation. 
The Ethnic Problems 
Various ethnic problems have made Sri Lanka, a battle ground. The 
citizenship problem was purely a political problem and affected only the Indian 
Tamils in Sri Lanka. But late on, the ethnic problems like, language, education, 
employment, communalism, colonisation of Tamil areas by Sinhalese and religio-
cultural problems came up, which affected Tamil speaking community as a whole, 
including both the Sri Lankan Tamils and Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka. The rigid 
stands taken by the Sinhalese dominated governments in the name of 
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ethnocentricity has made the situation grave and miserable for the Tamil 
community. Important of these problems are discussed here in detail. 
i) Problem of Language 
In Sri Lanka, each ethnic group has its own language. The Sinhalese 
speak Sinhala language brought to the island by migrants from North India about 
2500 years ago. The Tamil is the mother tongue of the Tamils. The Moors speak 
Tamil. Those who are settled in the Sinhalese areas speak English as well as their 
mother tongues. 
A more specific but less complex issue concerns the language rights of the 
Tamils. It can be said that discrimination hi ensuring the linguistic rights of 
minorities, which include principally the right l:o education, manage public affairs 
and communication in their own language, is one of the essential requisites for the 
promotion of national integration and racial unity. In any plural society, the 
minorities are more sensitive towards their linguistic rights as they feel that the 
preservation of their ethnic identity and cultural and economic development are 
based on the guarantee of their language rights. 
The language issue sprang from the tlirust of the nationalist movement 
itself Agitation for the use of Swabhasha (by which was meant Sinhala and 
Tamil) as state language began in the 1920s. It seemed logical that with 
independence the language of the colonial master should be replaced in 
government, administration and education by the language of local people. At 
independence, all political groups were committed to gradually making Sinhala 
and Tamil the official languages of the country in place of English. The demand 
for national language was reasonable as only 6% of the population were English-
educated and the remaining 94% were more or less alienated from the 
administration of the westernised "power elite" in the political, economic and 
cultural spheres. 
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In the beginning agitation was for the use of Swabhasha, which included 
both Sinhalese and Tamil. But the assault on the language rights of the Tamil 
minority was to begin soon. Some politicians look the opportunity to ferment the 
situation. 
The English versus Swabhasha demand, which is related to the 
replacement of a foreign language was more or less acceptable. But the parity of 
Sinhala and Tamil concerned the relative status of two indigenous languages. In 
sum, the Tamil-Sinhala parity issue was substantially more sensitive. At its 
inception, the SLFP had called for the parity of Sinhala and Tamil. But by the end 
of 1995, it was advocating the primacy of Sinhala, as the sole official language in 
the place of English, and shortly afterwards entered into coalition with a few 
smaller parties to form the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (M.E.P.). But the UNP 
was still for parity. So were the main left parties, the Lanka Sama Samaj Party 
(LSSP) and the Communist Party of Ceylon. 
The year 1956 was a landmark in the history of Sri Lanka's political 
development as well as ethnic conflict. Thereafter, Buddhism and the Sinhalese 
language began to receive government patronage to the detriment of the Tamils. 
Besides demanding the creation of a Buddha Sasana (administration) it asked for 
the repeal of the section in the constitution dealing with protective clauses 
pertaining to the minorities. The report which Avas called "Betrayal of Buddhism" 
was a significant document of Buddhist resurgence and became an effective 
political instrument in the hands of the Buddhist chauvinists. 
The Tamils perceived this step as a breach of trust on the part of the 
leadership of dominant political parties because earlier, both the UNP and SLFP 
had supported the substitution of English by Sinhala and Tamil. This was a severe 
blow to Tamil interests, and caused much resentment among them. Thus, with the 
induction of mass politics and the demise of English as the official language, the 
phase of Sinhalese-Tamil competitive co-existence moved into a phase of ethnic 
conflict. 
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In 1966, Chelavanayakam entered into a new pact, this time with Dudley 
Senanayake. But his pact also found its way into dustbin of history. The first 
Republican Constitution of Sri Lanka of 1972 also did not contain adequate 
provisions for safeguarding the interests and llanguage of the Tamil community, 
which had all along stood for regional autonomy under federal constitution, began 
to demand the establishments of a separate Tamil state. 
As the situation was deteriorating day by day, the second Republican 
Constitution of Sri Lanka of 1978 tried to improve the status of Tamil language as 
it declared Tamil a national language along with the Sinhala after retaining latter 
as the only official language of the country. 
In 1987, President Jayewardene has wisely accepted that giving Tamil a 
second rate status way back in 1956, was a refograde step and has contributed in 
a large measure to the alienation of the Tamils fi-om the country's mainstream. It 
was the kind of a mistake Pakistan committed in East Pakistan when it imposed 
Urdu on Bengalis. In an interview a day after signing the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord 
of 29 July, 1987, he said that it was his and his Party's mistake to have backed the 
Sinhala's only demand. 
ii) Problem of Higher Education 
Education has become one of the most controversial issues in ethnic 
relations in Sri Lanka and has clearly been one of infrastructure, whereas the rest 
of the island lacked it, with exception of the Colombo region. And the promotion 
of free education, after independence, helped a phenomenal expansion of primary 
and secondary school enrolment among the Tamils. With Sinhala as the sole 
official language since 1996 those who did not know it, were at a disadvantage. 
Despite an expansion of the administrative jobs in the Sinhala areas were lost to 
them. A similar expansion of ser\dces in the Tamil areas did not help much 
because the proportion of Tamil school - leavers were, more than could be 
absorbed there. So the Tamils tried to meet the new situation by turning out a 
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disproportionately large number of Science graduates aspiring to enter the 
specialized professions. 
The main task before the Sri Lankan government in the beginning of 1990 
was to restructure the educational system for imparting scientific education at the 
school level. The Sri Lankan Tamils maintained their ratio in Science education 
before 1995 with the help of their missionary-ischooling. But they have lost their 
preponderant position following the expansion of secondary education in the 
Sinhalese areas by neglecting the Tamil dominated provinces and transition to 
vernacular teaching fi-om English. With a clear move to restrict considerably 
pupils coming from Tamil minority schools wiith superior laboratory facilities, the 
government systematically ignored the timely needs of the Tamil schools. For 
example, in 1993 most of the Tamil and Muslim schools were functioning without 
English and Science teachers, even though more than 6000 candidates enrolled 
their names during 1990-93. 
The Ministry of Education followed the ratio of 80 (Sinhalese) : (Tamils): 
8 (Muslims for the recruitment of teachers in 1996). The ratio prescribed for 
recruitment of teachers gave over percentage to the Sinhalese as according to the 
population of each ethnic group, the ratio should have been fixed at 72:21:7. 
Despite all the discrimination, those who studied in the Tamil language formed 
the major proportion of those who were admitted to desired disciplines. 
The percentage of the Sinhalese to higher education. For example, a 
formula with different grading marks was used in 1991-92 to admit students in 
Universities. Subsequently, standardization-cum-district quota system, and merit-
cum-district quota scheme were used in 1993, 1994 and 1996 respectively. 
This new system of selection called 'standardization' was introduced in 
1991, when United Front Government took up the position that it was difficult to 
compare the relative standards of Sinhalese medium and Tamil-medium students. 
It may be argued that the primary concern of every democratic government is to 
estabUsh balance between different communities in attaining education, 
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employment and the economic development. It is the responsibility of the 
government to see that the underprivileged are brought upto national mainstream 
with the help of special provisions. 
iii) Communal Problem 
The Buddha passed into nibbana (parinirvana) in 483 B.C. At that very 
moment as Buddha was passing avi^ ay, Vijaya and his seven hundred followers 
from Kalinga (modem Orissa) landed in Sri Lanka, Emperor Ashoka accepted 
Buddhism as a state religion around 260 B.C. King Devanambiya Tissa of Sri 
Lanka accepting Buddhism from Emperor Ashoka around 240 B.C. It must be 
noted that Emperor Ashoka and King Devanambiya Tissa accepted Buddhism as 
state religion facilitated Buddhist Monks dabbling in state affairs, and entering 
into high politics, though it is specifically prohibited by Lord Buddha himself 
The organization of the Sajigha was such that, while the top Buddhist 
hierarchy was very close to the rulers, the rank and file of the monastic order was 
close to the masses. Hence the power of the Buddhist Sangha was very strong. It 
is especially true in Sri Lanka. Every Buddhist constantly recites that I take 
refijge in the Damma and the Sangha. 
The historical chronicles of Sri Lanka have been either written by 
Buddhist Monks themselves or by laymen imder their control. And all the 
chronicles have maintained the notion that Sri Lanka belongs to Sinhalese. In a 
plural society like Sri Lanka, with Sinhalese:, Tamils, Muslims Burghers and 
Christians this notion has only created greaiter complications in the relation 
between these communities and particularly with the Tamils, 
The role of the monks as a pressure group can be traced over the years 
divided it as during ancient medieval and modem periods. 
The history of this period is covered by the Buddhist chronicles 
Deepavamsa and Mahavamsa. The mahavamsa is popular one. It was written by 
a Buddhist Monk called Mahanama in the sixth century A.D. and tells the story of 
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Sri Lanka from the arrival of Vijaya in Sri Lanka in 483B.C. to the Kind 
Mahasenas reign in 352 A.D. 
The Mahavamsa starts with the story of three visits of Lord Buddha to Sri 
Lanka, first to Maiyangane to meet the Yakkas, second to meet the Nagas in 
Nagadipa and third Kalyani (Modem Kelaniya) again to meet the Nagas in 
Nagadipa and third Kalyani (Modem Kelaniya) again to meet the Nagas. 
The Sinhalese backed up by the Buddhist Monks believe that Sri Lanka 
was given to them by the Buddha himself Mahanama, has thus sown the seed of 
racial pride in the Sinhalese and this is still active even after 1500 years. This is 
inspite of the fact that a great historian of Sri Lanka, Dr. Paul E. Pedes, has 
candidly stated that "the Dravidians were in the island long before the arrival of 
Vijaya". The role of the Buddhist Monks in Sri Lanka is cmcial on every 
occasion and in every matter even though it is obviously irrational. 
Medievai Period ; 352 A.D. - 16*^  Century A.D. 
The Culavamsa takes up the story of the Sinhalese where Mahavamsa 
leaves it, that is by 352 A.D. and carries it up to 13the Century A.D. This was 
indeed a dark period for the Sinhalese Cherji, Chola, and Pandya Kings from 
Tamil Nadu attacked the Sinhalese, destroyed the Buddhist places of workshop 
and palaces, and carried away the treasures. The cmel adventurer Magha of 
Kalinga wrought havoc in Sri Lanka. The Monkish scribes and recorded these 
events in racist color. 
In the year 1070 AD. Vijayabahu-I, defeated the Cholas, and 
Parakramabahu-I invaded Tamil Nadu. Culavamsa praises the Sinhala heroes. 
Pujavalinga also narrates the story of the same period, but in a more 
antagonistic manner. SaddharmalankarayEi, written by Dharmakerti of 
Gadaladeniya also tells about the Sinhala/Tamil conflict with vicious undertones 
"with their sacred ash, they look like pumpkins". He makes devotees of Vishnu 
ridicule devotees of Siva, with a sense of humour. 
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Modern Period ; 1659 -1999 A.D. 
Professor Stanley Jayaraj Thambiah has made a penetrating study of the 
role of the Buddhist Monks in Sri Lankan politics and recorded them in his book 
"Buddhism Betrayed". He identifies different Ikind of Buddhist Monks. Viz: 
1. The Revivalist 
2. The Radicals 
3. The Socialists 
4. Political Monks and 
5. The Violent Monks. 
This indicates the gradual fall of the Sri Lankan Buddhist Monks from 
their sacred position of being the sincere followers of the teachings of Buddha to 
the present condition when they are deeply involved in the violent anti-Tamil 
politics in the Island. 
The following pages will record the down fall of the Sri Lankan Buddhist 
Monks: 
The rise of the Portuguese the Dutch and the British Power in Sri Lanka 
had favoured the Christians. Some leading Buddhist Monks feU that this injustice 
must be removed. The lead was given by Mittatuwatte Gnananda Thera and 
Hikkadwa Sumanangala Thera in 1960 A.D. Colonel Olcolt of the Theosophical 
Society supported these Monks. Anagarika Dharmapala joined these Monks and 
became a violent critic of Christians and Tamils. He became the spearhead of the 
attack against anti-Buddhist activities. 
JRadticaiists 
Some Sri Lankan Buddhist Monks go a step further and intervene in 
politics of the right and the left. These Monks are centered around Vidyalankara 
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Privena in Kelaniya. Leaders in this field are Balangoda Ananda Maitreya, and 
Walpola Rahula, who was educated in Colombo University, Calcutta University 
and Sobome in Paris. He wrote a book in 1946, called Bhiksuvage Urumaya (The 
Heritage of Bhikku), and he explained how the Monks had from earliest times 
played a significant political and social role in Ceylon. Under the leadership of 
these Monks, Sri Lankan Buddhist Monks were taking part in Trade Union 
processions and speaking in public platforms. 
Socialists 
Around 1956, to defeat the Senanayakas, Bhandaranaike appealed to the 
Buddhist Monks, Vernacular teachers, Ayurv(;dic Physicians and Sinhala minor 
employees. Buddhist Monks formed an organisation called Eksath Bhikku 
Peramuna (United Front of the Monks) in 1956, and took a leading role in the 
socialist movement and elections. S.W.R.D. Bhandaranaike won the 1956 general 
elections and became Prime Minister. The ksading supporter of Bhandaranaike 
was Buddharabhita Thera, the chief priest of Kalaniya Temple. When 
Bhandaranaike introduced 'Sinhala only' as official language the Buddhist 
Monks hailed him to sky. At the same time when Bhandaranaike in his attempt to 
appease the Tamils entered into Bhandaranaike Chelvanayagam Pact, the 
Buddhist Monks demonstrated in fi-ont of this house. Bhandaranaike tore off the 
pact as a sign of oneness with the Buddhist Monk. Bhandaranaike was shot dead. 
This mdicates the limits to which Sri Lankan Buddhist Monks can go in the field 
of politics 
I*t:flitical J%<tc»n/cs 
As mentioned earlier, there has been an element of politics in the life of Sri 
Lankan Buddhist Monks fi-om the time of Kind Devanambiya Tissa, but this 
involvement of theirs in the politics of the Island has now gained more 
aggressiveness with the rise of the Sri Lankan Tamil problem firom 1956 and after. 
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A close Study carried out by Professor Peter Schalk of Upsella University, Sweden 
brings out the Monks political involvement in bold relief He identifies an 
association called the Mavbima Surakime Vyaparaya (MSV) (The Movement for 
the protection of the Motherland), a joint venture by seven Buddhist Monks 
organizations and other lay Buddhist organizations whose main objective was to 
frustrate the demands of Sri Lankan Tamils, specially their demand for separate 
State. The MSV supported the Sri Lanka Freedom Party. Its leaders were Sophita 
Thera a fiery orator and Palipane Chandanatida Thero, Head of the Asgiriya 
chapter in Kandy. They MSV opposed the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord and bluntly 
objects to any concessions to Tamil, Since the MSV enjoys a wide network of 
supporters all over Sinhalese areas, no Sinhalese politician dares to oppose them, 
on the face of this attitude, on the part of Monks, Thanthai Chelvas advice to the 
Tamils "you must get out of the Clutches of the Sinhalese were aware of the 
lurking dangers to the Tamil due to Sinhala Chauvinism. And the Sinhala leaders 
also, in other to strengthen their dominance, wimted to forge a close link with the 
Buddhist order. The Buddhist Monks also desired such a relation between politics 
and pulpit. The Buddhist Bhikku Amunugama, writes. 
"The 1980s see the rapid politicization of the Sinhala Sangha. All Sinhala 
based political parties have established support organisations among the Sangha. 
They complete for Monks favours by offering them material benefits-official 
residence, Mercedes Benz cars, trips abroad, sl:ate appointments and construction 
of temples. Pirivena and Universities became recruitment centres of Monks for 
different political parties. The ethnic conflict provided an opportunity for Monks 
for openly engaging in social and political activities since it was presented as 
national concern. 
It is interesting to look back at the role of Buddhist Monks on Sri Lankan 
Politics. They have chalked out a cunning, methodical plan to eliminate the 
challenge to Sinhala Buddhist supremacy in Sri Lanka. 
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First they located the weakest minority-Muslims and deah a blow to 
Muslims in 1915 riots. Since then the Muslims have found it wiser to side with 
the Sinhalese. Then the Buddhist Monks took up the Christians. They demanded 
the nationalization of schools. The Catholics v^ e^re preparing to oppose this move. 
Then Cardinal gracias of Bombay stepped in and diffused the situation in 1947, 
Since then the Christians have learnt to toe the Sri Lankan Government line. 
Later in 1948, one million Tamil labourers of Indian origin were disenfranchised. 
The Buddhist Monks of the present generation have gone fiirther to take up 
the gun. In the 1940s, a Sinhala Leftist fire brand Rohana Vihjayaweera had 
started Janatha Vimuki Peramuna (Peoples Liberation Front) (JVP). He prepared 
five lectures on politics, and the last was about the Tamils and Indians. The 
Sinhala youth, as well as the young Buddhist Monks, studied these lectures and 
joined the AT in thousands. In 1971, the .PVP, staged a coup, and Srimavo 
Bhandaranayake crushed it with the help of India. Nearly 20,000 young Sinhalese 
were killed along with some young Buddhist Monks, Many young Buddhist 
Monks were jailed and tortured. The Sri Lanka Freedom Party and the United 
National Party used the powers of the military and the police (in 1971 and 1990) 
to crush the JVP. Around 60,000 young Sinhala boys, girls, and Monks were 
killed. But the AT, is still alive and active, 
A unique feature of the Sri Lankan Buddhist Sangha is the rififed caste 
system in operation among them. The Malwatte and Asgiriya chapters, in Kandy 
are at the very apex of the Buddhist Sangha. The Goigama (farmers) caste only is 
constitutionally admitted into its fold, The Kelanya and Katte temples are 
affiliated to the Malwatta and Asgiriya chapter!?. To overcome this difficulty: the 
depressed caste sent ordination. In the Amarpura in Burma and received 
ordination. In the Amarapura sect in Colombo, the karva (fisherman). The 
Salangama (cinnamon peelers), and Durava (Todday Tappers), are admitted as 
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Monks. Later another delegation was sent to Rammana in Burma and ordination 
was gained. It is located in Colombo and admits depressed caste Monks. 
Thus there are deep caste and political divisions in the Buddhists Sangha 
of Sri Lanka. But when it comes to the matter of Sri Lanka Tamil problem they 
all unite to suppress the Tamils. The Buddhist Monks called on President 
Chandrika and Wickramasingha to close ranks and destroy the Liberation 
Movement of the Tamils. 
When the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is discussed, usually it refers only to 
the trouble between the Sinhalese and the Tamils, but not between the Sinhalese 
and Muslims, The Muslims in Sri Lanka, however, are total one million people 
and there have been conflicts between them and the Sinhalese also. 
The Muslim community in Sri Lanka has a history of at least one thousand 
years, In the early part of eighth century A.D. they began to settle down in the 
coastal areas such as Trincomalee, Jaf&ia, I*uttalam, Colombo, Beruwela and 
Galle. Under the Portuguese Mid the Dutch they were persecuted. 
Under the British rule this community participated in political life; in trade 
such as germs, jewelry, pearl, tea, coconut and mbber. 
The first communal riot in Sri Lanka started between the Sinhalese and 
Muslims in 1915. The riot occurred because the Muslims of Kandy were 
objecting to the playing of music in fi-ont of the Mosque. However, the main 
reason appears to be Sinhalese enmity to Mushm material prosperity and the 
awakening of Sinhalese chauvinistic attitude roused by opposition to the Colonial 
rule. 
In 1976 a major riots broke out between Sinhalese and the Muslims of 
Puttalam. They began in the morning hours oi^ 2"'* February 1976 and no earlier 
than 7* February 1976 could they be brought to an end. Though the Muslims 
suffered extensive damage, but a fake picture of the incidents was presented 
before the Prime Minister Mrs. Bhandaranaike by her officials, who in turn got 
their information from the Puttalam police, who were directly involved and 
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biased, proving that the riots were initiated from the side of Muslims. As soon as 
it was concluded that the Police was behind this communal violence the authority 
was immediately handed over to the army to miaintain law and order in Puttalam. 
iv) Colonisation Problem 
The resettlement of the Sinhalese from the densely populated south-west to 
the sparsely populated Northern and Eastern provinces which the Tamils regard as 
their traditional homelands also has caused ethnic tension between the two 
communities since 1980s. All governments since independence have made efforts 
to reduce Sri Lanka's dependence on rice imports. One means of doing this was 
to construct irrigation schemes or to restore ancient ones in order to encourage 
population in the densely populated Sinhalese iireas to migrate to the north-central 
and eastern regions of the country, which had remained sparsely populated for 
centuries. The problem has been amplified by the Mahaveli development project. 
Most of the irrigated farmland created by the Mahaveli project has been 
distributed to Sinhalese settlers. Most of the jiettlers being Sinhalese, the Tamils 
feared that such colonisation schemes would be used by Sinhalese - dominated 
governments to convert Tamil majority areas in Sinhalese majority areas. This led 
to tensions in these areas. 
The change in the ethnic composition due to colonisation schemes gave 
rise to suspicion and fear among the Tamils, who viewed it as an endeavour to 
"make the Tamils a slave race". The Tamil leaders made it clear that they were 
against only the Government's attempt in converting the Tamils into a minority 
group in northern and eastern provinces by settling the Sinhalese, not against the 
latter, buying lands in Tamil areas. They even sought justifiable places to be 
allotted to the landless local Tamils while selecting colonies in the Tamil 
provinces. But, turning down the Tamils's plea, the Government justified the 
Sinhalese migration from west zone to North and East as their fundamental rights 
granted in the constitution. But, the government's failure in preserving the 
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interest of the citizens and maintaining equality among them in every sphere, 
shows the inherent established idea to secure political gain. 
In later 1990s, deterioration of tranquility in Sri Lanka forced the 
Government of Sri Lanka to come to an understanding with the Tamil United 
Liberation Front (TULF) on the settlement issue. The expected result of 
endeavour was an arrangement of colonies in such a way that the demographic 
composition of the territories will not be distiarbed. But the whole picture was 
changed after the historic violence of July 1993. To make things worse, the 
government had finalised a plan in 1995 to setlle 45,000 Sinhalese families in the 
Tamil North with the ultimate aim of creating parity in the population of 
communities there. The proposal said, "the prospective settlers would be 75% 
ethnic Sinhalese in line with the overall population breakdown of the country". 
Atulathumudali, the National Security Minister, announcing the proposed plan, 
stated that "the only way to root out terrorism was to remove the concept of 
'traditional homeland' and create parity between different communities. He 
added that the new settlers would be given military training and equipped with 
arms to safeguard themselves". The Tamils, on the other hand, made the 
government clear that if the colonization scheme goes through, there can be no 
solution than the division of the country. 
v) Problems of Employment 
At the time of independence, a number of important position in the public 
services and the armed forces were held by the Christians and Ceylon Tamils. 
This fact led the Sinhalese to think that they were denied the employment that was 
due to them in proportion to their population. Therefore, parallel to the demand 
for better educational facilities, the demand for more employment also came up 
from the Sinhalese. Hence, the demand was mel; when Mrs. Bhandarnaike's SLFP 
Government nationalised majority of schools in 1990. 
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Objectively, the grant of ofificial status to Sinhala provided the Sinhala 
educated middle class prospects for better opportunities for employment and 
promotion in public services. In a scarce resource society, with the state being the 
largest employer, the language issue was thus not merely an emotive issue but was 
infused with hard economic implications. The Tamils had dominated the civil 
services and the professions in the past but their share began declining. In 1980, 
Sinhalese who were about 70% of the population held 85% of all the jobs in the 
state sector, 82% in the professional and technical categories, and 83% in the 
administrative and managerial services. The Tamils had only 11% of the public 
sector jobs, 13% of the professional and managerial positions. The Tamils 
constituted 5% of the civil service in 1970. In 1997 no Tamil gained entry to it. 
Till the standardization was introduced in higher education the Tamils had 
a high percentage in technical employment due to their large number in Science 
courses. But they have lost their proportion since 1990. Further, because of the 
language and other barriers to employment in the public sector, quite a lot of 
Tamils were finding self-employment or setting up their own enterprises. All this 
consistent injustice gave an impetus to the Tamil militant, movement in northern 
and eastern part of Sri Lanka. 
vi) Other Problems 
There are other issues which created problems. The problem of 
decentralisation of power is very significant. One of the foremost demands of the 
Tamils from the beginning was to establish a federal system in Sri Lanka. To this 
effect, the Federal Party called a Convention at Trincomalee in 1996 which 
demanded establishment of one or more Tamil linguistic states as a federating unit 
or units enjoying the ardent autonomy 1. Responding to Federal Party's demand, in 
1997 the then Prime Minister, SWRD Bhandamaike signed an agreement with 
Chelavanayakam which provided for the establishment of Regional Councils in 
Sri Lanka. But soon it was abrogated due to mounting Sinhalese pressure on the 
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government. As a result, the Tamils were reverted to resume their cry for 
federalism which gathered its momentum in 1990s. 
For the Tamils, the unitary form of government is the rule by the majority 
community and the minorities are subjected to them. They feel that direct 
participation of the minorities could only be possible in the federal system. In this 
context, it was viewed that, "unless the electorate directly participate in the 
administration, it can not be said that there is ireedom in the country". In contrast 
to it, the Sinhalese perceived it as an attempt to disintegrate the country in the 
future. Dismissing the Sinhalese speculation, the Tamil Parliamentarians 
reaffirmed their dedication in preserving the unity and integrity of the country as 
they said, "we are not asking for the division of Sri Lanka on racial basis. We 
stand for a division of power and thereby achieving unity in diversity". At the 
same time, the Tamils warned the Sinhalese of grave consequences if their share 
was denied to them. In this regard a Member of Parliament said "whatever the 
federal principle was recognised all people gained a lot. Wherever it was denied 
the loss was not only to the minority, but to the majority too". 
In the response to the Tamil federal demand, the United Front Government 
headed by Mrs. Bhandaranaike introduced a 'Political Authority' system as a 
measure of administrative decentralisation in 1993. According to the scheme each 
district was placed under a political authority that was a ruhng party's local MP. 
The Central fund to each district under the decentralisation budget was placed 
under the central of the District Planning Authority (DP A). Administration at the 
district level. An outcome was that the Tamil youth's demand soon became 
secession and not just devolution of power or federal autonomy any more, 
crystallizing into the demand for a sovereign homeland in 1996. 
The in equal financial distribution to the Tamil district was also considered 
to increase the complexity since 1990'. While releasing funds to districts under the 
decentralised budget, it was the general policy of the government to take into 
account such criteria as population of the districts, rate of development of the area, 
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the potential for development and the unemployment rate. But such criteria were 
not followed in the case of the Tamil districts. Thus, the Tamils were denied of 
their due share while the Sinhalese district having same criteria of the Tamil 
districts for allocation were given more than the latter. This had aggravated the 
problem. 
Geologically, Sri Lanka was an extension of the Indian mainland. Its 
religion, its social structure, its political institutions, the language, its agricultural 
economy, al came from India, Its connections with Indian, were never repudiated, 
yet the Sinhalese were something other than the Indian, and this otherness was 
often categorically asserted as being the intrinsic quality of Sinhalese culture. 
The modernity of nationalism lies in the belief that culture and politics should be 
agreeing that each culture must have its own political roof and territorial 
homeland. Therefore, their past continued to have a sense of exclusive identity. 
The 1992 constitution accorded special privileges to Buddhism. According to it, 
all citizens had the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. But 
Buddhism had the 'foremost place'. This discrimination provided complications. 
It is clear from the above discussion that the problem of language, 
education, employment, colonisation of Tamil areas for the Sinhalese and various 
other misunderstandings created fears, which nurtured a feeling of insecurity and 
distrust, particularly amongst the minority community youth. 
SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT ATTITUDE 
Sri Lankans traditionally have not been very mobile, Sri Lanka's 
demographic history shows the extent to wMch population growth has been 
affected by this large scale migration of a mobile Indian labour force. The Tamil 
Tea Estate workers of Indian ancestry were immediately defined as non-
belongers. In 1950 not only estate workers but also Ceylon Tamils, whose history 
on the island stretched 2500 years back, found themselves isolated as non 
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belongers when Mr. Bhandamaike decided to play the Sinhala card in the poUtical 
game. 
Before independence, when Jawahar Lai Nehru visited Sri Lanka in 1939, 
Sir John Kotelawala bluntly told him that "Indians would not be employed in Sri 
Lanka when there were not enough jobs for the local population". 
The most important legislative enactment affecting migration is the 
Immigrants and emigrants Act No. 20 of 1948. This Act repealed the Aliens 
Registration Ordinance No. 30 of 1935 and Passport Ordinance No. 20 of 1923. 
Although the background for the 1948 Act was mainly based on the problem of 
Indian estate labour, it provided for comprehensive regulation of influx and 
exodus of persons to and from the country. It also provided for a controller of 
Immigration and Emigration, and the Department of Immigration and Emigration 
was established in 1949. 
Changes in Government policy on migration from time to time influenced 
legislative developments and the fimctions and activities entrusted to the 
Department of Immigration and Emigration. The other relevant Acts that were 
subsequently passed between 1948 and 1985, nm as follows : 
1. Citizenship Act No. 18 of 1948 
2. Indian and Pakistani Residence (Citizenship) Act No. 34 of 1949, 
3. Compulsory Public Service Act No. 70 of 1961 
4. Indo-Ceylon Agreement (Implementation Act No. 14 of 1967 
5. Temporary Residence Tax Act l^ o^. 15 of 1971 
6. Passport (Regulations) and Exit Permit Act No. 53 of 1971 
7. Foreign Employment Agency Act No. 32 of 1980 
8 Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment Act No. 21 of 1985. 
9. And other Acts are applied 
In this way, there were continuous blows of migrant population in Sri 
Lanka particularly on the Indian migrants. Donoughmore Constitution of 1931 
granted universal adult franchise, but the Sinhalese opposed it as that would grant 
46 
Introduction 
the vote to "Indians" in tea estates qualifying as 'credentials' and the Sinhalese 
would be at disadvantage in Kandy. And this did happen. Out of seven seats in 
Kandyan constituency, six were wotn by Indian Tamil candidates in 1947. But 
after their disfranchisement by enactment of 1948, the people of Indian origin 
were out of the periphery of Ceylon's national politics, though they number 
including some 700,000 plantation labourers, nearly a million. 
Sir John Kotelwala stood up bluntly against Indian Tamils. In his 
autobiography 'A Prime Minister's Diary', he said, "we are certainly not going to 
keep Indians in employment when our own people are unemployed. When it was 
a question of retrenchment, the Indians had to go". Since 1956, cultural ethnicism 
of Sinhalese (Sinhala for Sinhalese) became a central concern of Sri Lankan 
politics. This happened largely because the two major parties United National 
Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Federal Part>' (SLEP) competed for maximum 
support of the dominant Sinhala Community. 
In 1958, the Federal Party (which was formed in 1949 in protest of denial 
of franchise to Indian Tamils) was declared illegal as a preventive measure against 
fiirther deterioration of the crisis and its members were placed in preventive 
detention. In 1964, due to the efforts of the Prime Minister of India, Sri Lai 
Bahadur Shastri, an agreement regarding the citizenship of Indian Tamils in Sri 
Lanka, was signed. The Sri Lankan counteqjart, Mrs, Sirimova Bhandarnaike 
signed it, taking the theoretical liability to implement it effectively, but failed to 
do so in priactice. 
In 1972, new constitution was brought. This made Ceylon a Republic and 
gave a new name, Sri Lanka. So far as the minorities, the Tamil in particular, 
were concerned, the new constitution negatived past commitments and signified 
objectives to counter the most important of the Tamil demands. It entrenched the 
unitary state structure ignoring the Federal Paily's demand for Tamil autonomy 
through a federal set up. The 'Sinhala Only' enactment of 1956 acquired 
constitutional status through section 7 of the Constitution. 
47 
Introduction 
In 1972, Constitution also accorded special privileges to Buddhism. 
According to 5,6, "It shall be the duty of the state to protect and foster Buddhism. 
But at the same time all other rehgions were assured complete freedom of 
worship". With the declaration of the nation as a 'unitary state' the Constitution 
of 1972 rejected the Tamil demand for federation. But the most flagrant act of 
discrimination was the distinction the new constitution made between 'person' 
and 'citizens' in the matter of fundamental rights. 
In 1970s, the Sinhalese sav/ themselves as a deprived-lit vis-a-vis the 
Tamils who had better access to education and employment. The harassment of 
workers of Indian origin after nationalization (company owned tea estates both 
foreign and domestic were nationalized in 1972 and 1975), has been one of the 
major complaints of the CWC, the largest plantation workers' union. It was said 
that, "thousands of Indian labourers, their wives and children had been ejected 
from the nationalized estates and were roaming the countryside begging for food." 
By 1977, the Sri Lankan political system had thus achieved a high degree 
of ethnic centralization in favour of the Sinhala-Buddhist majority. Any 
adjustment of Tamil ethnic interests was seen at the cost of the majority. As a 
result, the Tamils were politically marginalized, and were shown to be irrelevant 
to the system. 
The Jayewardene Government claimed that, "it had done more for the 
Tamils than any previous regime had done, Tamil had been constitutionally 
recognised as a national language along with Sinhalese and made the language of 
administration in Tamil areas. Tamil plantation workers of Indian origin had also 
been granted voting rights in local government elections, and the dual system of 
citizenship - citizen by descent and citizenship by registration - had been done 
away with. 
This conciliatory approach did not, however, materially changed the 
situation and in 1978, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) a militant 
branch of TULF, started sabotaging and killing police officers. The Jayewardene 
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government reacted by enacting the Proscribing of the LITE Law (No. 16 of 
1978), In July 1979, the government repealed this law and replaced it with the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act (No. 48 of 1979) which gave wide powers of search 
and arrest to the poUce and the army. He declared a state of emergency in the 
Tamil areas from July 11,1979. 
Tamil riots in 1977 and 1981 were dififierent from the riots in 1958. These 
were not directed merely against the ethnic Tamils (12.5% of total population) or 
limited to the areas inhabited by them. These riots extended to the Tamils of 
Indian origin (5.5% of total population) living mostly in the plantation districts. 
More than 50,000 Tamil plantation workers had sought asylum in the North. 
They became the targets of organised attacks. The reason for the spreading of the 
violence to cover all segments of the country's Tamil population was that the 
plantation Tamils, though they did not support the succession demand, had begun 
making common cause with the ethnic Tamils. This was disturbing the Sinhalas. 
Again in 1985, there were efforts to solve the crisis. Due to the efforts of 
India, two rounds of talks were held in Thimpii. But these talks failed as both the 
parties were firm on their stands. The Sri Lankan delegation had outrightly 
rejected foreign principles of the Taimil groups for the reason that, "they constitute 
a negation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. They are 
detrimental to a United Lanka and are inimical to the interests of the several 
communities and religion in Sri Lanka". 
At last, due to efforts of Rajiv Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India, an 
accord was signed between India and Sri Lanka. The signatories were Rajiv 
Gandhi and the Sri Lankan President J.R. Ja)fewardene. Under this agreement, 
Indian Peace Keeping Force IPCF) was sent to Sri Lanka to create peace in north-
east provinces. The north and east provinces were merged into one and elections 
were held. 
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TAMIL RESPONSE 
Nineteen eighty three is generally regarded as the year Sri Lanka's ethnic 
conflict began It has since escalated into a fiiU blown civil war, claiming the 
lives of over 58,000 people and not showing any sign of ending. But the roots of 
the problem between the majority Sinhalese and minority Tamils, who have lived 
together for centuries in a 25,000 square mile island home, goes back many years 
before July 1983, when thousands of Tamils first in Colombo and then in many 
other parts of the country were brutally attacked by Sinhalese. 
The 1983 riots did lead to an uprising - by Jaffna Tamil youth led by a 
group of young men disillusioned with the Tamil community's existing political 
leadership. They believed that there was no non-violent way to achieve what they 
perceived to be justice for Tamils. This group of militants would develop within a 
few years into the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). 
The Tigers are led by the 45 year old Velupillai Prabhakaran. From 1972 
various youth groups of Tamils, including Prabhakaran's Tamil New Tigers, had 
become active and had together engaged in a prolonged and continuous campaign 
of disobedience that included murder, bombings, and arson. Although the Tamil 
United Liberation Front (TULF), a grouping of the Federal Party, always 
distanced itself from the violence of the youth but played a major part in electoral 
successes in the north and east. The TULF swept the Tamil areas in the general 
elections of 1977 and claimed a mandate, on the basis of its manifesto, to establish 
a separate state of Tamil Eelam in the Northern and Eastern provinces. By then 
the Tamil New Tigers had become the LTTE and had made its presence felt when 
Prabhakaran personally assassinated Alfred Duraiappah, the Sri Lanka Freedom 
Party (SLFP) mayor of Jaffna, signaling the militants growing disenchantment 
with establishment Tamils. 
Prabhakaran who had indoctrinated young Tamils on the need for a 
separate state, has been able to inspire fanatical devotion to his cause. A core of 
suicide cadres, including the young woman who killed Prime Minister Rajiv 
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Gandhi in India in 1991, has been developed, giving the Tigers a frightening 
terrorist capability. The trademark cyanide capsule that LTTE members wear 
around their neck to bite if captured - so that they will tell no tales even under 
torture - has often been used. 
LTTE's fiindraising abilities (including extortion), especially among 
nearly a million expatriate Tamils living and working in the West, is immense. In 
addition to arms captured form the Sri Lanka army, military hardware including 
sophisticated weapons are regularly procured and landed in was zone under its 
control. Sri Lanka now spends betiA^ een 5 and 6 percent of GDP on the war with 
the Tigers, and the security forces have been expanded from 10,000 in 1983 to 
120,000 today. 
An awesome ability to caiiy out terrorist strikes anywhere within Sri 
Lanka remains a potent weapon in the LTTE armory. Although the security 
forces continue to enjoy a monopoly on air power in the war, the Tigers in recent 
years have acquired an antiaircraft capability and have shot down several 
government aircraft, requiring the air force to fly circuitous sea routes to reach 
airfields in government-controlled northern and eastern areas. 
The extent of terror imposed upon the Sri Lankan polity by the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was brought into focus on the island nation's 52"*^  
Independence Day. For the first time. Independence Day was observed without 
the head of state participating in the official fiinction and unfiirling the national 
flag. With neither President Chandrika Kuimaratunga nor her mother. Prime 
Minister Sirimavo Bhandaranaike, attending the fiinction, it was the lot of the 
Speaker of the Legislature, K.B. Ratnayake, to do the honours at a ceremony 
inaccessible to the public for security reasons. The venue was the Parliament 
complex, not the Independence Square with the usual march pasts. With the 
Opposition United National Party (UNP) and the Tamil parties boycotting the 
event, only a small group of government personalities was present. The 
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Independence Day message to the nation by President Kumaratunga was issued 
from the official abode, "Temple Trees". 
The above picture shows that the Tamils have responded violently 
showing no signs of lack of equipment and finance. Their ruthless dedication 
remains intact. After seventeen yejirs of war and privation, tens of thousands of 
deaths and constant ideological indoctrinations, it may be maladroit for the 
leadership to settle for anything less than what they set out for. 
SOLUTIONS 
With the LTTE preparing a battle of encirclement and annihilation of the 
Sri Lankan troops trapped in Jaffna, the Tamil War in Sri Lanka seems to have 
entered a decisive stage. An important event is unfolding in Sri Lanka and 
military historians, politicians and other concerned people should awake to this 
fact. Having said this we make two bold assertions in this article before looking at 
some of the issues arising from the current phase of the civil war in Sri Lanka. 
These assertions may appear unpopular considering the flak the LTTE is atfracting 
in the press these days. However they stem from an objective observation of the 
military situation prevalent in Northern Sri Lanka today. 
Every War Reaches its Decisive Stage 
My first assertion is that probably the LTTE has won its war against 
Colombo for all practical purposes. The second assertion is that the LTTE, led by 
an extraordinary military leader, has akeady passed into history as one of the most 
efficient military organizations ever created by a resolute people striving for 
political autonomy. Perceptive military historians will explain that this has 
happened because the LTTE has seized the straitegic initiative against Colombo by 
intelligently keeping the military option open even as the latter talked peace. 
Recent events also prove that by the use of heat seeking SAMs and other modem 
weapons the LTTE has effectively neutraUzed the Sri Lankan air force and navy. 
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There are lessons in the audacity of the LTTE for other governments and their 
adversaries to learn in the Indian subcontinent. And in the interest of peace and 
lasting economic development in the subcontinent these lessons can hardly be 
ignored. 
The LTTE is placed in a comfortable position today and no amount of 
invective directed at its leader can detract from this historical fact. Tamil political 
victory is also reflected in the candid admission of the new Lankan President 
according to which Prabhakaran controls one-third of Sri Lanka and two-thirds of 
its coast. Let us not forget that Sri Lanka is a small island country and such 
frankness leaves not very much for its Sinhala majority. More than 20,000 
Lankan troops he besieged and isolated in the Jaffna peninsula and face the 
prospect of surrender, or worse, massacre. The statements issued by the Lankan 
field commanders commanding these men inspire httle confidence against the 
Tigers. In these circumstances Lankan morale is bound to fall with each passing 
day. Press reports also indicate that Colombo might initiate a desperate move to 
relieve its northern garrisons. In short, by meticulously planning and executing the 
encirclement of the Jafl&ia garrisons the LTTE has pushed the Sri Lankan 
Government into a 'no win' situation. Faced with this Hobson's choice what are 
the options left with Colombo? 
The Meaning of War 
The great philosophers of war from the ancient Tsun Tsu to the modem 
Glausewitz have described war as the pursuit of policy by other means. The 
objective of war is not to get caught in attrition but to achieve victory over the 
enemy. However the mere annihilation of the enemy's armed forces does not 
result in complete victory. The political objective of waging war is realized when 
the victor successfiilly imposes his will over the vanquished. Ultimately victory 
in war depends upon correct Jttrategy, vi^ hich emerges from a superior 
understanding of all the elements constituting a particular war. Following this is 
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another principle of war according to which war must be directed and executed by 
statesmen and commanders endowed with exceptional political and military 
qualities. In contemporary history the Vietcong victory against the French, 
Americans and South Vietnamese illustrates the meaning of war in its classic 
sense. In contrast the failures of the Sri Lankan Government in the light of this 
historically received military wisdom become only too apparent. Many 
governments, including the Soviet, have failed to stand up to the time honored 
dictum of war: "know yourself and your enemj^  fight a hundred battles and win a 
hundred victories". 
Options for Colombo 
Considering the totality of the contemporary Sri Lankan scenario, the 
Lankan Government has three options before it. Let us examine them briefly: 
a) The military options 
To increasingly desperate governments the military seems the ultimate 
solution to apparently intractable domestic and foreign problems. Often by 
whipping up nationalist hysteria governments also try to popularize a resort to 
armed forces as the obvious choice of an entire nation. But nothing's further from 
the truth. A careful look at the prevalent situation in northern Sri Lanka 
straightaway precludes the obvious. If the Lankan army launches a gallant 
looking offensive to save its trapped garrisons without adequate air and naval 
support it is more than likely that more of its divisions will be cut off in the north. 
More troops poured mto the pocket of LITE control, provided they 
manage to break the Tamil stranglehold in the first place, will only create the 
Stalingrad of the Sri Lankan army. Going by past experience, mcluding the 
failures of the Indian Army against the LTTE, it can be said without doubt that the 
Sri Lankan army is incapable of sustaining a major offensive or an outflanking 
maneuver against its agile adversary. The LTTE has demonstrated the ability to 
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disperse and concentrate highly mobile formations at the right time and place on 
several occasions in the past. While its enemies do not know the exact strength of 
the LTTE it has rarely failed to exploit in foil the element of surprise, which is 
essential to the type of war it has ruthlessly waged against Colombo. Analysts 
will easily conclude on the basis of modem Sri Lankan military history that the Sri 
Lankan armed forces will not be able to overcome the mastery of mobile war 
which has become the preserve of the LTTE. In short, the preservation of the 
Lankan garrisons trapped in the Jaffna region depends upon the political wisdom 
of their leaders more than anything else. 
b) Foreign armed assistance / intervention 
At present I cannot think of any country' but India which can possibly send 
an expeditionary force to Sri Lanka. Though this would please some shortsighted 
Indian politicians, in the even it will not, and should not, happen. First of all the 
Indian policy makers must remember the LTTE, which is only partly their 
creation, with great bitterness. Secondly the Indian Army will always remember 
its poor record in Jaffna with nothing but regret. Thirdly the Indian armed forces 
with Kashmir on their hands can hardly think of getting involved in Sri Lanka or 
anywhere else for that matter. 
From the past the examples of Vietnam and Afghanistan shine and dictate 
that the Indian Army should never be used to pursue someone else's domestic 
political policies. India and some other countries can supply military hardware to 
Colombo and in fact the latter has already started placing orders in the 
international arms market. But events suggest that imported weapons will not tih 
the strategic balance in Colombo's favor. Furthermore, who can say that the 
Tigers will be unable to disrupt the supply of arms to the harassed and 
demoralized Sri Lankan armed forces. The import of arms will divert fimds from 
the task of development, deepen Lanka's debt problem and prolong the war only 
in favor of the LTTE. Most probably the LTTE is gambling for this. 
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c) The peace option 
Since the import of arms and foreign intervention will push Colombo 
irrevocably towards the military option the Sri Lankan leadership would do well 
to shun them both. Political desperation and military panic at the moment will 
only help the LITE by creating domestic instaibility. President Kumaratunga can 
ill afford all this. Unfortunately the situation leaves the Sri Lankan government 
with very few options. But even with these some peace can return to Sri Lanka. 
Firstly the Lankan Govermnent should revise the agenda of autonomy 
promised to the LITE. A new policy for the Tamil controlled regions of the 
country should be announced and internationally publicized as soon as possible. 
Secondly the Lankan Government shouldl persevere in its attempts to 
diplomatically isolate the LTTE. Thirdly the Sri Lankan navy should intensify its 
patroUing of the Sri Lankan coast to disrupt the supply of arms to the LTTE. 
Some people would go far enough to suggest that Colombo should negotiate with 
the LTTE on the latter's terms. In other words concede the Tamil Eelam and then 
see, and let the world see, whether an organi;zation trained for war can manage 
peace. 
Above all, peace and not war will save the Lankan Government and 
preserve the Sri Lankan nation. The tilt towards the military option will weaken 
the process of democracy and civil society in Sri Lanka. On the other hand by 
losing the war in JaflFna the Sri Lankan Government might manage to win the 
peace in the rest of the country. I do not know whether or how this will happen. 
Only time will tell whether the Lankan leadership is capable of steering its ship 
out of these troubled waters. 
Latest reports confirm that the Sri Lankan air force has resumed the 
bombardment of some LTTE camps but the results of this, from Colombo's point 
of view, will become clear only in the long mm. For the moment, and with the 
LTTE beginning to evolve its air power, our southern neighbour is drifting 
towards another protracted conflict, which v/ill not yield peace. This article 
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inveighs against the military option not onl]? because of the objective factors 
mentioned earlier but also because of the feeling contained in the following lines 
of a song sung by American soldiers in Vietnam which highlights the horror of 
war for everyone involved in it: 
Strafe the town and kill the people. 
Drop napalm in the square. 
Get out early every Sunday 
And catch them at their Morning Prayer. 
The Causes and Consequences of the Communal Violence in Puttalam 
To interpret the communal violence of 1976 in Puttalam merely as a 
reflection of religious tension is to disregard a number of significant economic, 
social and political developments, which influenced the course of events. 
Whatever the offense Muslims gave, the atta.ck upon them was grossly out of 
proportion. The explanation for the said over-reaction is complex. Some 
Sinhalese regarded the Muslims' arrivals as a threat. They were principally not 
abut matters of religious ideology but about commercial concerns, especially the 
impression which they had that they were at a disadvantage against the Muslim 
traders. Earlier, the Muslims in Puttalam had been active in trade, and these 
Muslims were proving an obstacle for the Sinhalese traders. 
Another source of anti-Muslim prejudice stemmed from the spread of 
racial hatred. It is interesting to note that the Sinhalese did not attack the Tamils, 
Malays and the Burghers. The Sinhalese mostly attacked only the business 
premises of the Muslims; and did not attack religious places of worship. It seems 
that the Sinhalese had planned to take over the Muslim premises and run business 
themselves. 
The other point of tension is the fact that the Muslims were in majority in 
Puttalam and they dominated most of the trade. The Sinhalese wanted to drive the 
Muslims away from Puttalam to some remote Jireas so that they could occupy the 
Muslims' shops and business areas. Puttakm was always represented by a 
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Muslim member of Parliament, and the Sinhalese felt that they should have one of 
their own members elected from the Puttalam electorate. 
The Buddhist monk, Kolitha Thero, who was involved in the communal 
violence, was spreading certain rumors in Puttalam and surrounding areas that the 
Muslims were attacking the Sinhalese in the ]?uttalam town. His main intention 
was to take over the Muslim premises and to hand them over to the Sinhalese. 
The monk Kolitha Thero largely sponsored the Buddhists' anti-Muslim campaign. 
The main trouble in Puttalam was initiated by the Sri Lankan Buddhists. 
The attack on the Muslims of Puttalam was grossly out of proportion. The 
explanations for such an over-reaction are complex. The Buddhist anti-Muslim 
campaign was largely sponsored by the Buddhist businessmen who were 
commercial rivals of the Muslims. 
On the whole, it seems, the communial violence in Puttalam was well 
planned and directed against the Muslim by the Buddhist leaders and the clerics in 
which local authorities were involved. The tension was already building up but no 
preventive measures were taken to anticipate the outbreak of violence. The 
timely action by the community leaders and authorities could have controlled the 
situation. It seems that ethnic and political prejudices, if favoured by economic 
imbalances and selfish shortsighted leadership., can transform small frictions into 
larger conflagrations. 
The above discussion makes it clear that Sri Lankan Buddhist Monks have 
drifted away from precepts of the Buddha and are directly involved in Sinhala 
politics. The Buddhism never preached violence. But the Buddhist Sangha is 
determined to keep Sri Lanka solely for power and greater glory of the Sinhala 
Buddhist. It must be mentioned that the politicisation of the Buddhist Monks has 
not helped the state, but only complicated the ethnic problem. 
The first setback to the government's strategy occurred in January 1998. 
Then the LTTE exploded a car bomb at the Temple of the Tooth in Kandy, home 
to the sacred tooth relic of the Buddha. Velupillai Prabakaran, the LTTE's leader. 
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had already rejected the government's proposals. As intended, the bomb 
undermined the President's efforts to convince an already reluctant Sinhalese 
public that the concessions embodied in the constitutional reforms were just and, 
potentially, the basis for a negotiated settlement with the LTTE, The temple 
bombing hardened Sinhalese opinion just when it appeared to be shifting in favour 
of compromise. Commentators had stated at the end of 1997 that the government 
would put its reforms directly to the people in the form of a "nonbinding" 
referendum in early 1998. 
Sri Lanka (known as Ceylon until 1972) is an independent island state in 
the Indian Ocean lying 20 miles off the Southern coast of India between the 
Northern latitudes at 5 55' and 9 50' and the Eastern longitudes at 79 42 and 81 
52. Sri Lanka is a fragment of an ancient Southern continent called Gondwanaland 
by geologists and divided into four Physical Divisions - the Central High Lands, 
the South West, the East, and The Northern Lowlands. The total land area is 
65,609.88 square kilometers. Since gaining independence from UK in 1948, Sri 
Lanka has been striving to secure economic stability a problem accentuated by a 
rapid population growth. The population has doubled in the past 25 years to its 
present total of about 13,000,000 and is increasing. 
Sri Lanka inhabited by varied mixtures of peoples who have immigrated to 
the island at intervals since remote times. The population while consisting of 
nationals of Sri Lanka, is divided into several groups. The two principal linguistic 
groups are the Sinhalese and Tamils. Relations between Sinhalese and Tamil 
have deteriorated in recent years, more as a result of current economic maladies 
and historic reasons. 
Buddhism is the religion of majority in Sri Lanka, followed by Hinduism, 
Christianity and Islam. 92% of the Sinhalese are Buddhists, 90% of Tamils are 
Hindus and 90% of the Christians are Roman Catholics. In other words nine out 
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of ten Sinhalese are Buddhists; nine out of ten Tamils are Hindus; almost all 
Moors are Muslims; and Christians, although constituting the majority of the 
Eurasian category, from a substantial minorities in the other ethnic categories. 
Various ethnic problems have made Sri Lanka, a battle ground. The 
citizenship problem was purely a political problem and affected only the Indian 
Tamils in Sri Lanka. But late on, the ethnic problems like, language, education, 
employment, communalism, colonisation of Tamil areas by Sinhalese and religio-
cultural problems came up, which affected Tamil speaking community as a whole, 
including both the Sri Lankan Tamils and Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka. The rigid 
stands taken by the Sinhalese dominated governments in the name of 
ethnocentricity has made the situation grave and miserable for the Tamil 
community. 
In Sri Lanka, each ethnic group has its own language. The Sinhalese 
speak Sinhala language brought to the island by migrants from North India about 
2500 years ago. The Tamil is the mother tongue of the Tamils. The Moors speak 
Tamil. Those who are settled in the Sinhalese areas speak English as well as their 
mother tongues. 
In the beginning agitation was for the use of Swabhasha, which included 
both Sinhalese and Tamil. But the assault on the language rights of the Tamil 
minority was to begin soon. Some politicians took the opportunity to ferment the 
situation. 
Education has become another most controversial issues in ethnic relations 
in Sri Lanka. 
Employment has been yet another problem in the Independent Sri Lanka. 
At the time of independence, a number of important positions in the public 
services and the armed forces were held by the Christians and Ceylon Tamils. 
This fact led the Sinhalese to think that they were being deprived of employment. 
Therefore, parallel to the demand for better educational facilities, the demand for 
more employment also came up from the Sinhalese. 
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The demand was met by Mrs. Bhandarnaike's SLFP Government. The 
Tamils had dominated the civil services and the professions in the past but their 
share began declining. In 1980, Sinhalese who were about 70% of the population 
held 85% of all the jobs in the state sector, 82% in the professional and technical 
categories, and 83% in the administrative and managerial services. The Tamils 
had only 11% of the public sector jobs, 13% of the professional and managerial 
positions. The Tamils constituted 5% of the civil service in 1970. 
All this consistent injustice gave an impetus to the Tamil militant, 
movement in northern and eastern part of Sri Lanka. 
Nineteen eighty three is generally regarded as the year Sri Lanka's ethnic 
conflict began. It has since escalated into a foil blown civil war, claiming the 
lives of over 58,000 people and not showing amy sign of ending. But the roots of 
the problem between the majority Sinhalese and minority Tamils, who have lived 
together for centuries in a 25,000 square mile island home, goes back many years 
before July 1983, when thousands of Tamils iirst in Colombo and then in many 
other parts of the country were brutally attacked by Sinhalese. 
This led Tamils believe that there was no non-violent way to achieve what 
they perceived to be justice for Tamils. Thus a group of militants developed 
within a few years into the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). 
From 1972 various youth groups of Tamils, including Prabhakaran's Tamil 
New Tigers, had become active and had togisther engaged in a prolonged and 
continuous campaign of disobedience that included murder, bombings, and arson, 
the Tamils have responded violently showing no signs of lack of equipment and 
finance. Their ruthless dedication remains intact. After seventeen years of war 
and privation, tens of thousands of deaths and constant ideological indoctrinations, 
it may be maladroit for the leadership to settle for anything less than what they set 
out for. 
To increasingly desperate governments the military seems the ultimate 
solution to apparently intractable domestic and foreign problems. Often by 
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whipping up nationalist hysteria governments also try to popularize a resort to 
armed forces as the obvious choice of an entire nation. The LITE has 
demonstrated the ability to disperse and concentrate highly mobile formations at 
the right time and place on several occasions in the past. While its enemies do not 
know the exact strength of the LITE it has rarely failed to exploit in full the 
element of surprise, which is essential to the type of war it has ruthlessly waged 
against Colombo. 
This is advisable that the Lankan Government should revise the agenda of 
autonomy promised to the LTTE. A new policy for the Tamil controlled regions 
of the country should be announced and int(;mationally publicized as soon as 
possible. Secondly the Lankan Government should persevere in its attempts to 
diplomatically isolate the LTTE. Thirdly the Sri Lankan navy should intensify its 
patrolling of the Sri Lankan coast to disrupt the supply of arms to the LTTE. 
Some people would go far enough to suggest that Colombo should negotiate with 
the LTTE on the latter's terms. In other words concede the Tamil Eelam and then 
see, and let the world see, whether an organii:ation trained for war can manage 
peace. 
Above all, peace and not war will save the Lankan Government and 
preserve the Sri Lankan nation. The tilt towards the military option will weaken 
the process of democracy and civil society in Sri Lanka. On the other hand by 
losing the war in Jafiha the Sri Lankan Government might manage to win the 
peace in the rest of the country. 
This may be easily concluded that on the basis of modem Sri Lankan 
military history, the Sri Lankan armed forces will not be able to overcome the 
mastery of mobile war which has become the preserve of the LTTE. In short, the 
preservation of the Lankan garrisons trapped in the Jaffiia region depends upon 
the political wisdom of their leaders more than anything else. 
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JAYARAM (P). Sri Lanka: Showing the way. India Today 19, 5; Mar. 15, 1994; 
89-91. 
This paper deals with the Sri Lanka poUtical and economical reforms. In 
1990, realizing that exports would be the mainstay of any reforms process, the Sri 
Lankan Government declared the whole country a free trade zone. This enabled 
all export units to work in a duty free envu-onnient. The government's board of 
investments, which approves all foreign investments in the country takes about 
two days to clear projects in the "promoted" sectors which are purely export-
oriented. Now, though the Tamil Tigers are still active, so is the Sri Lankan 
economy, The explanation for this apparent paradox is surprisingly simple "we 
have compartmentaUzed terrorism and economic growth by delinking the internal 
strife in the north-east from the main economy", say the young Prime Minister of 
Sri Lanka the 44 years old Ranil Wiekramesinghe. 
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KARUNARATINE (H.D.). Sectoral diversity of income inequality in Sri Lanka : 
A desegregated analysis by factor incomes. Regional Development Stupes. 5, 1; 
1999; 1-25. 
This article stressed that the income inequality in the urban, rural and 
estate sectors in Sri Lanka, applying the desegregated Gini coefficient and the 
decomposed their index. Two income inequality phases have appeared in Sri 
Lanka during the 1963-87 period. First, income inequality between 1963 and 
1973 reflecting Sri Lanka's welfaire state system. Second, income inequality 
increased between 1973 and 1987, particularly within the urban and rural sectors 
while declining the estate after 1973. Intra-sectoral inequality contributed more 
than 90% of total income inequality in 1986-87. Sectoral differences in product 
specialization, factor income shares, foreign transfers, government intervention 
and economic performance under the liberalization policies could be identified as 
the main causes behind the income inequality differences among sectors. 
, , GLOBALISATION 
3. COLOMBAGE (S.S.). Continuing process of Globalization in Sri Lanka, Liberal 
Times 7,3, M&T 1999; 31-15. 
This paper stressed that the Sri Lanka has been increasingly participating 
in the globalization process through various policy measures, including relaxation 
of foreign trade and exchange control, reduction of tariffs, encouragement of loans 
mobility and promotion of foreign investment. This helped the country to 
maintain a long-term average GDP growth rate of 5 percent and reduce poverty 
level to around 20 percent of the population. The south Asian region as a whole 
has lagged behind in trade integration compared with other regions, particularly 
East Asia. 
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_, LffiRALE&ATION and GOVERNMENT 
DUNHAM (David); and KELEGAMMA (Saman). Does leadership matter in the 
economic reform process? Liberalization and Governance in Sri Lanka, 1989-93. 
World Development 25, 2; Feb 97; 179-90. 
This article deals with the governance assumptions of the East Asian 
miracle may not be a sufficient or a necessary condition for effective economic 
reform or for solid growth to emerge in other ^^ i^an economics. This paper argues 
that in Sri Lanka, where the state is not strong, disciplined in organizational terms, 
strong political leadership proved critical in the second wave of reform from 
1989-93 even if it was essentially illiberal in the process of implementation. 
Technical and political imperatives are seen to be interrelated and parts of a single 
reform package. 
_, SETTLEMENT 
DUNHAM (David). And KELEGAMA (Saman). Stablization and adjustment: A 
second look at the Sri Lanka experience, 1977-93. The Developing Economics. 
35, 2; June 1997; 166-84. 
This article deals with the three years before the World Bank embarked on 
its first structural adjustment loan in 1980, Sri Lanka had begun a process of 
economic liberaUzation. It is therefore one of very few countries that have had 
nearly two decades of reform experience. What was achieved has been 
extensively documented to the end of the 1980s (Jayawardene et al. 1987; Herring 
1987, Lai and Rajapatirana 1989; Chuthbertson and Athukora 1991; Kelegama 
1993; Authukarola and Jayasurya 1994); The discussion has been detailed and it 
has been very wide-ranging, but why the Sri Lankan reform effort failed in the 
second half of the decade has still not been adequately explained. 
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_, MDM, PEDM role of 
GAMAGE (Siri). Material determination model (MDM) and the political 
ideological determination model (PIDM) in the study of rural classes in Sri Lanka. 
Contemporary South Asia. 5,2; July 96; 165-90. 
This paper explores different way s in which social scientists concerned 
with Sri Lanka rural economy and society have conceptuaUzed social classes. 
MDM is considered to be more usefiil than the PIDM in the study of rural classes 
in Sri Lanka. Its needs to be applied to new situations only after a careful analysis 
of the location specific production and exchange relations. If one Is to apply 
PIDM with credibility, further theoretical and methodological refinement of the 
model is required. Class consciousness and ideology and rural petty bourgeoisie 
and rural working classes emerge out of the material conditions prevaihng in 
society, rather than these being premised by one class over another, or by an 
external force like the state. 
, , SETTLEMENT, POLITICAL PARTIES, 
1998 
7. FERNANDO (Nilan). Sri Lanka in 1998: Political stalemate and economic drift. 
Asian Survey 39,1; Jan. - Feb. 1999; 185-96. 
This paper stressed that the events of 1998 practically extinguished hopes, 
even for Sri Lankan of an early end to the war that were raised by the election of 
President Chandrika Kumaratunga in 1994. President Kumaratunga brought a 
new vigor and sense of urgency for ending the conflict, which she translated in to 
constitutional reforms, for developing power to Sri Lanka's nine provinces and 
granting the Tamil-dominated north-east a fair measure of autonomy. But the 
opposition United National Party (UNP) and the separatist Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have opposed the reform for widely different reasons and 
effectively vetoed the president's "peace package" changes to the constitution 
have to be approved by a two-third majority in parliament an then satisfied in a 
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popular referendum, but Kumaratunga's People's Alliance coaliance has a bare 
parliamentary majority. 
., TRADE POLICY, AGRICULTURE 
ATHUKORALA (Prema-Chandra), KELEGAMA (Saman). Political economy of 
agricultural trade policy: Sri Lanka in the Uniguay Round. Contemporary South 
Asia 7,1; March, 98; 7-26 
This paper deals in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 
(URAA) laid a firm foundation for establishing a rule-based world trading system, 
compassing both developed and developing countries, for agricultural products. 
This paper aims to broaden our understanding about the constraints faced by 
developing countries in their attempts to comply with new URAA rules through a 
comparative base study of Sri Lanka in the South Asian context. We find Sri 
Lanka's poHcy initiatives so far under the URAA to be unique among the South 
Asian countries. In a notable departure fi"om the constant policy responses of the 
other countries, Sri Lanka has made use of window of opportunity provided by the 
URAA to quantificantly liberalize agricultural trade as well as to lock in the going 
trade reform process at low duty leaves. This move has laid the foundation for 
further trade liberalization with the aim of restmcturing the agricultural sector in 
accordance with Sri Lanka's comparative advantage. 
PROBLEM 
SUBRAMANIAN (Nirupama). Sri Lanka : A new package. Frontline. 17, 15; 
Aug. 6,2000; 53-5. 
This paper stresses that the main political formation of Sri Lanka has 
reached a historic consensus on new constitutional documents. But its passage in 
parliament depends on the Tamil parties and the resolution of some outstanding 
issues raised by the United National Party. It was by far the single most important 
development in the political history of Sri Lanka since the Liam Fox Agreement 
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of 1997. But whereas the Fox agreement was an abstract promise of bipartisan 
cooperation in the unpredictable future. Never before have the leaders of the two 
political grouping sat together and thrashed out any issue of national concern, let 
alone the most emotive of them all namely, the sharing of power with the Tamil 
minority. 
1991 
10. SINGER (Marshall R.). Sri Lanka in 1991; Some surprising twists. Asian Survey. 
32, 2; Feb.92; 168 - 74. 
This article states that, the two major events in 1991 promise to have 
significant ramifications for Sri Lankan politics. The first was the assassination of 
Rajeev Gandhi in May; growing evidence points to the responsibility of the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. The assassination can be seen as revenge for 
the conflict between them nd the Indian peacekeeping force in Sri Lanka (1987-
1990). The Indian reaction to the killing has been to cut of support for the LTTE. 
The second major event was the demand for the impeachment of the president 
following an upheaval in the ruling United National Party. This coup attempt has 
significantly weakened the president. 
,1993 
11. KERRAWELLA (Gamini). And SAMARAJIVA (Rohan) Sri Lanka in 1993: 
Eruptions and flow. Asian Survey. 34,2; Feb. 94; 168-74. 
This article deals with the year 1993 was an unusually violence-ridden 
one. President Premadasa was assassinated during a May Day Parade only eight 
days after one of his principal opponents. Given the highly centralized and 
autocratic nature of the administration, the assassination of the president could 
have led to a break down of government. But the system seemed to handle the 
shocks surprisingly well. By the end of the year, the main trends of the post -
1970s period - a growing externally linked economy, a nonpluralist political 
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system that allowed for limited dissent and in apathy conducted war, and 
seemingly intractable problems in negotiating a peaceful settlement - had 
reasserted themselves. Nevertheless the economy showed promising signs 
reflected in GNP which grew at a rate of 5.6 %. 
..ACTION POLICIES 
12. De SILVE (K.M.). Affirmative action policies : The Sri Lanka experience . 
Ethnic Studies Report 15, 2, July. 1997; 245-86. 
This paper deals with the affirmative action policies or preferential politics 
came to Sri Lanka in the 1970, with the left of centre United Front Government, 
and were confined to university admissions. Begirming as preferential policies 
designed to benefit the Sinhalese students, they were transformed in the late 1970s 
to a regional quota system cutting across ethnic and religious identities. The 
introduction and implementation of preferential policies in Sri Lanka's University 
system and the impassioned resistance to modifying them, much less to reversing 
them, provide an excellent introduction to the complex nature of Sri Lanka's 
ethnic conflicts, and the political ramifications of rivalries between Muslim and 
Tamils, division among Tamils and of course, rivalries between Sinhalese and 
Tamils. Despite appearances to the contrary, language policy changes effected in 
the mid - 1950 were not affirmative action policies, nor was any element of 
officially sanctioned ethnic preference in employment in the state sector. 
, , ADMINISTRATION and MANAGEMENT 
13. AHMED (Shafiqul Haque). Administration of decentralized planning in Sri 
Laxika Asia Journal of Public Administration. ll,2;Dec90; 151-69 
This article deals with the combination of Sri Lankan administration and 
Indian also the combination of management. The main rights records of India and 
Sri Lanka in the sphere of the rights have been better than in most Asian countries, 
if one is to forget the existence of the cast system. When compared in the Sri 
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Lanka's cast system has eroded considerably in recent rights in India, the 
government has promulgated various public is combat caste discrimination but has 
been slow to commit in to enforcing these lav?s. 
, ARMED CONFLICT, LITE, SINHALA 
14. HELLMANN - RAJANAYAGMA (Daginar). Sri Lanka : A current perspective. 
Asian Affairs 78,3; Oct.91; 314-29. 
This paper represents the study of current perspective on Sri Lanka is in 
three parts ; first the historical and political background to the current armed 
conflict between Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka; second is a description of 
Journey to Jaffiia with a relief convoy in September 1990; and the three is an 
update to 1991 ith an assessment of the situation after the assassination of Rajeev 
Gandhi. The last part fills in the events from Sept. 1990 until July 1991 the time 
of the battle for Elephant pass. The assassination of Rajeev Gandhi on 21 May 
1991 is discussed shortly together with the question whether the LTTE can be 
blamed for this or not. The evidence until now is inconclusive. 
, , ARMS ASSISTANCE, INDIA, role of 
15. CHERIAN (John). Sri Lanka : Of arms and assistance. Frontline 17, 11: June 9, 
200; 20-1. 
This paper states that the India signals its readiness to prove as yet 
unspecified assistance to ease the situation in Jaffna, the diplomatic and military 
aspects of the crises take on a new dimension. With JafEha coming under pressure 
from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, behind-the-Scene diplomatic efforts 
relating to this situation have intensified. Sri Lankan diplomatic sources, 
however, confirm that not even a single bullet has been received from India since 
the onslaught on Jaffna stated. They say that Pakistan and China were among the 
first national to step in. 
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, BASIC ISSUES 
16. BASTIAMPILLAI (Bestram). Cogent Analysis of Basic Issues facing Sri Lanka, 
Mainstream 27, 52; Aug. 10, 1996; 28-9. 
This paper deals with the human rights, democracy and civil society have 
assumed a vital place in the agenda of the politics of today, whether it be national 
or international. In fact many of donor countries of the North have in recent times 
emphasised the need for good governance because whatever development may 
take place it would not be meaningful to the people unless they are able to enjoy 
democracy and an assurance of their right and liberties, and they remain free of 
any erosion of civil society. 
, , CHALLENGE, 1999 
17, SARAVANAMUTTU (Paikiasothy). Sri Lanica in 1999; The challenge of Peace, 
Government and Developmental. Asian Survey. 30,1; Jan. Feb. 2000; 219-25. 
This paper deals with the immediate task at hand in Sri Lanka is to restore 
public confidence in the ability of the government to rule, maintain civil order, 
and unite the country behind a democratic agenda to better facilitate governance 
and constructive conflict resolution The prospects for change are not especially 
propitious at present nor have they been irretrievably lost. Sri Lanka enters the 
new millennium at a critical juncture in its pohtical and economic evolution. Its 
collective will and capability to heal internal divisions by tolerating difference, 
dissent, and diversity will be decisive in overcoming the current crises and 
realizing its potential in the future. 
, , cmzENsmp 
18, GUNEWARDENE (Victor). Right to Information : Sri Lanka. Liberal Times 7, 
l;Jan. 1991; 31-5. 
This article deals with the 50 years of independence prevailing 
administrative regulations and bureaucratic attitudes make access to government 
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held information difficult for the citizen. A tested means of ensuring that the 
citizen's right to know is effectively guaranteed is by enacting a freedom of 
information law. If the imposition of a restriction is challenged its necessity in 
democratize society, understood to mean a society in which there is freedom, 
pluralism, broad-mindedness and tolerance, will have to be proved. The current 
legal policy leaves a large area of information in the realm of uncertainty. In this 
gray area there is neither a clear rule of assess nor a clear rule of confidentiality. 
_, ACT, 1948 
19. AMITA SHASTRI. Estate Tamils, the Ceylon citizenship Act of 1948 and Sri 
Lankan politics. Contemporary South Asia. 8,1; March 1999; 65-86. 
This article stresses that the conservative, illiberal orientation of Sri 
Lankan nationalist ideology towards the Estate Tamil population has contributed t 
the present ethnic conflict. This orientation was made evident in the citizenship 
and franchise laws Sri Lanka passed soon after independence too exclude the 
plantation Tamil workers from the political nation. The actions of the Sinhalese 
elite were loaded with an anti-working class and ethnically divine content. The 
new laws distorted the pattern of political inventives alignments and party 
competitions in the emerging system, and systematically skewed it to favour the 
mot traditional segment of the Sinhalese electorate. This created an intractable 
dynamic of ethnic outbidding between the two major Sinhalese dominated parties 
to attract the Sinhalese voting base, at the expense of the Sri Lankan Tamil 
minority. This contributed to the letter's aUenation, support for secessionism, and 
the outbreak of ethnic violence and civil ear in the 1970s and 1980s. 
, ,CrVILWAR 
20. De SILVA (Manik). Sri Lanka's Civil War. Current History 8, 15; Dec. 1999; 
428-32. 
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This paper stresses that the major obstacle to any settlement of the conflict 
is the Liberation Tigers' demand far a separate state. Although the guerrillas have 
repeatedly indicated they are open to negotiation on this question, past experience 
has made Colombo wary. But given the war weariness of the Sri Lankan people, 
condition are conductive for peacemaking, although formidable obstacles exist. 
The civil war in Sri Lanka continues, despite the enormous resources deployed to 
military subdue the LTTE, because of the active role India played in fostering the 
early insurgency. India came into the equation in the post-1983 period, justifying 
its role in assuming and training the rebels by pointing to "sub-regional 
sentiments" in Tamil Nadu favoring the "struggle" of fellow Tamils in Sri Lanka. 
., COLONIZATION 
21 GHOSH (Parthas). Myth of 'Tamil Homeland' in Sri Lanka. Mainstream 27, 53; 
June 17, 1995; 23-6. 
This article deals with the last fort>' years and more the two central 
arguments upon which the ideology of Tamil separatism has been built. The 
systematic government there have sponsored re-settlement of Sinhalese people in 
the so-called 'Tamil homeland' thereby chaining the demographic composition 
and political interest. That through the histoiy of the island the better has been 
ruled by two communities - Tamil and Sinhalese with clearly defined territories 
under their respective sovereign control, the T<mi\ ruling the present day northern 
and eastern provinces covering 30 percent of Sri Lankan territory and almost 50% 
of its coastline which includes one of the best natural harbors of the world, 
Trincomaleee, while the Sinhalese rule the remaining part in the south and west, 
' , , TAMIL NADU 
22. KARAT (Prakash). Sri Lanka: In the name of clemency. Frontline 17, 1; Jan. 21, 
2000; 32-6. 
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This paper deals with it is necessary that democratic forces in Tamil Nadu 
mobilise public opinion in favour of a jut solution to the conflict in Sri Lanka, but 
they should ensure that the LTTE does not find a safe haven in the state. Recent 
events in Sri Lanka have once again highlighted the activities of the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam 9LTTE) with their consequent fall-out in India. The 
assassination attempt on President Chandrika Kumaratunga in Colombo is a grim 
reminder of the ruthless methods adopted by the LTTE to eUminate anyone who 
stands in its way. 
, , COMMUNAL VIOLENCE, SINHALA, MUSLIMS, 
1976. 
23. AS AD KAME.. Communal violence between Sinhalese and Muslims in Sri 
Lanka; The Puttalam riots 1976. Journal of Political and Historical SUuties. 37, 
l;Jan. 1993; 55-63. 
This paper stresses that the Muslim community in Sri Lanka has a history 
of at least one thousand years. In the early part of eighth century A.D. they began 
to settle down in the coastal areas such as Trincomalee, Jaffiia, Puttalam, 
Colombo, Beruwela and Gale, Under the Portuguese and the Dutch they were 
persecutes. Later on, during the day, it was understood that the Sinhalese had 
organized themselves into several groups. One such groups was in foil operation 
on the Colombo roads, near the Puttalam Buddhist Centre, under the leadership of 
the Buddist Priest named Kolitha Tliero. The communal trouble even spread to a 
village called Nallachchi which was a Muslim village. 
, , CONFLICT, 1997 
24. FERNANDO (Nilan). Sri Lanka in 1997: Inching toward a durable peace Asian 
Survey 38, 2; Feb. 1998; 142-47. 
This paper deals with ethnic civil war dominated the political scene in Sri 
Lanka in 1997. However, economic growth continued throughout the year 
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especially in the industrial sector. President Kumartunga - Bhandaranaike's 
efforts to reach an early political solution to the civil ear were thwarted by the 
opposition United National Party. The protected civil war as well as the need to 
raise revenue has forced the government to implement structural reforms. The 
major problem area remains constitutional reform. The President needs to muster 
a two-thkds majority in Parliament in order to pass her proposed adoption of a 
federal system. Should the govenmient achieve constitutional reform Tamil rebel 
groups will have to respond in order to mciintain international support. Most 
likely, conflict resolution will justify much bargaining between rebels, the 
government and opposition parties. 
, CONSTITUTIONALISM, CRISIS 
25. TIRUCHELVAM (Neelan). Sri Lanka : Crisis of constitutionalism. Mainstream 
29, 28; Sept. 28,1991; 2-3 
This article deals with the Sri Lanka an pride themselves with 
having the old democracy in Asia, and point to the introduction universe adult 
franchise in 1931, almost two decades before India. They have been periodic 
elections and the peacefiil alternation of political power between two political 
parties, the ruling United National Party and the Opposition Sri Lanka Freedom 
Prty with together command almost 80% of the popular votes. The continuing 
crises in the North-East and the recent development in the south make the Sri 
Lankans realise that there is something deeply flawed not merely in their 
constitutional arrangements, but in their very approach to constitutionalism. 
' , CULTURAL REIATIONS, INDIA 
26. DABRAL (V.K,). Indo-Sri Lanka cultural affmity-n. Third World Impact 10, 
130 , Oct. 1999,22-26 
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This paper deals with the Mauryan empire lasted a little over a hundred 
years and after the death of Ashoka, began to break up in 185 B.C., the last 
Mauryan Ring was killed by Pushyamitra Shunga, who started the Shunga dynasty 
in Magadh. The Shungas were of Brahmin descent and in turn were succeeded by 
the Kanwas in 28 B.C. Bharhut, Sanchi, Samath, Bodh Gaya represent the art of 
this period. Two great cities of Sri Lanka, Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa, are 
testimony to the innumerable steps, monasteries and viharas, dagabas representing 
different phases of time and social milieu. This has further whetted one's 
curiosity in visualizing the trend of Buddist art in context with the Indian view. 
Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa and Sigiriya are known as "ruined cities" of Sri 
Lanka. 
, DEMOCRACY 
27. MATHEWS (Bruce). Trouble in Sri Kotha: Strains and perils of democracy in Sri 
Lanka. The Round Table 322; Apr. 92; 215-27. 
This paper states that, despite socio-economic and political disorder, Sri 
Lanka still sustains a certain political democracy. A discussion of the 
uncertainties of its current dilemma of democratic government which focuses on 
the parliament suggests a dependence of the; executive presidency on internal 
party democracy and co-operation with the legislature. The constitutional crises 
of 1991 demonstrated the resistance to authoritarian rule and the tenacity of 
democratic traditions in Sri Lanka. 
, , ,1947-77 
28. AMITA SHASTRI. Electoral competition and minority alienation in a plurality 
system: Sri Lanka 1947-77. £fector«/sft«/ies. 10,4; Dec. 1991; 326-37. 
This article discusses the Sri Lanka was distinctive amongst the less 
developed countries for having a parliamentaPi? democracy based on regular and 
fair competitive elections. The present article analyse, the long term project that 
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the plurality, system of elections had on the consolidation of political alignment 
and cleavages in Sri Lanka in its post independence period the study finds that 
very success of the plurality system in encouraging popular participation and 
absolute parUamentary majorities served to undermine the democratic aspects of 
the system. 
, LIBERAL PARTY role of 
29. WUESINHA (Rajiva). Liberal Initiatives in Sri Lanka. Liberal Times. 8,1; Jan. 
2000;18-23. 
This article deals with the history of liberalism in Sri Lanka, and in 
particular the contribution of the liberal party. It began as a think tank called the 
council for liberal democracy' the first institution to criticize the all embracing 
statism of the colonial and immediate post-wlonial periods. In espousing fi^ee 
economic policies together with wide-ranging political fi^eedoms the council, and 
then the party, opposed both the authoritarian crony capitalism of the United 
National Party and the socialism of the Sri Lanka Freedom party. Both the parties 
are now, in theory, in favour of wide fi-eedom, but to ensure that these are 
understood and entrenched, there is still need of coherent liberal activism. 
, , ,PREMADASA role of 
30. GUPTA (Anirudha). Neighbours and Bordeirs - III : Premadasa's Brand of 
Democracy. Economic and Political Weekly. 17, 34; Sep. 19,1992; 2028-31. 
This paper deals with the, what was clear the very swift and efficient 
manner in which the government suppressed the murmur of discontent hard at the 
fiineral. Colombo's three important news agencies were warned not to publicise 
the event. When the island, a newspaper owned by Sirimavo Bhandaranaike's Sri 
Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), disputed the official version, the government 
owned daily news attached it or biased reporting. Some blamed president 
Ranasinghe Premadasa for not finding a way of ending the nine-year old war with 
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LITE. But such report could as well as exaggerated. For at the heart of Sri 
Lankan politics, is the image president Premadasa is trying to project for himself 
,ZAMB][A, STUDY 
31. HULME (David), SANDERATNE (Nimal), Jind CROMWELL (Elizabeth), Food 
subsidy policy and democracy : A comparative study of Sri Lanka and Zambia. 
Democratization. 1, 3; Autumn, 94; 461 - 84. 
This article compares the political processes involved in food subsidy 
policies in Sri Lanka and Zambia and relates these experiences to the concept of 
"good government" that western nations have been promoting. The Sri Lankan 
case illustrates the workings of the policy process in a democratic political system, 
albeit on that centralized considerable in the 1980s. The Zambian case illustrates 
the policy process in a one-party state that returned to multi party democracy in 
1991. Despite their very different political systems the nature of food subsidy 
policies show striking similarities: Decades of high levels of non-targeted 
consumer subsidies that placed great demands on public expenditure until radical 
reductions in expenditure occurred following an electoral based change of 
government and multilateral agency pressure. Differences in the process of policy , 
formulation and public accountability are explored. They revel that neither case 
study flinctioned as democratic theory would predict, The conclusion points to 
the inability of the concept of "good government" to model the empirical 
experiences reported in this article. 
, , DEVELOPMENT, WOMEN role of 
32. AMTA SHASTRI. Women in development and politics : The changing situation 
in Sri Lanka. Journal of Developing Societies. 88, 2; July - Oct.92; 194-211. 
This article stresses the situation of v/omen in Sri Lankan society and 
politics has attracted attention for being unusually favorable by third world 
standards. It has approximated, in some respects even surpassed, that of women 
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in more industrially developed societies. Several scholars and commentators have 
directly linked it to the ongoing process of modernization and, in a optimistic but 
uncritical vein, expected it to continue in the future. Argue against his view and 
point out the anomalies of the situation in Sri Lanka from a historical perspective. 
Elucidate the manner in which the contemporary situation evolved in Sri Lanka. 
Identity the merging rends for women's participation in the economic and political 
arena in Sri Lanka in the recent pas and find that the prospects for their increased 
participation do not seem as favourable in the foreseeable future. 
, ELECTION 
33. JAYARUM (P). Sri Lanka : Walking a tightrope. India Today 19, 20; Oct. 31, 
1994;165. 
This article stresses that the new government has done very little says 
United National Party, and a candidate for the presidential elections scheduled for 
November. Politically, it makes sense. It's rare that a new administration actually 
tires to stick to its election manifesto. And this should help woo the electorate for 
the presidential elections, in which Chandrika takes on Dissanaiyake, her main 
rival in a field of six. Political punters say she could have a landslide victory. Be 
that as it may, the points is that support because of the ethnic problem lasts only 
so long as there is some hope that it will be solved. This is a time when 
Chandrika will have to balance short term political expediency with long term 
goals, and in Sri Lanka these days, that tightrope walk is getting very tricky. 
1994 
34. SCHAFFER (Howard B.). Sri Lanka elections of 1994: The Chandrika factor. 
Asian Survey. 35, 5; May 95; 409 - ,25. 
This paper stresses on November 9* 1994 Chandrika Bhandaranaike won 
a landslide victory in the presidential election. The magnetite of her victory 
significantly consolidated the mandate of the people's Alliance as its sought to 
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bring about major political and social reforms. It also greatly strengthened the 
new president's hand as the moved forward to resolve the chronic ethnic problem 
and end the eleven-year civil war it has spawned. The new president has moved 
to restore Sri Lanka's badly eroded democratic institutions and flawed human 
rights record by legislation and changes in government pohcy and style. She is 
also pressing forward with plans to abolish the executive presidency and estabUsh 
a more accountable political system. On the economic front, she seems to be 
maintaining the free market approach she has pledged to follow. But whether a 
settlement in the North-East can brought about is for from clear. The president 
went ahead with the peace process despite a disappointing early reaction from the 
rebel Tigers, who sought to extract fiirther economic and literary concessions 
before entering into the substantive political discussions the government urged, 
ANALYSES, 1994 
35. De SELVA (Chandra R.). Election of 1994 in Sri Lanka : Background and 
analysis. The Round Table. 334; Apr. 95; 207 - 17. 
This paper deals with the parliamentary and presidential elections in 1994 
marked the end of a continuous seventeen yeais rule by the United National Party 
(UNP) and the emergence of a People's Alliance (PA) government. An analysis 
of the elections indicate that factionalism within the UNP and the resolution of the 
leadership issue within the PA wee significant factors in the PA victory. 
Furthermore, the acceptance by the PA of the need for greater devolution of power 
and its support of a liberalized economic pohcy eroded the support of the farmer 
ruling party. Minority parties have become important segments of the new 
governing coalition but despite the emergence of a new charismatic leader in 
President Chandrika Kumaratunga the political situation remains more volatile 
than ever. 
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36. SHAKOOR (FARZANA). Sri Lankaa election 1994: An analysis, Pakistan 
Horizon 47,4; Oct. 94; 77-83 
This paper deals with the experience of government emerging from the 
electoral alliances has not very happy in the South Asian context, where a 
government often failed to complete its terms It has been relatively easy for the 
political parties to from coalitions; howe\er, to turn these coalitions into 
meaningfijl partnerships capable of governing has often appeared beyond their 
means. Though Sri Lanka for the better part of its parliamentary history, has been 
ruled by coalition governments, the alliance of the SLIP and parties of the left rod 
not been very successfiil in the past. The left was made to compromise its stands 
over language and religion because of its alliance with the SLIP and its role as a 
partner of SLFP in the coalition had been subordinate, so that at times it appeared 
as an appendage of the SLIP. It remains to be whatever in the left succeeds to 
remove this image and prove itself as an alternate power base. For SLIP, the 
support of the left would be more crucial this time, since the alliance it leads is 
short fan absolute majority and confrontation with any of its partners would spell 
its doom. 
, BHANDARANAIKE role of 
37. De SILVA (K.M.). Sri Lanka : The Bhandaranaike's politics in the island and 
public life. Reflections on the centenary of S.W.R.D. Bhandarnaike's birth. The 
Round Table 350, Apr. 1999; 241 - 90. 
This article deals with the period of 40 years after S.W.R.D. 
Bhandaranaike's assassination (1959) and the celebration of the century of his 
birth (1999). The Sri Lanka Freedom Party, which he founded in 1951, has been 
in power for 15 years generally as the case of a center left coalition. Uniquely, the 
SLIP remains essentially a family party, the party of the Bhandaranaikes, and a 
political instrument for the perpetuation of the power and influence of that 
political dynasty. From March 1952 to date, every general election has been a 
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contest between the United National Party and the SLIP. Since 1956 the SLIP has 
fought elections as past of a center left coalition with an electoral arrangement 
with parties of the Marxist left. On every occasion, save the presidential election 
of 1982, a Bhandaranaike has led the SLIP. The author traces the connection 
between the family and examines the prospects for the fijture. 
GOVERIflVIENT, POLITICAL PARTIES, 
KUMARATUNGA'S role of 
38. JAYARAM (p). Sri Lanka's a vote of confidence : The poll results have 
strengthened Kumaratunge's hand. India Today. 22, 7; Apr. 15,1997; 93. 
This article stresses the Sri Lankan's election. President Chandrika 
Kumaratunga has something to smile about. The sweeping victory of her people's 
Alliance (PA) a group of parties led by the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLIP) in 
the recent local-bodies' polls is being seen as a vote of confidence in her two-and-
a-half years old govenmient. The results, in an immediate spin-off, strengthen 
Kumaratunge" hand in pushing through a package for the Tamil dominated north-
east. A similar desire for peace appears to be behind the overwhelming Sinhalese 
support to Kumaratunge. The president has impressed many with her bold 
initiatives to end the cycle of violence that has come close to destroying the island 
nation. 
, , , , , UNP role of 
39. JAYARAM (P). Changing Equations : The Ul^ changes course as its chauvinist 
links fails. India Today 19, 8; Apr.30,1994; 128. 
This article stresses that the Easter this year held a symbolic significant for 
Sri Lanka's ruling United National Party (UI^). Shocked by the humiliating 
defeat in the southern provincial council election last fortnight and faced with the 
prospects of a repetition in the coming presidential and parliamentary elections, 
the UNP has decided to resurrect former president Ranasinghe Premadas and 
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focus on his populist politics. However, there is some comfort for him in the fact 
that it was also compromise. The SLFP and its allies view the verdict as a major 
step in their bid for power. "We didn't expect such a tremendous victory", 
Chandrika Bhandarnaike Kumaratunge, the SLFP Chief Minister of the Western 
provincial council. The support to the Alliance opposition provided by this 
crucial segment which goes under the banner of Janta Mitro (People" Front) will 
undoubtedly be a serious challenge to the UNP' in the coming election. 
, KUMABATUNGA, role of 
40. JOSHI (Chaur Lata). Chandrika's Challenge : Sri Lank. For Eastern Economic 
Review 18, 3; Mar. 16,2000; 24. 
This paper deals with the Sri Lanka's president, wounded by a bomb blast, 
contemplates peace talks with the Tamil rebels she accuses of trying to kill her. 
Chandrika Kumaratunga hardly needs reminding of the meaning of confrontation. 
Barely three months ago, Sri Lanka president lost an eye as she narrowly escaped 
assassination by a suicide bomber. The altack bare the trade mark of the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam or LTTE, v/hich has fought a bloody, 17 year 
war to tern Sri Lanka's Tamil speaking areas into a separate state. 
41. SAMBANDAN (V.S). Sri Lanka : A second chance for Kumaratunga. 
Frontline 17,1; Jan, 21,2000; 24 - 5. 
This paper deals with the Chandrika K.umaratunga assumes office as Sri 
Lanka's president for a second term and warns the LTTE that its " days of terrors" 
are numbered. December 1999 was a particularly eventfol month in Sri Lankan 
Politics. There was a high-deibel campaign for the presidential election, and on 
the day it concluded, on December 18, an attempt was made on the Hfe of 
president Chandrika Kumaratunga at a public meeting in Colombo by a suspected 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) suicide bomber. 
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, PARLL J^MENTRY, NGO's 1994 role of 
42, BOURNE (Richard). Observing Sri Lanka's (1994) parliamentary election. The 
Round Table 333; Jan. 95; 67 - 72. 
This paper stresses the Sri Lanka's August 1994 parliamentary election 
focuses on the nature of election monitoring and difficulties in applying the "free 
and fair" test. The author was a member of an international non-governmental 
group, put together to monitor the snap election at the request of two Sri Lankan 
umbrella bodies of NGOs. His conclusions describe the way in which observers 
can become actor in the electoral process., contrast between "official" and 
"unofficial" international observers, the fact that "unfair" elections may produced 
broadly acceptable results, and problems over agreeing a verdict and producing it 
quickly. 
, , , POLITICAL PARTIES role of 
43. HICKMAN (John). Explaining the two-party system in Sri Lanka's National 
Assembly. Contemporary South Asia. 8,1; March 1999; 29-40. 
This paper says that although members of Sri Lanka's National Assembly 
are elected under a proportional representation electoral system, the 1994 and 
1989 elections produced a legislative party system with only two major parties 
Legislative Party System are the result of deviations from proportionality, as the 
degree to which parties fail to receive shares of legislative seats equal to their 
shares of popular votes. This article reports findings from a constituency level 
analysis of the relative effects of effective threshold, ethno-national diversity, 
"Presidentialism" and voter turnout on deviation from proportionality. A 
simulation is used to evaluate the effect of the "bonus seats" provision. The 
finding reveal that the effective threshold and the bonus seats provision, but no 
ethno-national diversity, after deviation from proportionality. 
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44. MOORE (Mick). Thoroughly modern revohitionaries : The JVP in Sri Lanka. 
Modem Asian Studies 27,3; July 93, 593 -642. 
This paper deals with the JVP (People's Liberation Front) come close to 
achieving state power both in late 1988 and mid 1989; it was thereafter destroyed 
very rapidly. The revolutionary strategy used by the JVP was shaped by and 
adapted to the environment - the economic, educational and occupational 
structures, demography and geography - of the Sinhalese areas of Sri Lanka to 
which the movement was confined. The insurrection was very much formed by 
the fact that it took place in a relatively urbanized and commercialized 
environment characterized by a high degree of inter-penetration of societal and 
state institutions. Although the JVP relied very heavily on claims of 
"indigenism", it was in fact very different in organisation and style from what 
might be considered the typical contempora)7 peasant - based Third World -
revolutionary movement. 
45. SCHAFFER (Howard B). Sri Lanka in 1996: Promise and disappointment. Asian 
Survey. 37, 2; Feb.97,143 - 48. 
This paper stresses that developments in 1996 revolved around the ethnic 
conflict, as they had during most of the 13 years since the LTTE launched an 
armed insurgence to establish an independent Tamil State in the north east of the 
island. The peoples Alliance Government stepped up is efforts to resolve the issue 
by a combination of military and political means, the two-pronged strategy it had 
followed since the Tiger's resumed hostilities in April 1995. The PA's aim 
remained to defeat the Tigers in battle while offering mare moderate elements in 
the Tamil Community an opportunity to have a fair share in governing the 
country. 
46. TRIPATHI (Arun V). Steer clear of Chauvinism, Foil Imperialist game in Sri 
Lanka. People's Democracy. 24,21; May 21, 2000; 1-3. 
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This paper deals with the point of time in this period. The LTTE was 
forced to realise that its' sessionist stunt enjoys no sympathy from the mass of the 
people in the region. It agreed to join the process of restoring peace in the country 
through the grant of autonomy for the North and East provinces and even to take 
part in the proposed elections in these provinces. But soon it went back on its 
word, and started the orgy of violence anew. In the last few years after the present 
president, Ms Chandrika Kumaratunge, assumed office, she made several efforts 
to solve this problem by conferring adequate provincial autonomy on the Tamil 
areas, and also tried to bring the LTTE to the negotiating table. But all these 
efforts came to naught because of the LTTE's intransigence. 
, REFEMCNDUM, 1982 
47. OBERST (Robert C.) and WELAGE (Amy). C*uantitiative type of electoral fraud . 
The 1982 Sri Lankan referendum. Campaign and Reform. 5,1; 1990; 49 - 62. 
This paper states that the linkage between racial composition in likelihood 
of electing a black mayor in cities of a particular size and location. Special 
attention is given to cities with a black mayor population in 1980 or with a block 
mayor in 1985. Most block mayor come from cities with block majority 
populations, but most of which such a majority do not have block mayor after 
controlling to city size and percentage of block it is shown that being locality the 
south as a continuing negative impact on the likelihood of electing block mayor in 
block majority cities. The need for the extension of the voting rights act is 
discussed. 
, , ELECTORAL, DIMENSION, GOVERNMENT 
PARTIES role of 
48. MOORE (Mick). "Guided democracy" in Sri Lanka : The electoral dimension. 
Journal of commonwealth and comparative Politics 32,1; March 94, 1-30 
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This paper deals with the Sri Lankan policy has come increasingly to 
remember the "guided democracy" systems of East and Southeast Asia where one 
party rule is effectively institutionalized in a context which is formally multi party 
and competitive. The result of six national elections between 1970 and 1993 are 
examined. They demonstrate that the electoral base of the dominant United 
National Party (UNP) has gradually shifted fiom the more urbanized to the most 
remote and agricultural districts. Data on voter turnout, spoiled votes and the 
timing of shifts in electoral allegiance suggest that this "ruralization" of the UNP 
reflects the increasingly authoritarian character of the polity : the greater capacity 
of the ruling party state machinery to control the electorate in remote rural arias 
where there is little institutional or socio-economic basis for over democratic 
opposition. 
, ETHNIC CONFLICT 
49, DeSILVA (KM). Sri Lanka : Surviving ethnic strife. Journal of democracy. 8,1; 
Jan, 97; 97-111, 
This paper depicts the introduction of Universal Suffrage in 1931 during 
British rule is an important Landmark in Sri Lankan democracy. A democracy 
since independence in 1948, Sri Lanka was the first Asian post-colonial state is 
change its government through the ballot. This has happened on seven occasions 
since 1956. Unused for Asia, Sri Lanka has t\vo principal parties taking turns at 
government. Sharp divisions of opinion on social and economic policy have 
placed enormous pressures on Sri Lankan democracy and a continuing ethnic 
conflicts remains an essential part of the country's politics since the mid 1950's, 
the principal obstacle to political stability especially since the emergence of a 
separate (movement. Sri Lanka democracy had faced and survived a powerfiil 
challenge from an ultra-left nationalist movement. A successful welfare system 
has been a stabilizing force. Despite relatively modest economy growth the 
principal social indicators are well above Lose of a poor country 
87 
Annotated Bibliography 
50. GUNARATNA (rohan). Sri Lanka ; A strategic failure. Frontline 17,10; May 26, 
2000, 63-8. 
This paper deals with the failure of the Sri Lankan security and 
intelligence establishment to evolve a strategy to infiltrate the LITE and disrupt 
its ideological, training, research and operational infrastructure has led t the 
unbridled growth of the separatist organization. The failure of the Sri Lankan 
agencies to penetrate the LITTE is attributed to politicization a flawed 
management system, training, inadequacies, and lack of supervision. The 
government hardly has an opportunity to capture a battlefield suicide attack codes. 
However, by employing sound and timely intelligence, of-the-battlefield suicide 
cadres can be captured during the pre-target phase. 
51. JEYARAJ (D.B.S,). Sri Lanka ; An uncertain future. Frontline 17, 1; Jan. 21, 
2000; 30 - 2. 
This paper deals with the lasting peace in Sri Lanka depends on two 
factors: a consensus between the two major parties and a realisation by the LTTE 
of the futility of pursuing the goal of Eelam and the need for negotiated peace. An 
uncertain political future awaits Sri Lanka as the island-nation enters the 21"' 
century. The years of political violence that the country experienced, particularly 
in the last quarter of the 20* century have created an overwhelming desire for 
peace among its long-suffering people. There is also the country's military. In 
the absence of any tangible interest in politics shown by the top brass, the 
possibility of active military intervention seems remote at least for now. 
52. JEYARAJ (D.B.S,). Sri Lanka : Continuous was or sustainable peace ? Frontline 
17, 4; Mar. 3, 2000; 52. 
This article deals with the extent of terror imposed upon the Sri Lankan's 
polity by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was brought in to focus 
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on the island nations 52"** Independence Day On a che«-less Independence Day, 
President Chandrika Kumaratunga extends on olive branch to the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam, which has stepped up its terror campaign against civilian 
targets in Southern Sri Lanka. For the &st time. Independence Day was observed 
without the head of state participating in the official fonction and unfurling the 
national flag. The general movement of the public too was quite restrained on the 
day. Bombed had exploded in public buses in different parts of the country in the 
days preceding Independence Day. 
53. KARUNATILLAKE (Waruna). Sri Lanka : The battle for serenading. The UNP 
usurps Chandrika's reformist plant. Even Prabakaran gives her a thumbs down. 
Outlook 29, 2; Dec. 13,1999; 36 - 9. 
This article deals with the latest came in the shape of a dramatic statement 
from LTTE chief Velupillai Prabakaran, calling her reign "the worst from of 
tyranny ever suffered by the Tamils". Forced to choose between the 'two evils', 
the Tamils were waiting for a signal from the reclusive militant leaders. The 
president was counting on support from the minority Tamils and Muslims to give 
her second term of office. By calling snap polls for December 21, a year ahead of 
schedule, Chandrika only wanted to wrongful the UNP and make the best of a bad 
situation. 
54. RICHARDSON (John.) Understanding violent conflict in Sri Lanka : How theory 
can help. Ethnic studies Report 9, I, Jan. 1991,40-550. 
This article discusses the system methodology provides a useful way of 
integrating contending schools of thought that propose explanations for violent 
political conflict. This approach has been used to formulate a series of models 
that examine relationships between long-term development and role of conflict in 
several third worid nations including Sri Lanka. For the Sri Lanka case a data-
base comprising 6,5000 political conflict event has been developed among the 
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important factors emphasized by the model are economic performance level of 
deprivation the potential for violent conflict mobilization of opposition 
government ethnicity and the role of militant. 
55. SAMBANDAN (V.S.). Sri Lanka : 4 nation on the brink. Frontline. 17, 11; June 
9, 2000; 4 -11 . 
This paper stresses that the battles rage in northern Sri Lanka, the army is 
emaciated and Tamil separatist militancy marks a territorial high-point. The 
nation faces on uphill task of holding out against the big challenge. More than 
ever before, Sri Lanka is today a nation on the brink. Confronted with the most 
malignant infliction of internal hemorrhage in its decades of countering 
secessionism, the ethnically divided island gears up to face its most severe 
challenge yet. The worst case scenario is one of Sri Lanka being forced to pull 
out its soldiers from the north and losing territorial control over the Peninsula. At 
best, the situation could be contained to a lov/er level of insurgency and attempt 
which has been relentlessly on for the past five years. If the Tigers were to wrest 
territorial control from the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) in the north, the situation in 
the east becomes unpredictable, with the Tigers aheady holding a part of 
Batticaloa district. 
56. SINGER (Marshall R.). Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict: have bomb shattered hopes 
for peace? Asian Survey 36,1 l;Nov.96; 1146 - 55. 
This paper depict that in January 1995, peace talks between the Sri Lankan 
government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were under way 
and a cessation of hostilities on both sides had been achieved. By February 1996, 
bombs had been detonated with a devastating effect. Chandrika Bhandaranaike 
Kumaratunga had been elected as president in December 1994 largely because of 
her promises to end the conflict. However, her government remained 
unresponsive to the set of stringent demands submitted by the LTTE. When the 
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demands were still not met by the April 1995 deadline, a major LTTE offensive 
was launched. In January 1996, a modified version of the peace package was 
submitted to the parliament offering a "federal" solution that would give the 
regions considerable autonomy, but new attribution governmental offensive were 
also ordered. The question remains as to whether the Sinhalese people are 
prepared to go as far as the government has indicated it is willing to go in offering 
devolution of power to the Tamils. 
57. SRI LANKA: After the holocaust. Economics and Political Weekly. 18, 33; Aug. 
13, 1993; 14-5. 
This article discusses that a number of people were killed in the anti Tamil 
riots in Sri Lanka. In coping with this situation the Sri Lanka government has 
been pursuing two objectives. First it has sought to prevent the so called Indian 
Tamils who were taken to Sri Lanka as bonded labours in the 19* century - from 
making common course with the Sri Lanka I'amils; and second it has to initiate 
some dialogue with LTTE. In regard to the first, the government has substantially 
succeeded. In regard to the second, the government which has earlier refiised to 
allow LTTE leader to travel to India has now permitted him to do so. 
58. SUBRAMANIAN (Nirupma). Sri Lankan stand off. Frontline 17, 12; June 23, 
2000; 120-21. 
This paper states that the present lull in the war for Jaffna has, ironically, 
affected the pace process, neither the government nor the LTTE would agree to a 
cease-fire, for such a step would be considered a sign of weakness. Since April, 
there has been little that the Sri Lankan government could take comfort in. 
Beginning with the capture of the Elephant Pass garrison by the LTTE, it was one 
military disaster after another. The biggest blow was India's rebuff of its request 
for military assistance as its security forces were on the brink of collapsing in the 
face of the LTTE's three pronged assault in the Jaffna peninsula. The 
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disappointment was all the more greater because President Chandrika 
Kumaratunga had appeared to have forget closer link with India compared to what 
any of her predecessors had done. 
,1990. 
59. KHALID MALIK. Sri Lanka in 1990. Regional Studies 9, 3, Summer, 91, 
20-44. 
This paper deals with the developments which have occurred in Sri Lanka 
in 1990, all interdependents, are linked to one major problem confronting a 
number of third world states, how to harmonize the interests of various ethnic 
groups in the evolution of a political process within the frame work of a nation 
state. Even after the withdrawal of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) India 
has remained a factors in finding a solution to the ethnic triangle. Fighting was 
renewed between the LITE, the most powerfixl Tamil militant out fit and the 
security forces and the temptation to exclude the tigers from the political 
management of the north east runes country to president Premadasa's "triple C" 
formula of solutions through consensus, compromise and consultation. The fear 
that one community will deprive the other its legitimate socio-political rights 
forms the bedrock of Sri Lanka's communal strife between the Tamils and the 
Sinhalese. 
60. SINGER (Marshall R.). Sri Lanka in 1990 ; The ethnic strife continues. Asian 
Survey. 3\,2,¥eh.9\, 140-5. 
This paper deals with the two of the most important events coloring 1990 
had occurred the previous year : (1) the unsuccessfiil the attempt by the JVP 
overthrow the government; (2) the electoral defeat of Rajiv Gandhi in India which 
lead to the pulling out of the IPKF from Sri Lanka. The IPKF had come to Sri 
Lanka in 1987 to impose a ceasefire and disarm militant Tamil groups. The 
LTTE, moved to the eastern provinces and started a rampage of killings. The Sri 
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Lankan army moved in to crush the Tamils in the Northern provinces and as the 
year ended the bombing continued. 
, BUDDfflST SANGHA 
61. ANUZSIYA (S.), Buddhist clergy as a pressure group in Sri Lankan politics. 
Third World Impact 11, 124; Apr. 2000; 27-31. 
This paper stresses that the organisation of the Sangha was such 
that, while the top Buddhist hierarchy was very close to the rulers, the rank and 
life of the monastic order, was close to the masses. Hence the power of the 
Buddhist Sangha was very strong. It is especially true in Sri Lanka. The Sri 
Lankan Buddhist Monks have drifted away from preaches of the Buddha and are 
directly involved in Sinhala politics. The Buddhism never preached violence. But 
the Buddhist Sangha is determined to keep Sri Lanka solely for power and greater 
glory of the Sinhala Buddhist. It must be mentioned that the politicisation of the 
Bhuddhist Monks has not helped the state, but only complicated the ethnic 
problem. 
, , ,CrVIL, MILITARY 
62. BURGER (Angela S.). Changing civil - military relations in Sri Lanka. Asian 
Survey. 32, 8; Aug. 92; 799 - 56. 
This paper deals with analyzes effort of factions in the ruling United 
National Party to have the military intervene to settle their constitutional conflict 
in September 1991. Discusses constitutional issue, intra and inter-party as well as 
civil military relationships. The incident marks a breach in a critical factor 
underlying uninterrupted civilian rule, namely, the commitment of politics to a 
civilian system of a time when the rapid increase of size of the security forces, 
changes in socialization and leadership, civil war, and linguistic policies have 
weakened the "Wellington Model" and "fusionist" control system. 
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, COLONIZATION, DRY ZONE 
63. PEEBLES (Patrick). Colonization and ethnic conflict in the Dry Zone of Sri 
Lanka. Journal of Asian Studies. 49, l;Feb. 90, 30 - 55. 
This paper deals with Sri Lanka's inability to contain ethnic violence as it 
escalated from Sporadic terrorism to mob violence to civil war in recent years has 
disheartened observers. In retrospect, Sri Lanka lacked effective local institutions 
to integrate society, and the Sinhalese elite relied on welfare and preferential 
policies for the Sinhalese majority to maintain power. These alienated the 
minorities and resulted in Tamil demands for a Separate State. During the United 
National Party (UNP) government of the recently retired President Junius Richard 
Jayewardene (1977-88), both the level of violence and the peace of land 
"colonization" in the Dry Zone increased between the Sinhalese and Tamil 
majority areas as a result of the creation of agricultural settlements in the 
underdeveloped interior of the island. The Dry Zone has been transformed from a 
separately populated and unhealthy but ethnically diverse region to a rapidly 
growing and almost exclusively Sinhalese and Buddhist one. 
, , . Comparative Study 
64 . NORTON (Robert). Ethno-nationalism- and the constitutive powers of cultural 
politics : A comparative study of Sri Lanka and Fiji. Journal of Asian and 
African Studies 28, 3-4; July - Oct.93; 180 - 97. 
This article examine the discussion of Smhalese ethno-nationalism in Sri 
Lanka and indigenous Fijian ethno-nationalism in the pacific island state of Fiji 
shows how the volatility of ethnic conflict can be affected by the particular 
manner in which collective identities are constituted. A distinction is drawn 
between a remonstrative process aggressively focused against "the other", and the 
routine living of identity in established social relations and cultural practices. The 
Sinhalese ethno nationalism which gave rise to violent conflict with the Tamils has 
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been characterized by a rivalries volatility in the political uses of culture that 
derives from deep disjunction's in social and cultural experience under colonial 
rule. This profound dissonance of social and cultural milieus had no parallel Fiji. 
Conflict between indigenous Fijians and immigrant Indian, though strongly based 
in economics and socio cultural deference, has not been intensified by acquiring a 
function in the reconstruction of identities previously suppressed. Manipulation 
of ideals and symbols by Fijian leader to secure popular support has tended to 
reaffirm established frames of routine social and political life within Fijian groups 
rather than being an innovative assertion of distinctiveness in opposition to " the 
other". 
, DEMOCRACY 
65. DeSILVA (K.M.).Sri Lanka : Surviving ethnic strife. Journal of Democracy. 8,1; 
Jan.97,97-111. 
This article stresses that the introduction of universal suffrage in 1931 
during British rule is an important landmark in Sri Lankan democracy. A 
democracy since independence in 1948, Sri Lanka was the first Asian postcolonial 
state to change its government through the ballot. This has happened on seven 
occasions since 1956. Unusual for Asia, Sri Lanka has two principal parties 
taking turns at government. Sharp division of opinion on social and economic 
policy have placed enormous pressures on Sri Lankan democracy; and a 
continuing ethnic conflict remains an essential part of the country's politics since 
mid 1950s, the principal obstacle to political stability especially since the 
emergence of a separatist movement. Sri Lankan democracy has faced and 
survived a powerful challenge from an ultra left nationalist movement. A 
successful welfare system has been a stabilizing. 
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,LTTE 
66, SAHADEVAN (P), On not becoming a democrat : The LITE (Liberation of 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam)'s commitment to amied struggle. International Studies. 
32, 3, July-Sept. 95; 249-79. 
This paper explores the LTTE have clearly demonstrated their preference 
for achieving their goal of a separate Tamil homeland through armed struggle. 
There are many factors which underlie the LTTE's refusal to compromise on its 
Eelam goal and take the path of peach through political negotiations; the foremost 
one is the unrelenting aggressiveness of its leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, who is 
quintessentially a militarist and strongly believes in violence. It is his 
determination to pursue a violent coercive strategy that is responsible for the 
behaviour of the LTTE. Also, the groups strongly believes in the behavior of the 
LTTE. Also, the groups strongly believe in seeking endless vengeance against the 
Sri Lankan's state, consciously nurtures the cult of martyrdom and avocets self-
sacrifice by the Sri Lankan Tamils because its leadership has an adult feeling 
"survivor guilt" through the LTTE is not powerful enough to register a decisive 
victory over the Sri Lankan army has sufficient military capability to protect itself 
from defeat. Finally, the brave LTTE men, who suffer from an accumulated 
feeling of insecurity, are not confident enough about leading a gun-free life in an 
atmosphere of peace, 
, , , ECONOMIC LIBRALIZATION 
67, CHAKRAVARTI (Sudeep), Sri Lanka: Promising proposals. India Today 19, 
21; Nov, 15,1994; 110. 
This article deals with the one of her first major policy announcements 
after becoming prime minister in August, Chandrika Bhandaranaike Kumartunga 
bluntly stated her government's position on economic Liberalisation : it will go 
on. Nothing will change except for streamlining policies that have gone off killer. 
And in many cases, policies would be even more liberal. How the country and its 
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policy makers act and react over the next few years will decide its fate : Whether 
it makes the grade as a booming regional service centre a south Asian Singapore 
clone and a newly industrialised country by the year 2000 or is relegated to the 
club of also-ran economics. The good news is that the Sri Lankan Freedom Party-
led coalition has shed its pre- 1977 socialist and disastrous nationalise -for-the-
good-of-the-people image. 
, ELEPHANT PASS Seized 
68. SAMBANDAN (VS.). Sri Lanka : The fall of Elephant Pass. Frontline 17, 9; 
May, 12, 2000; 124-6. 
This paper deals with the capture of Elephant Pass, Sri Lanka's most 
fortified Army Camp, the LTE appears to have won a crucial victory in the battle 
for JaflEha. The end game in Sri Lanka's protracted separatist war seems to have 
started. The ever-in-flux military map of the island nation underwent its most 
drastic change this April, when the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
took control of the once impregnable Elephant Pas military complex. Elephant 
pass, referred to as EPS in the jargon of the military conflict as the most talked 
about complex. 
, , , FOREIGN POLICY, 1987 
69. BABU (Ramesh B.). Indian intervention in Sri Lanka (1987): Anatomy of a 
failure. World Affairs 2,3; July-Sept. 1998; 132 -45. 
This article deals with the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka in 1987 was 
mistake - an ill considered foreign military intervention in a complex and long 
festering multi ethnic conflict. Premadasa's "invitation" to leave the country, 
though humiliating, was only to expected. The Indian Peace Keeping Force's 
military operation was doomed from the start because it was based on an 
exaggerated notion of India's capabilities and leverage vis-a-vis the LTTE and 
other Tamil ethnic groups. 
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,GOVERNMENT role of 
70, RAJAGOPAL (D.R). Sri Lanka : Premadasa's options narrowing. Mainstream 
29,30; Oct. 12,1991; 17-8. 
This paper stresses the chief of state of Sri Lanka, Ranasinghe Premadasa, 
a self confessed virtuoso of political duels, has over the past three years in office 
fighting an "unwinnable" war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE), which honey-combs his flawed society and wounded civilisation been a 
prisoner of his own rhetoric. As his political track record bears out, Premadasa 
makes a litany of promises but has been unable to deliver, as the current ego 
political reality of his dhama dwipa or "island of justice" suggests, with 
devastating effect. 
1990 
71. SINGER (Marshal R.) Sri Lanka in 1990 : The ethnic strife continues; Asian 
5'«rvev,31,2,Feb,91;140-5. 
This paper depicts that two of the most important events coloring 1990 had 
occurred the previous year : (1) the unsuccessful the attempt by the AT to 
overthrow the government, (2) The electoral defeat of Rajiv Gandhi in India 
which led to the pulling out of the DPKF from Sri Lanka. The IPKF had come to 
Sri Lanka in 1987 to impose a ceasefire and disarm militant Tamil groups. In 
June 1990 the most militant of the Tamil groups, the LTTE, move to the eastern 
provinces and started or rampage of killings. The Sri Lankan army moved in to 
crush Tamils in the Northern provinces and as the year ended bombing continued. 
, , ,roENTITY, TAMIL 
72. SARAVANAMUTTU (P). Instability in Sri Lanka. Survival. Asian Survey 32, 5; 
Sept - Oct, 90; 455 - 568. 
This paper depicts that parliamentary democracy was undermined by the 
sustenance of ethnic identity and unrealized socio-economic inspirations. 
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Constant recourse to populism precluded the formation of a durable national 
identity and fostered armed challenges to political establishment from both the 
Sinhalese and Tamil communities Manifested through misurgency, secession and 
state repression violence was endemic. The anti-systemic threats attracted direct 
external intervention in 1987, when India dispatched a peace keeping force to the 
Tamil secessionist war and signed an accord with Sri Lanka covering the islands 
internal composition and external orientation. Once the withdrawal of the 
unpopular Indian force was secured and the Sinhalese insurgency crushed, 
secessionist War resumed. In the changed strategy environment, neither side can 
win quickly or cheaply. Only a political solution based on independence could 
succeed. 
, INDIA role of 
73. DHUME (Sadanand). Sri Lanka : Taming the Tiger. For Eastern Economic 
Review 18, 5; May 18, 2000; 20 - 1 . 
This article deals with the Tamil victory of Elephant Pass poses a test for 
India as well as the government in Colombo. But New Delhi is resisting military 
involvement. By all accounts it was an unequal context. On one side were more 
than 10,000 Sri Lankan army troops defending Pass, the gateway to the Jaffna. 
The Sri Lankan government rejected a rebal offer of safe passage for government 
troops on May 8. Should palaly be immobilized by Tiger Artillery, military 
observes believe Kankesanturai would fall within 24 hours. 
74. GUNARATNA (Rohan). Sri Lanka : Targets in India ? Frontline 17, 3, Feb. 18, 
2000; 106. 
This article deals with the security threat posed to India by the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is on a par with the threat to the country from the 
numerous other terrorist groups, according to a recent Indian intelligence warning. 
The intelligence agencies have alerted the government of India about the 
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impending threat from the LITE. It has now been revealed that the LTTE, an 
organisation with long - term strategic goals, has developed contingency plans to 
target nuclear facilities in South India. The LTTE has planned to deploy a number 
of suicide squads armed with custom designed improvised explosive devices 
(lEP's) to sabotage these facilities in the event of India stepping up military 
assistance to the government of Sri Lanka, especially by reintroducing its troops 
on Sri Lankan soil. 
75. PANNEERSELVAN (AS,). Sri Lanka ; Metamorphosis of belief Outlook 30, 
20; May 29, 2000; 30 - 4. 
This article deals with the ideology to political of expediency, the DMK 
has changed colors. Its stand on Sri Lankan is just an instance. Within a span of 
fifteen days Karunanidhi has made five contradicting statements. First, after the 
fall of Elephant Pass, he told the state legislative assembly that "India must refrain 
from sending its army to Sri Lanka and from extending arms, ammunition and 
logistical support". He also criticized the center for not taking the state 
government into confidence. But following his visit to New Delhi, he changed 
tack and said that the "would not like to tie the center's hands in taking 
appropriate steps to resolve the crises in Lanka. 
, IPKF role of 
76. JAGANNATHAN (N.S.). IPKF Withdrawl : Anatomy of a Misadventure. 
Mainstream 28, 26; Apr,31, 1990; 3-4. 
This paper stresses that the last soldier of the Indian Peace Keeping Force 
(IPKF) in Sri Lanka is back home ahead of the revised deadline of March 31, the 
dominant emotion in the country is relief at the end of a misadventure. For the 
IPKF itself it is a welcome end of 32 months of fiustration and heart-break arising 
environment set by political superiors who had not thought though the 
implications of the military obligations they were undertaking. In retrospect, it is 
100 
Annotated Bibliography 
also clear that the top military brass and intelligence agencies had grossly 
underestimated, at least at the beginning, what the EPKF would be up against once 
it landed in the island. 
, JAFFNA. 
77. JEYARAJ (D,B.S.). Battle for Jaffna; A ground level account of the action. 
Frontline 17,11; June 9, 2000; 12-9 
This article states that the Jaffna, as Yarlapanam, in northern Sri Lanka is 
now the main theatre of conflict. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
is now focussing it energies and attention on Jaflftia which is described by its 
political adviser in London, Anton Balasingham, as "the cultural capital of the Sri 
Lankan Tamils" after a string of victories in the northern mainland of the Wanni 
and later in the southeastern part of the Jaffna Peninsula, the LTTE is advancing 
further upwards with the objective of establishing control over the whole region. 
Although there have been several stages of fighting, th entire operation, styled by 
it as "Oyatha Alaigal" continues. 
78. JEYARAJ (D.B.S.). Sri Lanka: A deceptive calm. Frontline 17, 13; July 7, 2000; 
31-2. 
This paper stresses that the relative calm prevails in Jaffna, the LTTE tries 
to raise the expectations of its supporters and the government exudes optimism 
that the army is re-establishing control over the peninsula. The fall of Jaffna have 
left the Sri Lanka shores in view of the slow pace of events in the northern 
battlefront of the island. The much-hyped Jaffna debacle has not taken place so 
far. The fighting the Jaffna peninsula has not escalated to the expected levels, 
while the civilian predicament is noteworthy and pathetic. In the midst of the over 
all yet deceptive calm prevails in Jaffiia, two spurts of military activity occurred. 
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, LANGUAGE. 
79. DeSILVA (KM). Coming fiill circle : The politics of language in Sri Lanka, 
1943-1946. Ethnic studies Report 14,1; Jan.96; 11-48. 
This article deals with the principles of post colonial policy in Sri Lanka 
were settled in 1943-1944, four years before independence. English was to be 
replaces as the official language by Sinhalese and Tamil by the mid 1950s. This 
settlement was unilaterally repudiated in 1956 and Sinhalese elevated to the status 
of sole official language. The conflict that erupted over language policy in 1956 
marked the beginnings of Sri Lanka's current ethnic conflict. However, the 
rhetoric on Sinhalese as the national language did not reflect the reality, the 
adjustment and modifications made as early 1958 and in 1966 and 1978, which 
resulted in a virtual parity of status for the two languages. The de facto situation 
was converted to a de jure one throw the 1978 constitution and the 16* 
amendment to it approved in 1988. 
, , , LITE. 
80. FATHERS (Michael). Who speaks for peace ? As the brutal leader of the Tigers 
silences all critics, Sri Lanka's moderate Tamils find they have no voice. Time. 
155, 22, June 5, 2000; 21. 
This paper stresses that the Tamil Tigers insurgents tighten their grip 
around Jaffna town, Prabhakaran supreme leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE), is taking his struggle online. But what about those Sri Lankan 
Tamils at home and in exile who are not convinced that a Tigers victory would 
usher in a new era of racial harmony, democracy and fi^eedom? Perumal himself 
is a marked man. He and a group of foreigner Tamil Guerilla leaders decided to 
support Sri Lankan president Chandrika Kumaratunga's bid for a negotiated 
settlement based on limited regional autonomy for Tamils. 
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81. GUNARATNA (Rohan). Sri Lanka : Piercing a security blanket. Frontline 17,9; 
May, 12, 2000; 61-5. 
This paper deals with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam, which is 
waging a separatist war against the Sri Lankan stat, has staged many deadly 
suicide attacks, on the battle field and of it. What makes it such a lethal force, and 
how can the Sri Lankan security forces face the challenge ? The Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has staged about 180 suicide operations since July 1987. 
All these have been within Sri Lanka, with the exception of the assassination of 
former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by Thenmuli Rajaratnam alias Dhanu on 
May 21, 1991. With a few exceptions, the LTTE has claimed responsibility only 
for the suicide-attack operations it has conducted against military targets in Sri 
Lanka's northeastern region. 
82. GUNARATNA (Rohan). Sri Lanka : The LTTE and suicide terrorism. Frontline 
17, 3, Feb. 18, 2000; 106-8. 
This paper deals with the suicide terrorism syndrome which has become 
acute in south Asia, West Asia in the past two decades has, however not driven 
states most affected by the menance to study and uproot it. The LTTE in Sri 
Lanka is among the deadlist exponents of the syndrome. The three suicide attacks 
by the LTTE in Colombo within a sipan of three weeks have revived the "suicide 
bomb syndrome" in Sri Lanka. Amiidst preventive and reactive measures against 
suicide attacks - curfews, large-scale arrests, mobile checkpoints, fighter security 
for vulnerable targts - the threat of another attack looms. 
83. JEYARAJ (D.B.S.). Sri Lanka : A deceptive calm. Frontline 17, 12, June 23, 
2000; 122-25. 
This paper deals with the LTTE advance has come to a half, but that does 
not mean that the army has gained the upper hand. Apparently the Tigers are 
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biding their time to strike harder. The curtain, by no means the final one, seemed 
to have come down on the theatre of conflict in northern Sri Lanka around the end 
of May. After weeks of intensive fighting, a comparative calm had enveloped 
Jaffiia Peninsula by June 2. The sporadic clashes between the Sri Lankan armed 
forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) had become somewhat 
low-key in comparison with the flill scale fighting that occurred earlier. The 
primary cause for this temporary lull was the absence of any noteworthy military 
maneuvers by the LTTE. 
84 JAYARAJ (D.B.S.). Sri Lanka : Another LTTE offensive. Frontline 17, 8; 
Apr.28, 2000, 52-5. 
This article states that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
launches a multi-pronged attack on Sri Lankan military installations in the Jaffna 
peninsula. Large scale fighting has erupted again in the predominantly Tamil 
Jaffna peninsula in the north of Sri Lanka. The latest confrontation began around 
midnight on March 26 when the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
launched a multi pronged offensive on military installation in the peninsula. For 
the people of Sri Lanka factual news about the situation is hard to come by owing 
to the censorship in force. On the other hand, news reports in the print electronic, 
audio and visual Tamil media outlets abroad, along with information gained over 
the telephone fi-om informed sources in Jaffna provide an insight into the LTTE's 
war strategy in the peninsula and related development. 
85. JAYARAM (P.). Sri Lanka; No longer supreme. InMa Today 19, 5; Mar. 15, 
1994; 94. 
This paper states that they dream of a Tamil Eelam his word is law. His 
followers have taken to calling him Chakravorty (emperor) and on his whim 113 
persons have been executed over the past year. But Velupillai Prabhakaran is now 
seeing the seeds of a powerful dissension sprout within the organisation he has up 
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till now held together with iron discipline. In the span of a single year, 
Prabhakaran has lost three of his closest lieutenants. Kittu, the party's spokesman, 
was killed on January 16 last year, when the LITE ship MV Ahat was 
overpowered by the Indian coast Guard. In 1989-90, during negotiations with the 
Sri Lankan government, Mahathya favoured a political solution to the Tamil 
problem against Prabhakaran's conviction that only military might could win 
Eelam for them. The Sri Lankan government has announced civic election in the 
Eastern Province early in March. 
86. JAYARAM (P.). Sri Lanka: The Mvstique cracks. India Today. 19,2, Jan.31, 
1994; 120. 
This paper deals with the any traitor caught passing state secrets to the 
enemy can expect to be sentenced for life or to death. The LTTE chief Vellupillai 
Parabhakaran chose death for Gopalaswamy Mahendrarajah, having decided that 
the former deputy commander had indeed violated the LTTE's code of loyalty by 
passing information to the Indian and Sri Lankan security agencies. That it is not 
easy task for the LTTE to try Mahendrarajah, popularly known as Mahattaya 
(Sinhalese for gentleman), was borne out by single factor - it had to create a kind 
of euphoria that help eclipse the embarrassment of his trial and the consequent 
execution on the extraordinary charge of being an agent of India's research and 
analysis wing and the Sri Lankan National Intelligence Bureau. 
87. JOSHI (Manoj). On the razor's edge : The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Sri 
Lanka). Studies in conflict and Terrorism. 19, 1, Jan. - March 96; 19-42. 
This paper deals with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) are a 
guerrilla/Terrorist group representing the minority Tamil Community, fighting for 
an Eelam, or homeland in the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka. The 
group started as a small forty to fifty man outfit in the early 1980s, but has since 
grown to an organisation of several thousand. A unique, feature of its tactics has 
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been the use of suicide commandos for individual assassination as well as mass 
attacks. Between 1987 and 1990, the LITE fought the Indian Army which was 
sent to disarm it as part of an Indian - Sri Lankan agreement. After the Indian 
pullout in 1990, the organisation use a suicide bomber to carry out the 
assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajeev Gandhi. Thereafter Indian 
authorities unraveled a well organized network of safe houses, supporters and 
logistics depots in Tamil Nadu. India maintains a strict naval cordon sanitair 
around the area of conflict, which shows no signs of abating. 
88, MEHTA (Ashok K.). Tackling the Tigers. Seminar 479; July 1999; 42-6. 
This article deals with nearly a decade back, the last batch of the IPKF was 
ceremoniously forced out of Sri Lanka's Trincomalee harbour. A Sri Lankan 
military band played the Indian National anthem followed by Auld Lang Syne. 
Minutes later, the Indian naval troops-ship, INS Magar, shoved off This was the 
cue for Sri Lankas's Defence Minister, Ranjan Wijeratne and Superintendent 
commander R. Premadsa, that all foreign troops had left Sri Lankan soil. Once it 
became clear the LTTE was not going to abide by the ISLA, military operations 
had to be launched, but in a knee-jerk reaction. These were conducted in two 
phase. First, the IPKF had to wrest control of the Jaffna peninsula, including 
Jaffna town, the hear and symbol of Tamil Eelams. 
89. MENON (Ramesh). Sri Lanka : Tiger's last stand. India Today 15,13; July 15, 
1990; 24-32. 
This article deals with the three years after an audacious Indian airdrop 
saved them fi-om impending decimation by a rampaging Sri Lankan Army, the 
fighters of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) are back to square one. 
Sri Lankan Army sources said they were waiting to free there troops from 
operations in the east and also for reinforcements to arrive from Colombo before 
launching a final assault. The new look army, lightly armed in the past, now 
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boasts some armour as well as artillery. Clear patterns were emerging in the 
fighting. Also observing the fighting with interest was the army brass, Indian 
military analyst also believe that unlike the pre 1987 situation the Sri Lankan 
army is now a potent fighting force, 
90, MENON (Ramesh). Tilting the scales : LITE assassination weakens the army 
offensive in Sri Lanka. India Today 17, 23; Dec. 1992; 109. 
This paper deals with the single, dramatic assassination and the Tigers 
seems to have wrested the psychological advantage that the Sri Lankan security 
forces held for several months. The Sri Lankan Muslim Congress, an ally of the 
ruling United National Party (UNP), threatened to withdraw its support and to 
launch a "Jehad" against the Tamils. Tamil United Liberation Front President 
Sivashithamparamblemes the ruling United National Party and the Sri Lankan 
Freedom Party, for failing to arrive at any solution and for lacking the political 
will to solve the problem. People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam 
leader Sidhadthan is pessimistic even about the possibility of a negotiated solution 
: "the army has not been able to weaken the LTTE and the Tigers will not come 
for negotiations, leaving little hope for Tamils". A continuing stalemate is the 
bitter truth. 
91. MITRA (Anirudhya). LTTE : Back in Business. India Today 17, 7, Apr. 15, 
1992; 45-7. 
This paper deals with the retreat is over and a new battle is about the 
begin. Having ticked the money wounds inflicted upon his organization afl:er the 
Rajeev Gandhi assassination lay May, LTTE Supremo Velupillai Pirabhakaran 
has sent forth his suicide squad; the black Tigers, to Tamil Nadu to eliminate the 
biggest torn in his flesh. The militant has revived wireless communication 
between Tam Nadu and Jaffna. Surprising in view of the intensive damage that 
intelligence agencies had done to the LTTE communication network, the supply 
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line, cadres and support base after the assassination. The Tiger's desperation 
stems from its dire straits at home, For one, the, Indian letter rotary, seeking wide-
ranging details about Parabhakaran. 
92. SAMBANDAN (V.S.). Sri Lanka : Advantage LTTE. Frontline 17, 10, May 26, 
2000; 4-9. 
This article states that the military gains made by the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam in recent weeks have taken it within striking distance of Jaffna. As a 
beleaguered Sri Lankan government resolves to fight on and appeals for help from 
"friendly countries", India face a serious pohcy dilemma. Sri Lanka was in war 
mode in the first week of May as the security forces, which have suffered a string 
of military setback in recent weeks, scrambled to contained advances by the 
separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which was moving 
menacingly ahead to take control of the northern Jaffiia peninsula. 
93. SHASHIKUMAR (V.K.). Sri Lanka : Death Stripes. Outlook 30, 18; May 15, 
2000; 22-3, 
This article proved that the thirteen years after the IPKF went into Sri 
Lanka, calls are being made yet again for India to step in. And it's not only the 
fringe anti-development, but also the popular opinion in Sri Lanka which is in 
favour of active Indian involveinent. Even the Buddist clergy in Sri Lanka, which 
had opposed the IPKF, has turned around. The national Sangha Council, an 
umbrella body of monks, was among the first to meet Indian high commissioner, 
Shiv Shanker Menon, asking for Indian intervention. Says Tamil United 
Liberation Front leader K. Sambandan, who lives in virtual confinement with his 
son because of the threat to his life, "India can't continue to be a distant spectator. 
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94. SPAETH (Anthony), People of the lion. Seminar 401; Jan. 1993; 85-6. 
This article deals with the Sinhala's th majority population of this island 
nation in the Indian Ocean, are the people of the lion. It seems a queer description 
: they are small, shy and skittish about their place in the world. On a visit in 
1896, Mark Twain found the Sinhalas disconcertingly delicate, particularly his 
local valet. At heart, it's the tale of the people of the lion and how they were 
made. In the past 44 years, the country leaders have won Western parliamentary 
elections by reviving old myths to create a new national identity. They rooted 
around in the past and achieved the dream of Kasapa ; to rule frame the Hon's 
mouth. Sri Lanka is poor, small population 17 million and off the geopolitical 
map. Since World War-II, the superpower have shown spasmodic interest in its 
strategic harbour at Colombo and Trincomalee, an interest that has faded with the 
end of the cold war. 
95. SUBRAMANIAN (Nirupama). Sri Lanka : A chance for peace. India Today 21, 
11, June 15, 1996; 92-6. 
This paper deals with the 1987 war between the LTTE and Indian troops, 
and in 1990 after the war between the Tigers and the Sri Lankan forces. When 
government troops moved into the town once again in December last year, this is 
to favour this peace again that thousands of Tamils who fled their homes in the 
Valikamam region of the peninsula - under orders from the LTTE after Rivers 
began last October - have now begun returning home from eastern Jaffna. With 
the Tigers retreating guilty, those who had moved out to Chavakacheri and Point 
Pedro have begun returning to their homes in a steady stream. The government 
should atleast involve them in negotiations, other wise peace would remain 
illusory. However, with the government military success, interest in deliberating 
on the political package seems to be flagging at the 21 - member PSC. 
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96. SUBRAMANIAN (Nirupma).Sri Lanka : Terror and hope. Frontline, 17,13, July 
7, 2000; 27-30. 
This paper deals with the amid terrorist attacks by the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam, the major political parties of Sri Lanka come close to a formula that 
they hope will lead to a solution to the ethnic strife. As Colombo seemed to gain 
the confidence at least to maintain a military statement in the Jaffna Peninsula, the 
LTTE resorted to the second strategy for a second time within a weak. The 
separatist groups may have hoped not only to destablise the government but set 
the Sinhalese and Tamil community against each other in the manner of 1983, On 
June 7, a day of much significance for the government, it chose an easy target. It 
was the countries first War Heroes Day and the government had gone all out to 
commemorate it suitably, with president Chandrika Kumartunga personally taking 
the lead, 
97, SURYANARAYAN (V,). Sri Lanka ; Mixed signals. Frontline 16, 27, Jan, 7, 
2000; 25-7. 
This paper deals with the speaking fi"om a position of strength, LTTE 
leader Vellupillai Parabhakaran offers talks, but will be negotiate. A careful 
reading of Parabhakaran's speech brings out the following points: First and 
foremost, the LTTE has catapulted itself to centre stage and Parabakaran is 
speaking from a position of strength. Second Parabakaran has elaborated on the 
LTTE's preconditions for peace talk. Before analysis of the implications of 
Parabakaran's statement, it would be worthwhile to keep in mind the LTTE's 
stance during earlier attempts to resolve the ethnic conflict. The first time the 
LTTE participated in such an exercise, it was (as an integral part of the Eelam 
National Liberation Front) in two rounds of Thimphu talks in July and August 
1985. 
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98. SWAMY (M.R.). Sri Lanka ; In the wake of LITE success in MuUativu. 
Mainstream 11, 54, Sep. 14,1996; 27-8. 
This paper deals with the Sri Lanka is at crossroads. Thirteen years after a 
flash point anti-Tamil carnage helped a nascent Tamil militant campaign to turn 
into fiill fledged insurgency, there is no let up in the violence ravage in the once 
island paradise. The humiliating military rout suffered at the hands of the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in the north-eastern garrison of Mullairivu has 
only brought to the surface the terrible sot from which the country is finding it 
near impossible to extricate itself Gone are the heady days when Sri Lankan 
leader pompously set targets to wipe out the LTE. Unfortunately thanks to a self-
defeating censorship, many Sri Lankan's including in Colombo, have been 
prevented from knowing the full details of the MuUaitvu disaster. But that can be 
no consolation to the Sri Lankan government. 
99. SWAMY NARAYAN (M.R.). Sri Lanka : Wages of courting the LTTE. 
Mainsteam 31, 23; June 5,1993; 28 - 30. 
This article deals with the long after his fiineral, two images of the 
assassinated President Ranasinghe Premadasa will linger on among Sri Lankan's. 
One, an ardent Sinhalese nationalist who was the most vocal among Sri Lankan 
leaders in his opposition to Indian support toTamil Guerrillas. Two, the only 
Sinhalese leader who went out of his way to give legitimacy to the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a move that turned out to be a political blunder for 
him and a military disaster for his island nation. What Premadasa said was indeed 
the truth. Some times in September 1983 India began a massive covert training 
program of the Sri Lankan Tamil drawn from five major militant groups, 
including the LTTE. 
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100. TILAK (Arvind K). Sri Lanka : Ethnic violence. People's Democracy. 24, 22; 
May 28, 2000; 1-3. 
This paper deals with the Lankan ethnic problem and the demand of 
LITE. This will return to that aspect later on. Here one must say that the ethnic 
problem in Sri Lanka does have much to ofifer to the world community to learn 
from, as a number of countries have mixed population and have been facing 
similar problems with specific differences here or there. Fiji is one such example, 
currently in focus. Now the problem has assumed such serious dimensions that no 
body can say with certainly as to what the fate of the Jaffna peninsula is going to 
be. Amid this uncertainly, however, one thing is more than certain - that if the 
LTTE is able to gain control of Jaffoa, it would mean 'a de yure, if not de factor', 
division of Sri Lanka. 
101. WIJESEKERA (Daya). Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE): The Asian 
Mafia. Law Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement. 2, 2; Autumn, 93; 308-17. 
This article proved that, the LTTE has over 10,000 well armed cadres. It 
is a Tamil, Hindu, based secessionist outfit base din the northern province of Sri 
Lanka in proximity to the India's Tamil Nadu Hindu state. Mafia style terrorism 
is their path to a Tamil ethnic state. Evident, it was sponsored, armed, funded and 
provided political count in world lobbies by India and Tamil Nadu Chief 
Ministers. Other terrorist organisations have trained them. The Diaspora of 
Tamils provides the ideal base for drugs smuggling operations. It is even link to 
the drug cartels of Colombia to provide weaponry and foreign expertise in 
exchange for carrying drugs. Elected members of Tamil political groups have 
been killed. LTTE terrorism is transnational. It stands indicated in Indian courts 
for the murder of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. 
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ARMY role of 
102. CHOPARA (Parveen). LITE: Pushed into a comer, India Today 17, 14; July 31, 
1992; 36-42. 
This article deals with the fired by new determination, the Sri Lanka Army 
is pushing ahead with its ferocious onslaught against the Tigers in what could be 
the last chance for a political settlement. The Sri Lankan army claims that if the 
decade - old war seems closer to a finale, as the Tigers fight with their backs to 
the wall, it is mainly because of its own tactical successes in the battlefield. 
Backing the LTTE against a wall, at Palaly airbase, the rat-a-lat of gunfire and the 
pounding of artillery is too close for comfort. A crucial and effective shift in 
strategy, the army's increasing control can be attributed to a crucial change in 
strategy. Tigers exposed as men of straw, army intelligence claims it has 
intercepted messages from LTTE cadres telling their leaders that they are gutting 
their pasts. 
103. JAY ARAM (P.). Turn for the worse : The LTTE exposes the army's weakness 
again. India Today. 18,23; Dec. 15, 1993; 145-47. 
This article states that the Tiger's looted the entire armoury of the 
Pooneryn base, including tanks patrol boats and mortars. It was the worst and the 
most humiliating defeat suffered by the Sri Lankan military at the hands of its 
long standing tormentor, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). But more 
than moiling the military's ego, the fiasco at the northern Pooneryn military base 
raises fundamental security and political questions that the D.B. Wijetunga's 
government. Pooneryn was the sixth military camp to fall to the militants since 
the latest phase of the conflict started after the collapse of the peace talk between 
the government and the LTTE in June 1990. Politically the government has led 
itself to a blind alley, military also the outlook is none to encouraging. 
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, ELEPHANT PASS Siezed 
104. JEYARAJ (DBS), Sri Lanka : The taking of Elephant Pass. Frontline 17, 10; 
May26, 2000; 10-3. 
This paper states that the first time in the history of the 'Tamil Eelam 
War', the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam has seized control of Elephant Pass, 
the gateway to the Jaffna Peninsula. A graphic account of the Tiger's strategy and 
its successful implementation. The full of elephant pass marked the first time in 
the history of the "Tamil Eelam war" that the Asia had come under the LTTE's 
control. The Dutch colonialists first buih a small fortress in 1776, which was 
converted in modern times in to a rest house for tourists. After independence a 
permanent garrison was setup there to check illicit immigration, smuggling and 
unlawful transport timber. 
,GUERRILLAS 
105. BULLION (Alan). Sri Lanka : Peacemaker Tur. The World Today 9, 2 ; Dec. 
1999; 14-5. 
This article deals with the five year ago President Chandrika Kumaratunga 
of Sri Lanka was elected with a mandate to achieve peace with the Tamil Tigers 
guerrillas who are fighting for a separate state in the north of the island. Having 
spent hundreds of millions of dollars on defence, and seen her soldiers continue to 
lose their lives - hundreds died or were injured in attacks in early November -
She is now seeking re-election on an uncompromising policy of military spending 
and no negotiation. The Sinhala regard themselves as a numerical majority in Sri 
Lanka, but an embattled minority within the wider Indian sub-continent, and as 
the keepers of the Thereveda Buddhist traditions. 
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REPORT. 
,JAIN (Commission) 
106. KARUNATILLAKE (Waruna). Sri Lanka : Just Desserts for Big Brother. 
Outlook 3, 52; Dec.22,1997; 42-3. 
This article deals with justice has finally been done. Following the Jain 
Commission report which triggered the fall of the I.K. Gujral government and the 
great debate in India as to which political party gave more support to the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) that's the feeling Sri Lankan are left 
with. People here see the political crises in India after the Jain commission report 
with a sense of glee. They feel that Sri Lanka has had to pay a huge price for 
India's mishandling of the ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka, while India got away scot-
free, They feel that it is high time that India too paid a price, For most Sri 
Lankan, it seemed their worst fears were coming true. 
, , , , PEACE, PROCESS 
107. FATHERS (Michael). Watershed : Sri Lankans pray for a breakthrough that will 
bring peace. Time. 154,25; Oct. 27, 1999, Jan.3, 2000; 80-1. 
This article stresses that the below the surface, however, is another world. 
Some areas, not cleared of Tamil insurgents, are left alone by the army, A dual 
government operates in the gray areas where Colombo's will is not firmly 
estabUshed. People move freely between the check points into and out of LTTE -
controlled areas after showing their identity cards. Foreign aid groups such as 
Medicines sans Frontiers make the trips almost daily. The Tigers scuttled her first 
and only attempt to negotiate, in 1995. In response, she stepped up the war, 
sending the army to seize Jafftia and open a land route through the Tiger-held 
northern area of Wanni. 
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, POLITICAL SOLUTIONS 
108, WATTS (Edward) and SLATER (EUchard). Negotiating Ethnic Conflict in Sri 
Lanka : An analysis of failure of political solutions. Seminar. 383, July 96; 
84-90. 
This article stresses that the analysis failure of 1994-95 peace talks to 
resolve Sri Lankan ethnic crisis, the authors examine in detail the rationales, 
motives and commitment of actors (Sri Lankan Government and LTTE) involved 
in the peace process, complex and interlocking sets of constraints; difficulties in 
reaching a satisfactory devolution agreement; and both sides unrelentingly 
nurturing their commitment to gain strategic advantage. The authors argue in the 
concluding section the need to uphold people's need for peace with a caution that 
persistence of both sides in not conceding strategic ground is bound to result in 
prolonging an unwindable ar or reversion to open warfare. 
, , , ,SINHALA 
109. SURYANARAYAN (V.). Sri Lanka : A country at a crossroads. Frontline 17, 1; 
Jan. 21,2000,26-3. 
This article deals with the any fresh dialogue with the LTTE has to be 
preceded by a Sinhala consensus so that the issues of war and peace are not 
subjected to the vagaries of competitive Sinhala politics. In an emotion-charged 
address to the nation after assuming office for a second term, Sri Lankan president 
Chandrika Kumaratunga referred to the continuing trauma in her life. At the turn 
of the new millennium, Sri Lanka is at a crossroads. Will competitive Sinhala 
politics continue to plague the country? Or will Kumaratunga and 
Wickremasinghe arrive at a consensus on holding negotiations with LTTE an, if 
Parabhakaran continues to be defiant, tackle the LTTE menace jointly. 
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110. WILSON (A, Jeyaratnam). Ethnic strife in Sri Lanka : The politics of space. 
Regional Politics and Policy 3,1; Spring, 93; 144 - 69. 
This paper states that, the Sri Lanka is a multi-ethnic state faced with a 
major crisis in the relation between the two principal ethnic communities, 
Sinhalese and Tamils. This essay outlines the circumstances of the conflicts and 
the reasons for their eruption. Until 1983, the two groups maintained a limited 
consociational type of relationship, though inter-ethnic links were weak. This was 
partly due to intra-ethnic competition, which prevented a resolution of the 
conflict. Consociationalism was not the conscious model for the island's elite 
groups, though elite behavior followed this pattern. However, a stagnant economy 
and mass mobilization of the electorate by competing political parties obstructed 
the adjustments and compromises that consociationalism could have effected, had 
political power remained at elite level till the foundations of the newly 
independent state had been laid firmly. Sri Lanka is now bedeviled by an internal 
civil war, which has adversely affected its economic growth. The conclusion 
draws attention to these consequences and makes projections about future options 
for this state in turmoil. 
,1992. 
111. HENNAYAKE (Shantha K.). Sri Lanka in 1992 : Opportunity missed in the 
ethno-nationalist crises. Asian Survey. 33,2, Feb. 93; 157 - 64. 
This paper deals with the dominant issue in Sri Lanka in 1992 is the 
intensification of the ethnonationalist crises. It is not an ethnic conflict between 
the minority Tamils and the majority Sinhalese but a complex war covering many 
spheres. First the arm for launched several successful operations against the 
LTTE, the Tamil separatist guerrilla movement. Second the LTTE also launched 
several attacks on army camps inflicting heavily casualty. Third is the export of 
LTTE terrorism from Jaffna to other parts of the island. Fourth is the LTTE's 
continuing policy of ethnic cleansing. Fifth, is the intensification of rivalries 
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within the LTTE itself. Sixth, is the LTTE's international program to discredit the 
Sri Lankan government. Seventh is the general disruption of life in Jaffna - the 
stronghold of LTTE. Eighth is the Indian efforts to discredit LTTE and to curb its 
activities in India, Ninth is the return of the Tamil refugees from Tamil Nadu, 
Tenth several unsuccessful peace attempts were made. The crises remain 
unresolved. 
, TAMIL NADU 
112. RANATUNGA (Sinha). Sri Lanka ; Frankenstein Exposed. Outlook 3,52, Dec.22, 
1997; 45. 
This paper deals with the militant Tamil movement in Sri Lanka had 
gathered momentum with each passing year. Mrs. Gandhi herself met some of its 
leaders and by July 1983, the ambush on a night patrol of the Sri Lankan Army 
resulted in an anti Tamil backlash in Colombo and elsewhere. The state was set to 
take Sri Lanka from an economic miracle to economics shambles. In India, Tamil 
Nadu politicians demanded military? intervention in Sri Lanka. And when the 
defence minister of the day R. Venkataraman and a Tamilian himself, rejected the 
case DMK legislators said his tongue should be cut off 
, , , TAMIL NADU 
113. SURYANARAYAN (V.). Tamil Nadu and Ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. 
Terrosim and Political Violence. 9, 5, Mar 8; 1994,118 - 32. 
This article deals with the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka became intractable 
because of the peculiar mid-set of the majority Sinhalese community. It is a 
majority community, which has a " minority complex". The Sinhalese do not 
consider the Tamils as a minority in Sri Lanka, but view them as an integral part 
of the sixty five million Tamils across the Palk Straits. They also ignore historical 
realities. For example, Buddhism v/as a visile religion in south India and the 
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efflorescence of Theravada Buddhism during the Pollanarava and Anuradhapura 
periods had much to do with Sri Lanka's contracts with Buddhist centres of 
religion and learning in South India. 
, MANAGEMENT, EMPARICAL 
INQUIRY. 
114. SAMARANYAKE (Gamini). Ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka and prospect of 
management: An empirical inquiry. Terrorism and political voilence3,2. 
Summer, 81; 75-8. 
This article state that the objective is to examine the back ground and the 
pattern of conflict and the management procedure in Sri Lanka. The author 
examines issues such a state sponsored peasant resettlement schemes, the official 
language policy, public sector employment and university admission policy as the 
background of the conflict. The pattern of the conflict began as political terrorism 
in 1972, gradually expanded and developed in the organized guerrilla warfare. 
Finally the response of the government and the contradictory objectives of the 
main actors are examined. 
, , , MOVEMENT, TAMIL EELAM 
115. SHASTRI (Amita). Material basis for Seperitism; Tamil Eelam movement in Sri 
Lanka. Journal of Asian Studies, 491; Feb, 90; 56 - 77. 
This paper deals in why should an "advanced" ethnic group from a 
"backward" region support secession when it apparently offers poorer material 
prospects than the existing national whole. The growth of support for the Tamil 
Eelam movement in north-east Sri Lanka in the 1970s was intimately connected 
both to the development of the region and to the discrimination that the regional 
minority population had contributed to a decline in their position and excluded 
them from the benefits of development, even in their ovm region. At the same 
time, the possibilities for the development of their region into a "forward" area in 
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which they would benefit provided a strong positive motivation in their struggle 
for a separate state. 
, NATIONALITY, TAMIL 
116, BIDWAI (Prafiil), Sri Lanka at a turning point? Frontline 17,2; Feb,4, 2000; 
103-05. 
This paper stresses that the traumatic recent events in the island unfold a 
new crisis which the political system might find it impossible to tackle given the 
dangerously widening ethnic rift, Sri Lanka which five years ago seemed all set 
to move towards far-reaching systemic reform and historic ethnic reconciliation, 
today teeters on the brink of a grim crisis. In an ahnost incredible turn of events, 
the forces of reform and progressive change appear exhausted; there is a sharp rise 
in ethnic tensions; growing insecurity grips the Tamil minority in the south; top 
functionaries of the state and the media indulge paranoid statements accruing their 
opponents of plotting their killings Ministers resort to inflaming cross majoritarian 
passions; and the air is thick with foreboding, suUenness and despair, 
, , , NEGOTIATION, BOSNIA and 
NORTHERN IRELAND. 
117. JENSEN (Llyod), Negotiations and power asymmetries : The case of Bosnia, 
Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka, International Negotiation 2, 1; 1997; 21-41, 
This paper deals with ethnic conflict, as illustrated by the cases of Bosnia 
Herzegovina, Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka, has been difficult to negotiate due 
to the power asymmetries involved and the general belief of national governments 
that such issues should be solved through the political process. Although external, 
ethnic-linked groups can help address some of the problems of power asymmetry, 
they can also complicate the process. Changing power structures in an 
increasingly multi-centric worid may create an environment in successful 
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resolution of ethnic violence becomes more likely but democracy impacts both 
positively and negative upon such an outcoming. 
, PEACE, 1994. 
118. KEERAWELLA (Gamini) and SAMARAJIVA (Rohan). Sri Lanka in 1994: A 
mandate for peace. Asian Survey 35,2; Feb.95; 153 - 59. 
This article deals with the year 1994 marked the end of the longest period 
of rule by one party in post independence Sri Lanka - 17 years, by the United 
National Party (UNP). In the parliamentary and presidential elections held in 
August and November respectively, the opposition People's Alliance (PA) le by 
Chandrika Bhandarnaike Kumaratunga of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party defeated 
the UNP, obtaining a mandate to negotiate a political solution to the 11 year old 
civil war with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. The change of power did not 
signify, however, a fiindamental change in the open economic politics initiated by 
the UNP in 1977; the PA promised continue infrastructure development and 
privatization processess and end the drain of war expendditures. The new 
administration launched major inquiries into human rights abuses, deaths of 
political and military leader and corruption. A series of militant labour action 
posed a serious challenge. The PA also faces a serious challenge in managing 
relations with the World bank and the IMF without offending its populer 
constituency. 
, , , PEACE PROCESS 
119. DISSANAYAKE (Gamini). Sri Lanka; Peace process. Mainstream 32, 21; 
Oct 29, 1994; 33-6. 
This article stresses that the Lionel Gamini Dissanayake's turn to be slain 
in a gruesome manner by a human bomber suspected to be a LTTE sympathiser at 
an election rally in Grandpass near Colombo around midnight on October 24, 
1994. This killing has undoubtedly given a new twist to Sri Lankan politics the 
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victory of the Sri Lankan Freedom party - led People's Alliance in last August's 
parliamentary election and the subsequent elevation of Ms Chandrika 
Bhandaranaike Kumaratunga to the office of the Prime Minister. Both Chandrika 
and Gamini were contesting for the ensuing presidential poll when the tragedy 
struck. 
120. SAHADEVAN (P.) and TISSAINA.YAGAM (J. S.) Current obstacles to enduring 
peace in Sri Lanka. Strategic Analysis. 15, 6, Sept. 92; 561 - 89. 
This paper deals with after the failure of the Indo - Sri Lankan Accord of 
1987 to resolve the ethnic crisis, the peace process is at a cross roads. The 45 
member Parliamentary select committee, which has been engaged in evolving a 
peace package based on "Consensus" since August 1991, has not made any 
headway. Several issue from impediments in restoring enduring peace and 
normality. The most prominent are ; the intractable stands of the Sinhalese and 
the Tamils on the issue of the merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces; the 
ticklish problem f power sharing between the central and the provincial 
governments. The refusal of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam to give up 
arms to join the democratic process, and the Sinhalese perception of India as the 
real obstacle to peace. 
, POLITICAL PARTIES, role of 
121. CHAKRAVARTI (Sudep). Return to uncertainty : Polls are unlikely to bring 
political peace in Sri Lanka. India Today 19, 16; Aug. 31, 1994; 160. 
This paper deals with the people in the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) 
still talk about it with awe. For the election in 1977 which practically blanked out 
the SLFP and the prime minister Sirimavo Bhandaranaike from power and has not 
let them back in since - Junius Jayawardene,s United National Party (UNP) ahd 
adopted a low key, surefire method of campaigning. Volunteers stood in bread 
queues, bus queues or at any social or political gathering and started discussion on 
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how the SLFP had taken the country to the brink of disaster. The SLFP is also a 
leading partner in the People's Alliance, a grouping of nine parties including the 
Muslim League and the left, formed after snap parliamentary polls were declared 
six months before the election deadline, 
122. JEYARAJ (D.B.S.). Sri Lanka : For a politics of consensus. Frontline. 17,3; Feb, 
18,2000,54-7. 
This paper deals with the People's Alliance Government and the 
opposition United National Party play for high stakes as they grapple with the 
tricky business of constitituional rform. The Sri Lankan political environment is 
currently experiencing fluctuations of mood and attiudes. Dramatic political 
developments overs the past few weeks have opned up possibilities for 
constitutional reform that could lead to a negotiated settlement of the ethnic crisis. 
While the ruling party People's Alliance (PA) Government of Chandrika 
Kumaratunga an the Opposition, chiefly the United National Party (LJNP) led by 
Ranil Wickremasinghe, disply a reorientation of approach on the one hand, 
assertive yet quite diplomacy by Norway point to negotiations commencing soon 
with the LTTE. 
, , , PROVINCIAL COUNCIL 
SYSTEM, ETHNIC. 
123. AMITA SHASTRI. Sri Lanka;s Provincial Council System; A solution to the 
ethnic problem? Asian Survay 32,S; Aug. 92; 723 - 43. 
This paper deals with decentralization of power is an urgent but difificuh 
task in most developing countries, Faced with the Tamil separatist movement, 
power was sought to be devolved in Sri Lanka through the Provincial Council 
System in November 1987 under the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. Militant Segments 
of both the Tamil and Sinhalese communities opposed the change. In practice, 
the system has worked in an ambiguous and contradictory manner, A process of 
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administrative decentralization has been taking place under the firm control of the 
central leadership. To solve the ethnic problem, maximum powers over subjects 
of regional concern have to be devolved to the provinces. The Tamil demand for 
a merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces remains an intractable issue. 
, REFUGEE, TAMIL 
124. NDCAM (Girish). Sri Lankan Tamil Refugee: Long Haul Home. India Today. 17, 
3,Feb.l5, 1992;67-9. 
This article deals with the Barely 16 Km. From the part where the 
repatriate refugees were to land 24 hours later, the irrepressible LTTE ambushed 
and killed 20 Sri Lankan Soldiers in the eastern province of Tricomalee. 
Simultaneously, a powerfiil blast in the Sri Lankan Air Force Armoury in China 
Bay in the some port town resulted in the death of nearly 40 air force personnel. 
The refiigees in fact face a poignant situation. Even since the assassination of 
Rajeev Gandhi they have been going through trying times in Tamil Nadu, a 
majority of them being viewed with distrust. It is a sentiment shared by scares of 
other refugees housed in the 110 odd caps spread across Tamil Nadu. A 
Shammughalingam, 25, and his wife Suhanthirni, 21, who are among the first 
batch of returners, chose to go back in order to escape the misery and persecution 
they faced in India. 
, , ,SEASEFIRE role of 
125. SAHADEVAN (P.). Why the ceasefire in Sri Lanka failed. Mainstream 29,19; 
Mar.l9,1991;22-6. 
This article deals with the exercise of the ceasefire was perceived by 
different people differently and interpreted variously according to the fancies and 
predilections of whoever was expressing an opinion. Though diversity of opinion 
is something to be cherished, in this particular instance it arose from an ignorance 
of the working and inner compulsions of the LTTE for wanting a ceasefire. This 
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is quite dangerous since the LITE claims to be fighting a war of Liberation of the 
Tamil against the Sri Lankan state. In political environment where the freedom of 
expression is ruthlessly suppressed, other minorities constantly targeted and rival 
political groups not allowed to function, the citizen in the majority Tamil 
provinces has not correct picture of what is going on or why certain decisions are 
made. 
, SEPRATISM, LTTE. 
126. SHASTRI (Amita). Material basis for separatism: The Tamil Eelam movement in 
Sri Lanka. Journal of Asian Studies. 49, 1; Feb. 90; 56 - 77. 
This article examines why should an "advanced" ethnic groups from a 
"backward" region support secession when it apparently offers poorer material 
prospects than the existing national whole, the growth the support for the Tamil 
Eelam movement in North-East Sri Lanka in the 1970s was intimately coimected 
both to the development of the region and to the discrimination that the regional 
minority population had experience. Tamils felt alienated because central policies 
had contributed to a decline in their position and excluded them from the benefits 
of development, even in their own region. At the same time, the possibilities for 
the development of their region in to a "forward" area in which they would 
benefit, 
, , . STATE role of 
127. PHADNIS (Urmila). Role of State in Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict. Mainstream 28, 
36; Nov.24, 1990; 15-8. 
This paper deals with the tensions and conflict between majority and 
minority communities have been a critical issue of political order and peace 
maintenance in plural societies, moor so, in the developing ones, is self-axiomatic. 
However, the nature of such patterns of interaction has varied, with one minority 
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being cooperative and other conflictual. Besides, the cooperative consensual 
competitive conflagration relationship can not the components of accord as much 
as discord, harmony as much as cleavages. What is of salience in this context is 
the whys and whats of discord pre-empting harmony and vice-versa. 
128. PHADNIS (Urmila). Role of state in Sri Lanka' ethnic conflict-II Mainstream 
28,38; Dec. 1,1990; 21-7. 
This article stresses that the ultimate result of the quotas and 
standardisation system was a progressive decline of Tamil students of the science 
based courses in which earlier they have done very well. Though the situation 
was amelioration to some extent during the UNP regime, the discranatory aspects 
of the SLFP policies were deeply in the Tamil psyche. During the initial five 
years of the UNP regime (1977 -83), its policies towards Tamil appeared to be a 
mix cooperation and coercion, with coercion having an edge over its promise of 
'national reconciliation'. The reasons for the governments' inability to contain the 
Tamil militancy were party because of contending perceptions for a solutions 
within its own party and partly due to the pressures and pulls from the major 
opposition party. 
, , , TAMIL SINHALA, 
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION 
129. SINGHER (Marshall R.) Sri Lanka's Tamil-Sinhalese ethnic conflict. Alternative 
solutions. Asian Survey 32, 8; Aug. 92; 712 - 22. 
This paper stresses the warfare between the Tamils and the Sinhalese has 
been going on since the late 1970s. Over the years, a number of agreements have 
been worked out between the Tamils and the Sinhalese dominated governments of 
the day, but in each case Sinhalese Chauvinists immediately accused these weak 
governments of "selling out to the Sinhalese people" and they ranged on the 
agreements within days of singing them. Eventually the Tamils becomes 
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disillusioned with the political process and decided that meaningful change for 
their people could only come about in Tamil Eelam and that the only way to get it 
was by the bullet. At the extreme right, the Sinhalese extremists want Sri Lanka 
to be a completely Unitary State. At the extremist left the LITE want a totally 
independent Tamil Eelam. 
THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 
i.30. RUDRAKUMARAN (Visuvanathan). Thirteenth Amendment: Does it really 
allow per sharing between the ethnic factions in Sri Lanka ? Asian Thought and 
Society 43; Jan. 90, 70 - 86. 
This article examines the merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces of 
Sri Lanka is analyzed in terms of the concept of "homeland". The proposed 
referendum is criticized on the basis of theoretical problems it raises with respect 
to the right to self determination and the established ideals of democracy. It is 
criticized on methodological and practical grounds, such as composition of the 
electorate in light of demographic change, delimitation of the geographical aria 
concerned supervision of the referendum and the effects of polarization and 
violence between rival factions. The provision for autonomy of the provincial 
council is evaluated by analyzing to what extant the council is controlled by the 
central government and by analysis of its Jurisdiction. 
, , , TIGERS PROBLEMS. 
131. SMITH (Chris). Sri Lanka: Tiger trouble. The World Today 11, 1; July 2000; 
25-6. 
This paper deals with the longstanding conflict in the north east of Sri 
Lanka appears to be reaching a critical juncture. Whilst renewed fighting is 
hardly unusual in this seventeen years war between the Tamil Tigers and Sri 
Lankan security forces, the scale and direction of current battles suggest that the 
Tigers may be close to victory, if their leadership cares to see it that way. The 
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rapid reverse in government fortunes presents dilemmas all round. After 
seventeen thousand Sri Lankan troops had been evacuated from the Elephant Pass 
garrison, the Tigers began to move forward towards Jaffha. The International 
community has kept faith just, with successive Sri Lankan governments and their 
attempts to end the war. 
role of 
132. CHENGAPPA (Raj.) Return f the Tigers. Sri Lankan politics, India Today 25,21; 
May 22, 2000; 44 - 52. 
This paper deals with the inside story of how the LTTE, after it lost Jaffna 
in 1995, regrouped to take on the might of the Sri Lankan army and why its 
dramatic resurgence worries both India and the world. As the battle for control of 
Jafiftia peninsula aged last week, in Colombo a senior Sri Lankan armed forces 
officer monitoring the string of surprising gains being notched up by the rebel 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), observed "the difference is that our 
soldiers fight to live, the Tigers fight to die." It was, however, clear that the Tigers 
had staged an awesome comeback in the peninsula after being driven out by the 
army in 1995. Last month the LTTE had overrun key Sri Lankan military posts, 
including the strategic Elephant Pass linking the peninsula to the mainland. 
133. FATHERS (Michael). Sri Lanka: The Tigers claw back. Time 155, 21; May 29, 
2000; 22-5. 
This paper states that the once dismissed as a spent force, Sri Lanka's 
Tamil rebels, led by the ruthless tactician Vellupilai Prabhakaran, stand on the 
verge of a stunning victory on the Jaffiia peninsula. The Sri Lankan army five 
years ago as a spent guerrilla force, the Tamil Tigers are close to pulling off" their 
most stunning victory - the military conquest of the Jaffha peninsula. Opening 
fresh attacks almost daily against government troops positioned on roads around 
Jaffha city, they are stretching the Sri Lankan forces to its limit and blocking all 
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avenues for reinforcement. After months of meticulous planning, extra 
recruitment and training and the capture of long-range artillery, the tigers, known 
formally as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). 
, ETHNIC CRISES, 1990. 
134. DIXIT (Aabha). Sri Lanka in the 1990s: A study of its ethnic crisis. Strategic 
Analysis 13,9, Dec.90; 1047-58. 
This article conveys that the president Premadasa's announced cement 
disinviting the Indian peace keeping Force (EPKF) and asking for its early 
withdrawal can be regarded as a watershed in Indo-Sri Lankan relations, 
particularly in relation to the post-occurred period. The renewed outbreak of war 
between Colombo and the LTTE has threatened to complicate the ethnic tangle 
even further. It is imperative to understand the basic issues involved in the ethnic 
conflict, if one is to distinguish between the tress and the woods, in a post - IPKF 
withdrawal scenario. The LTTE refuses to come to terms with the prevailing 
winds. Its obstinacy in fighting for a remotely achievable cause, without 
sympathies and support is bound to hart its long term interests. The Sri Lankan 
army is now in the position to relentlessly pursue the LTTE in to the jungles in a 
battle of attrition. 
, , , GOVERNMENT, 
KUMARATUNGA ANALYSIS 
135. GHOSE (Partha S.), Chandrika's Federal Package: A Political Analysis in Sri 
Lanka. Mainstream 27, 59; Sep. 16,1995; 9-12. 
This paper deals with the Sinhala - Tamil ethnic strife is now about four 
decades old. Still, there does not seem to be any ray of hope at the end of the 
tunnel towards its peaceful management. The war between the government forces 
and the LTTE is becoming more and more fierce and no one knows what would 
its final outcome be. How this point of no return has been reached is a long story 
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but it would suffice here just to underline the harsh reality that successive Sri 
Lankan governments and Tamil leadership have missed one opportunity after 
another to address the problem from a realistic sense of judgement. 
, INDIA, role of. 
136. GHOSH (Bipattaran). India and the ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka. India Quarterly. 
51, l;Jan.-Mar. 95;53-64. 
Problem arising out of the Tamils' demand far a separate state and 
opposition by the Sinhalas became aggravated by India's involvement. Initially, 
India considered it to be Sri Lanka's internal affair. But geopolitical and domestic 
compulsions did not allows her to remain indifferent. Colombo had to admit New 
Delhi's stake and its inescapable role in the solution of the problem. 
Consequently, an Indo-Sri Lankan record was concluded in 1987, transforming 
India's role from a mediatory into a participatory one. India sent a peacekeeping 
force to ensure the implementation of the accord. But that failed to solve the 
problem and both the contending parties demanded its withdrawal. An 
embarrassed India acceded. Now she is just an onlooker to the ongoing ethnic 
strife. 
137. KIDWAI (Anser). India and the Sri Lankan Tragedy. Nation And The Word 
9,209, July 1, 2000; 6-8. 
This article states that the Indian Prime Minister was up against the 
suggestion from a major ally which called for bifiircation of the neighbouring state 
into two separate independent entitles. Balkanisation came knocking at doorstep. 
Karunanidhi commended the Czechoslovak model as a solution to the ethnic 
problem in Sri Lanka - dividing that country into Tamil Eelam and Sinhala 
handcuff remarks on issues of international import. Moreover, the entire question 
is highly emotive since those involved in a gory warfare in Jafl&ia peninsula are 
the progeny of migrants from India. 
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, INITIATIVES, KUMARTUNGA 
role of. 
138. ARVIND (Kumar). Sri Lankan ethnic crisis and Chandrika's peace initiatives, 
Straie^c Analysis 18, 9; Dec. 95 : 1179-92. 
This article deals with the two consecutive elections in Sri Lanka, Parliamentary 
and Presidential, held in August and November, 1994 respectively, and the victory 
of Chandrika Bhandaranaike Kurartunga's people's alliance in both contests, have 
proved that Sri Lankan support Chandrika's declaration to end the country's 
ethnic conflict. However, thus far, her devolution package has not procured peace 
for the island because the rebel Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) forces 
have neither accepted it nor made constructive proposals of their own. At present, 
the resolution of the conflict hinges on : (1) the ambiguity of the LTTE on its 
final goal; and (2) the powerful hegemony that the LTTE holds over more 
moderate Tamil groups parties to negotiations, and the desire for LTTE leader V. 
Parbhakaran to maintain control over the course of events. 
, , , LTTE, DMK, INDIA 
139. SWAMY (Prakash M.). LTTE-DMK Parleys Damning Diary : Evidence of 
Karunanidhi's LTTE links. India Today 17,4; Feb. 29,1992; 157 - 58. 
This paper deals with the wliispers of insinuation will now give way to a 
hard-nosed probe. Armed with details of meetings between the Tamil Nadu Chief 
Minister M. Karunanidhi and Senior LTTE emissaries, the Tamil Nadu Special 
Investigation Team (TANSIT) is poised to make some sensational revelations. 
The key to the investigations : diary in which arrested LTTE member A. Tagore 
alias Sankar, recorded the Parleyes, is now in the possession of TANSIT, which is 
probing the Tigers' activities in the state, and the diary extract is : Feb. 16 Bala 
brother (Balasingham) and Yogi brother met Karunanidhi and MurasoU Muran 
today for talks. February 19 Tagore has narrated Pattinamkathan shootout 
incident in detail. Feb. 22 Other militant groups met Karunanidhi again today. 
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June 19 Tonight Kadambakkam Zachria Colony, he has narrated the Padmanabha 
killing in detail, 
, SINHALA, JAFFNA, 
PROSPECTS, INDIA. 
140. SUBRAMANIAN (Nirupma). Sri Lanka crisis and Indian perspective. 
Mainstream 38, 24; June 3, 2000,1-4. 
This paper stresses the situation in the northern part of Sri Lanka - the 
Jaffiia peninsula-continues to be gritn Jaffna has not yet fallen to the LTTE and 
with the strength of both numbers as well as airpowers the Sri Lankan forces are 
putting up stiff resistance. But the question is : far how long. To pose such a 
query is not to betray any lurking sympathy for the Tamil Tigers but only to 
recognise the capability of the LTTE to overwhelm the Sinhala Army despite its 
numerical weakness, as it has demonstrated time and again. India can do much to 
make this outcome possible for the good of Sri Lanka and its Tamils. That is the 
essential national interest for India vis-a-vis Sri Lanka. 
, , . NORWAY role of. 
141. JEYARAJ (D.B.S.). Sri Lanka : A Norwegian initiative. Frontline 17, 5; Mar. 
17, 2000; 50-2 
This paper states that the Norway's offer to use its good offices to find an 
amicable solution to the Sri Lankan crisis has the approval of almost all groups 
concerned. It is understood that initially only a tentative agenda would be fixed 
and the permanent agenda is to be evolved by the participants themselves. The 
government position on third-party intervention had been that it required only a 
facilitator and not a mediator. Given Colombo's sensitivity over the question of 
an intermediary assuming a facilitator and not a mere mediatory role, Norway 
would strictly confer its role to that of providing its good offices alone at the 
present juncture. 
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, REFUGEES, UNHC roie of 
142, KENDLE (Andrew Bruce). Protecting whom? The UNHCR [High Commissioner 
for Refugees] in Sri Lanka; 1987-1997. The Round Table 348, Oct. 1998; 
521-41. 
This paper reveals that after dealing with the history of the UNHCP, the 
article looks at the first repatriation program from South India, which began in 
December 1987, and assesses whether or not the process was voluntary and safe. 
There follows an examination of reasons why the UNHCR decided, in 1990, to 
work on behalf of internally displaced persons and retumess. Subsequently, the 
events that led to the 1992 repatriation program from South India to Sri Lanka are 
presented, an assessment is made of the level of protection that the UNHCR 
eventually chose to provide retumess, and a possible explanation for why the 
organization chose to become involved in this endeavor is offered. This is 
followed by an examination of the January 1994 Tripartite Agreement on the 
repatriation of Tamil asylum seekers from Switzerland, signed by the Swiss and 
Sri Lankan governments and the UNHCR. Some critical comments are made and 
some questions asked about the UNHCR's future. 
, , , SOLUTION 
143. RAJESHWARI (PR.). Ethnicity, Its causes and possible solutions : The case of 
Sri Lanka. Strategic Analysis. 23, 3; June 1999; 483-95. 
This article deals with the end of cold war has swept a wave of ethnic 
conflict across parts of Asia, Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and Africa. 
Belying early expectations the disappearance of bipolarity and cold war did not 
usher in peace and security in the worid. Rather, it unleashed many critical issues 
like ethnicity, terrorism, environmental degradation and so on. The issue of 
nationalism, social change and confrontational tendencies have encouraged not 
only national and supra-national movements, but also new trends, such as ethnic 
and sectarian nationalism. That is how one finds many countries facing internal 
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instability from the two processes of politicisation of the issue of ethnicity and 
ethnicisation of politics. 
, TAMIL LroERATION WAR, 
INDIA role of 
1.44. IMTIAZ AHMAD. "Regional hegemony" in South Asia. India and Lankan 
Tamil's war of liberation. Regional Studies. 10, 4; Autumn 92; 23-50. 
This article deals with the two interrelated arguments are critical to the 
understanding of India's role in the Sri Lankan Tamil's was liberation : (1) the 
success of the Indian ruling class in organizing hegemony, not only with respect to 
the internal dimension but also with respect to the external dimension of the state, 
and (2) the hegemonic construction of a great and strong India in the image of the 
modern western state. In this context, the Indian government, while organizing 
hegemony among both the Indian and Sri Lankan Tamil population, succeeded in 
transforming the Tamil Liberation struggle into an Indo-Sri Lanka affair and in the 
process consoUdated India's prominent position in the South Asia. The latter only 
signified India's drive towards great power status in the image of the modem 
western state. 
, , , THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 
role of 
145. RUDRAKUMARAN (Visuvanathan). Thirteenth Amendment : Does it really 
allow power sharing between the ethnic factions in Sri Lanka: Asian Though and 
Society 43; Jan. 90, 70-86. 
This paper states that the merger of the Northern Eastern provinces of Sri 
Lanka is analyzed in terms of the concept of "homeland". The proposed 
referendum is criticised on the basis of theoretical problems. It raises with respect 
to the right to self determination and the established ideals of democracy. It 
criticizes on methodological and practical grounds, such as composition of the 
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electorate in light of demographic change, delimitation of the geographical area 
concerned, supervision of the referendum and the effects of polarization and 
violence between rival factions. The provision for autonomy of the provincial 
council is evaluated by analyzing to what extent the council is controlled by the 
central government and by analysis of its jurisdiction. It demonstrates in what 
specific ways land allotment based on national ethnic ratio would be harmful to 
the numerical minority, and proposed that allotments be based on provincial ratio. 
There is no meaningful power sharing under the amendment. 
, ETHNIC VIOLENCE 
146. GAMAGE (Siri). Radicalisation of the Tamil middle class and ethnic violence in 
Sri Lanka. Journal of Contemporaty Asia. 24,2; 1994; 161-78. 
This article deals with the radicalism or conservatism of class elements 
determines the nature of politico-military struggle policies and ideology of the 
state ruling elites determine the radicalism or conservatism of class elements. 
Tamil militants, the AT members v^ h^o fought the state and, government soldiers 
come from rural petty-bourgeois (RPB) lower middle class (LMC) backgrounds. 
These three elements follow different ideologies and political strategies. The Sri 
Lankan ethnic conflict has been constructed as an ethnic conflict by vested 
interests. Viewed in class terms, members of the same class (LMC) fight each 
other while the elitist, bourgeois class continues to rule the country. If the three 
LMC elements unite politically, they can be a serious challenge to the elitist 
political leadership. Any political solution to the ethnic problem depends on 
dominant class character of the Tamil-Sinhala political leadership, means 
bourgeois-middle class or middle lower middle class. 
, CAUSES and SOLUTION 
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147. PERUMAL (C.A.). and THANDAVAN (R). Ethnic violence in Sri Lanka : 
Causes and Consequences. The Indian Journal of Political Science. 50, 1, Jan. 
Mar. 1991; 1-78. 
This article deals with the dominant paradigm of the Sri Lankan case 
happens to be the primordialist view of ethnicity. As Sri Lanka is multi-ethnic 
and developing, ethnicity is acting as a fragmentary force here. All ethnic groups 
vigorously compete for the fruits of nature. The study of development and 
underdevelopment of various ethnic groups in a multi-ethnic society need to be 
studied from a socio-historical perspective. It is possible and desirable to look 
into the dominant ethnic groups of post-colonial societies as possessing well 
entrenched ideology working towards their modernization; and, in such a 
situation, while modernization was an ongoing trend of the dominant ethnic 
groups, a development of underdevelopment could be the discernible consequence 
amidst the less intensive ethnic groups. 
, CrVIL WAR, MILITARY, 
JAFFNA 
148. DESHPANDE (Anirudh). Lessons of Military History in Sri Lanka. Mainstream. 
27, 52, June 3, 1995; 6-8. 
This paper stresses that the LTIE preparing a battle of encirclement and 
annihilation of the Sri Lankan troops trapped in Jaffna, the Tamil was in Sri Lanka 
seems to have entered a decisive stage. An important event is unfolding in Sri 
Lanka and military historians, politicians and others concerned people should 
awake to this fact. Having said this we make two bold assertions in this article 
before looking at some of the issues arising from the current phase of the civil war 
in Sri Lanka. These assertions may appear unpopuler considering the flak the 
LTTE is attracting in the press these days. However, they stem from an objective 
observation of the military situation prevalent in northern Sri Lanka today. 
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, LIONS, TIGERS 
149. RAJA (Shani). Sri Lanka's Lions and Tigers. Far Eastern Economic Review 
162, 22; July 22, 1999; 29. 
This paper stresses that the Tigers have their own scorpions albeit 
seemingly of a less peaceful vairiety. According to Sri Lanka's military 
intelligence, a small group of fighters within the movement are disgruntled with 
their elusive leader, Velupillai Perbhakaran. They believe he is turning soft-
cutting back on operations that injure foreign power. The difference is that while 
the scorpions in the Sinhalese camp are pro-peace, here they appear to be against 
the Tamil militant estabhshment's nascent softening. 
,LTTE 
150. JAYARAM (P), Return to Terror : Tigers announce their comeback with 
devastating attacks. India Today 191,15; Aug. 13,1998; 102-03. 
This paper deals with the death and suffering a side, the only other 
constant in Sri Lanka's bloody ethnic conflict has been the tenacity of the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelams (LTTE). Time and again their opponents have 
celebrated their downfall - only to be stunned by the ferocity of the counterattack. 
The twin blows for the goverrmient came just as president Chandrika Kumartunge 
was drawing heavy fire from the opposition for what they said was her 
administration's lack of direction and inept handling of the economy. In the 
present climate, peacemaking is going to take a backseat. While the Sri Lankan 
military comes to term with the mess, LTTE chief V. Pirabhakaran has made good 
his vow to fight on even after the fall of Jaffiia. 
137 
Annotated Bibliography 
,JAFFNA 
151, J AY ARAM (P.), Return to terror : Tigers announce their comeback with 
devastating attacks in Sri Lanka. India Today 21,15, Aug. 15,1996; 102-06. 
This paper deals with the Mullaitivu victory is sure to boost the LTTE's 
political and military standing in Tamil eyes. Death and suffering a side, the only 
other constant in Sri Lanka's bloody ethnic conflict has been the tenacity of the 
LTTE. The twin blows for the government came just as President Chandrike 
Kumaratunge was drawing heavy fire from the opposition for what they said was 
her administration's lack of direction and inept handling of the economy. For the 
island's Sinhala's, the heady days following the capture of Jaffna last December 
appear to be a finding memory, while the moderate Tamil groups, which has 
strongly supported the government in Parliament are disillusioned with the 
government virtual abandonment of the devolution pack age for the north. 
, , , , MINORITY, PROBLEMS 
152. HOLLUP (Oddvar). Ethnic identity. Violence and the estate Tamil minority in Sri 
Lanka, ne Round Table 323; July 92; 315-38. 
This article says that the apart fi"om acknowledging the importance played 
by ideology, national identity and historical perceptions in shaping inter-ethnic 
relations and as roots to the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, this paper stresses the 
significance of Socio-economic factors and increasing inequalities created by the 
open, liberalized economy, as an important motivating force for anti-Tamil 
hostility and ethnic riots in 1983. The fact that it was mostly urban middle class 
Tamil who were attacked and their properties destroyed was closely linked to their 
relatively dominant position within trade in Colombo and towns in the hill 
country. It tries to consider ethnic conflict from another ethnic minorities point of 
view, the estate Tamils (Indian Tamils), who are plantation workers and traders, 
living in the central highlands. In the discourse they are often denied a separate 
identity and considered the same as the indigenous Sri Lanka Tamils, with whom 
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they do not share common interest and problems. Estate Tamils perceived the 
ethnic riots differently and could not comprehend any other reason for the attacks 
on the, as having no other purpose than that of destroying their dominance over 
retail trade and curtail their economic expansion and prosperity. 
, NGO's role of 
153. GOODHAND (Jonathan). And LE^ WER (Nick). Sri Lanka : NGOs and peace-
building in complex political emergencies. Third World Quarterly. 20,1; Feb. 
1999,69-87. 
This paper stresses on an overview of the conceptual background and 
preliminary field work finding of research program investigating the 
consequences of violence and conflict in villages in eastern Sri Lanka. Initial and 
speculative conclusions from these community surveys indicate that NGOs have 
only a limited impact on the local dynamics of conflict. To have any limited 
peace-building role, NGOs must also undertake a more fine grained analysis of 
community social fabric and processes together with the associated economic, 
political and military forces. 
, , , PEACE PROCESS 
154. SUBRAMANIAM (Nirupma). Sri Lanka; Political and peace process. Frontline. 
17, 14, July 21, 2000; 128-29. 
This paper deals with the offering of some effort at persuading the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelum to begin negotiations. The Sri Lankan 
government now appears to have decided that marginalising the separatists would 
be a better option. In any situation of conflict, it is reasonable to assume that the 
best way out would be for the warring sides to sit together and thrash out issues of 
mutual concern. But Sri Lanka seems to be caught in a different sort of bind, in 
which there is no meeting ground even for dialogue. Sri Lankan government 
under president Chandrika Kamaratugna holds the view that any basis for 
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negotiation has to be the devolution package now being discussed by the ruhng 
coalition, the opposition and the Tamil parties. 
,RELIGION, roleof 
155. ARIYARATNE (At.). Lining with religion in the midst of violence in Sri Lanka. 
Bulletin of Peace Proposals 21,3, Sep. 1990; 231-285. 
This article stresses that the application of today's intellectual concepts to 
domestics interpretations of contexts can lead to distort events fair certain requires 
participants with an unconditioned meant in addition to intellectual concepts and 
categories. A substantial share of the responsibility for the present violence in Sri 
Lanka should go to local and political analysts who used western intellectual tools 
and initiative phraseologies to deal with this International theme in a distorted 
way. Some other moment in Sri Lanka is a common ideology is to peacelessness 
and unjustified in society through non-violent and spiritually means. It brings 
together people from bottom up to discover ideological, technological and 
structural methodology to recreate a sustainable society. 
, , FOREIGN POLICY 
156. MENDIS (Vernon L.B.). Roots of Sri Lanka's foreign policy. South Asian 
Survey 1,1; Jan-June 94; 59-86. 
This article says that Sri Lanka has a history of around 2500 years. Its 
foreign policy is rooted in its regional location at the cross roads of its 
civilizations and astride its sea lanes, its proximity to India and symbiotic 
relationship with it, its topographical pattern which made it agriculturally 
prosperous but engendered political divisions with invited invasions. The 
principal motivation of its diplomacy was to promote Buddhism when following 
its introduction by the Indian Emperor Ashoka in the third century B.C., Sri Lanka 
became its second home. This apostolic role won far in respect of other nations 
and even paid secular dividends as traders were attracted to it, making it a premier 
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conunercial emporium. Because of its key location it became a coveted object of 
rival colonial power and was conquered by Britain. Its diplomatic initiatives since 
in dependence such as dynamic neutralism, Non Alignment, Peace Zone in the 
Indian Ocean, regionalism represent a continuation to the present day of its 
Buddhist inspiration and historic perspectives. 
, CHINA 
157. SURYANARAYAN (V.). Sri Lanka's policy towards China ; Legacy of the past 
and prospects for the future. China Report. 30,2; Apr.-June 94; 203-14. 
This article stresses over the promotion of Sri Lanka's interests - ensuring 
security, promoting economic development, diversifying arms purchases, 
enhancing trade and investment -- implies fruitfol interaction with as many 
countries as possible. China, the most populous country and a growing economic 
and military power, naturally has to be friended. Still more relevant, in trying to 
erode Indian pre-eminence, Colombo wants to encourage the involvement of 
external powers which for their own reasons, had differences with India. But 
playing into the hands of India's adversaries has its own limitations and could 
make Sri Lanka more vulnerable to external manipulations. 
, , , FREE TRADE, AGREEMENT, 
INDIA role of 
158. KELEGAMA (Saman). Indo-Sri Lanka trade and the bilateral free trade 
agreement: A Sri Lankan perspective. Asia-Pacific Development Journal. 6, 2; 
Dec. 1999; 87-96. 
This article states that the Indo-Sri Lanka trade has been growing in recent 
years. In the mid 1990s India became the main import supplier of Sri Lanka. 
Although Sri Lankan exports to India remain small, they have been growing faster 
than Indian imports to Sri Lanka in recent years. The Indo-Sri Lanka Bilateral 
Free Trade Agreement is a future step, by removing existing trade barriers, to 
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Stimulate trade between the two nations. While trade brings benefits to both there 
is an import competing sector in both countries that is still not in a position to face 
external competition from free trade. The agreement allows for a "negative list" 
to accommodate this sector but the preparation of the negative list has proved to 
be a time consuming and intricate exercise. 
, INDIA 
159. CHERIAN (John). Sri Lanka ; India's policy dilemma - India has difficult choices 
ahead. Frontline 17,10; May 26, 2000; 14-6. 
This article stresses that the gloomy assessment in New Delhi about the 
military development in the Jaffiia Peninsula later gave way to cautious optimism 
with news coming that the Sri Lankan troops had established the situation on the 
warfront. According to Indian government sources, the late-1980's experience 
involving the Indian peace keeping force was not the only restraining factor 
behind the cautious Indian response. The Indian government does not want a 
situation to arise in Jaffiia that could precipitate a refiigee influx into India or 
impact adversely on the political situation in Tamil Nadu. 
160. WILSON (A. Jeyaratnam). Foreign policies of India's immediate neighbours: A 
reflective interpretation. Journal of Asian and African Studies. 25,1-2; 1990, 
42-59. 
This paper deals with the foreign policies of Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh 
and Sri Lanka have focused mainly on Indian security concerns. These states 
have avoided a clash with Indian where clashed occurred, as in India-Nepal 
relations, 1987, India intervened to stress her claims. India's relationship with 
Pakistan has been unsatisfactory. Both states fed on each others military 
insecurity. In 1948 Sri Lanka similar fears. However, its participation in the 
nonalignment movements been harmony with India's Pakistan sought admission 
and has been in harmony with India's Pakistan sought admission and joined he US 
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alliance network against the USSR Pakistan's trajectory invites US and PRC 
interest and India has secured a position with the Indo-Soviet Treaty, 1971. The 
involvement by major power threatens South Indo-Soviet Treaty, 1971. The 
involvement by major power threaten South Asian Peace. The SAARC is a 
solution neither for economic nor for political problems. South Asia should be 
recognised as a sub-system for international purposes. In that event the meddling 
of foreign powers in a volatile can be monitored by the JN to restore confidence 
and stability in the region 
, and PAKISTAN 
161. RAJAGOPALAN (Swama). National integration in India, Sri Lanka and Pakistan: 
Constitutional and elite visions. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics. 3,4; Winter 
1997; 1-38. 
This article deals with, how do states envision themselves and what is the 
vision of elite members of nationalities within the state? What does the panoply of 
vision and voices at play in the political arena tell us about the project of national 
integration? A summary of the available scholarly writing on integration, co-
operation and national-building sites the back drop for an examination of self 
defining propositions from the India, Pakistan and Sri Lankan constitutions and a 
digest of ideas on integration expressed by elite interview respondents in Madras, 
India and Colombo, Sri Lanka in 1996. The article concludes by deriving a 
definition of integration fi-om these sources. 
, , , INTERNATIONAL CHANGES, 
and REGIONAL COMPULSION 
162. KODIKARA (Shelton U.). International change and regional compulsions: Sri 
Lanka's foreign pohcy. South Asian Survey. 2,1; Jan. - June 95; 11 - 100. 
This paper deals with the Sri Lanka has been susceptible to global change, 
particularly economic change. The end of the superpower rivahy in the Indian 
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Ocean has altered the focus of Sri Lanka's non alignment from being concerned 
strictly with politics and the Indian ocean as a peace zone, to issues of marco-
economics such as economic independence and the country's integration in to the 
world economy. This new outlook goes hand to hand with the new salience 
accorded to the SAARC. Despite Sri Lanka's refusal to participate in SAARC 
conferences because of its differences with India over the deployment of Indian 
Peace Keeping Forces on the island Sri Lanka remains firmly cOnraiitted to 
SSARC for economic reasons a strategy that has repercussions on the country's 
foreign policy. 
LffiRAL ECONOMIC, 
AGREEMENT, 1987. 
163. KODIKARA (Shelton U.). Genesis of the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement of 29 July, 
1987 Contemporary South Asia. 4,2; July 95; 171 - 85. 
This article deals with the Sri Lanka has periodically feared military 
intervention on the part of India since the formation of the repubUc in 1972. In 
the 1980s President J.R. Jayewardene's pro-western liberal economic foreign 
policy orientation and the escalation of the island's Tamil-Sinhalese ethnic crisis 
gave India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi causes for concern. The Indian 
government saw US naval and oil business nearest in the Sri Lanka port facilities 
of Trincomalee and the reflect of Tamil refugees in to Tamil Nadu as potentially 
destabilizing. After unsuccessful negotiations in 1986,Jayewardane committed 
himself, despite non-consultation of parhament and its approval from Tamil 
separatists to signing the July 1987 Accords with Prime Minister Rajeev Gandhi. 
The cessation of hostilities lasted only until October, when the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam resumed violence against rival Tamil groups as well as attaching 
the India peace-keeping force. However, Jayewardne's stance remained 
unmanaged, for the agreement had enabled him to transfer needed hoops from 
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north to south in order to quell the Sinhalese - Tamil insurgency, thus saving Sri 
Lanka's leadership from possible distress on more than one front. 
, TAMIL NADU 
164. VISWANATHAN (S.). Sri Lanka: The double speak in Tamil Nadu. Frontline 
17,13; July 7,2000; 33-37. 
This paper deals with the some major allies of the BJP in Tamil Nadu 
resort to political doublespeak: They claim to support the centre's policy of the 
same time try to whip up to-Eelam sentiments. The national Democratic Alliance 
Government at the Centre continues to be hamstrung by the obstructionist tactics 
of three of its Tamil Nadu-based constituents in acting decisively on the Sri Lanka 
issue. It has been hesitant in taking proactive steps to help resolve the crisis in the 
island nation in accordance with its well-defined and nationally accepted policy. 
, , FOREIGN RELATION, ATTFTUDE, INDIA and 
SOVIET 
165. JAYAWARDANE (Amal). Soviet attitude towards the Indo-Sri Lankan problem. 
Pacific Affairs 64,2; Summer 91; 194-207. 
This article state that, the soviet and Indian vies on the Sri Lankan 
situation in the 1980s were stirringly similar. What brought about such a 
coincidence of view points was basically the mutuality of their threat perceptions 
regarding the external power involvement in the region. Both Moscow and New 
Delhi become suspicious of the pro-Western tilt of Sri Lanka foreign policy in the 
eighties, which was interpreted as having a destabilizing effect on the security of 
the region. Soviet analysts were, however hardly innovative in their reporting on 
the indo-Sri Lankan problem. Instead of reaching their conclusions through 
independent analysis, they uncritically adopted the Indian rhetoric on Sri Lanka. 
As a result, they never offered a critical evaluation of India's role in the Sri Lanka 
crisis. 
145 
Annotated Bibliography 
INDIA. 
166. De VOTTA (Neil). Sri Lanka's structural adjustment Program and its impact on 
Indo-Lanka relations. Asian Survey. 38, 5; May 1998; 457 - 73. 
Sri Lankas's western foreign policy till during the 1977-1987 period let to 
checkered relations with India, as the later viewed his pro-Western foreign policy 
as a threat to India regional hegemony. Indian retaliated by supporting the Sri 
Lankan Tamil rebels bent on creating a Tamil state, thereby destabilizing the 
island's political climate. A retrospective evaluation suggests that it was the 
stmctural adjustment policies, adopted by the post-1977 Sri Lanka reign, that 
influenced a redirection in the country's foreign policy, which in turn challenged 
India's regional hegemony and soured relations between the two countries. 
167. GURWARDENE (Rashni M.). Indo.-Sri Lankan relations - Towards confidence 
Building. Asian Thought and Society 42; Jan. 1991; 60 - 8. 
This article deals with the new dimension has been added to the Indo-Sri 
Lankan relations after national Front assuming to power at New Delhi. The 
interventionist approach has created for India a very complicated situation, 
bristling with dangerous possibilities and unpredictable consequences. However, 
New Delhi had to contend with heightened and bruised sensibilities within the 
country's, particularly in Tamil Nadu where emotions could be instigated and 
exploited easily for short term political gains. The IPKF interference has placed 
India in an extra-ordinary situation and resulted in much strained relations with Sri 
Lanka as never before. Further there is a complete loss of confidence and mutual 
trust between these countries. As such the NF Government has made initial 
attempts to redefine the parameters of Indian policy towards Sri Lanka. India has 
learned a lesson that too during a destabilized situation there was point beyond 
which India could not go. 
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168, JHA (N.N). India-Sri Lanka relations. India Quarterly. 50, 1-2, Jan. - June 94; 
53-62. 
This article stresses unlike the rest of Sri Lanka, inhabited by native 
Sinhalese, the Northern and Eastern provinces of the island state have traditionally 
been areas of Tamil habitation. Repeated v^ aves of Sinhala colonizer have ahered 
the demographic balance of the rich agricultural Eastern province, so that its 70 % 
Tamil population fell to 42% by 1981. Consequently, Sri Lanka witnessed 
communal riots between the two groups on the regular basis. During the 1980, 
these conflicts escalated and the Tamil political parties backed by the armed 
partisans of the LTTE formally introduced the concepts of a minority " national 
homeland" in the frequent Indian-brokered talks. The unpopular India Sri Lanka 
agreement of July 1987 coupled with the aversion of the Sinhalese to a federal 
structure have led to a renewed of the Eelam war in 1990, which shows no sign of 
early resolution. 
169. JHA (N.N.). India-Sri Lanka Relations. Terrorism and Political Violences, 3; 
May 4, 93; 53 - 60. 
This paper deals with the one hand one witness an especially peculiar 
phenomenon, in Sri Lanka, in tenn of which the majority community - the 
Sinhalese, comprising 74% of the total population- perceives itself to be a 
minority confronted by a vast ocean of Tamils, not only around them but directly 
across the water, in Tamil Nadu. Therefore, any attempt by the Tamil minority in 
that country (not to be confixsed with the plantation Tamils brought from India in 
the last century) to seek its legitimate rights encounters stiff opposition from the 
majority Sinhala Community. Land and language have always provided the basic 
ingredients of an explosive political mix. 
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170. MOHAMMAD IQBAL. India - Lanka relations : An assessment Regional 
Studies 11,4; Autumn 93; 47 - 105, 
This article states that the age old cultural similarities bridging the twenty 
kilometer gap of the Palk Strails between Sri Lanka and India have failed to 
produce harmony, understanding and mutual benefits. Instead of the much 
desired cooperation for development, tense political relations are reflected in the 
limited economic exchange between the two neighbours. The 1980s witnessed an 
extremee worsening of mutual relations. Since early 1989, Sri Lankan have been 
attempting to conclude a reciprocally balanced treaty of friendsship with India 
which could replace the unequal 1987 Accord. The procrastination practiced by 
India in finalizing the draft and its instence on the includion of all provisions 
which offerend Sri Lankan sovereignty complicate efforts at achieving peace, 
171, MONGIA (Roop Singh), India's Limited options in Sri Lanka Nation And The 
World 9, 208; June, 16, 2000; 14 - 6, 
This paper deals with the elephant pass, defended by over 10,000 troops 
fell virtually without a flight, and so did Palali base, and the fleeing troops left 
behind heavy weaponry, which is now being used by the LTTE against the army. 
The air strikes may temporarily halt the LTTE advance, but will cause many 
civilian casualties and increase the exodus of refiigees to Tamil Nadu, forcing 
New Delhi to get involved in humanitarian relief The Sri Lankan government 
pressed the penic button after losing the strategic Elephant Pass to Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and called for international help. Colombo is 
trying to take comfort from fact that the LTTE had controlled Jafi&ia till 1995. 
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, GOVERNMENT 
172. BOSE (Pradip). New turn in Sri Lankan politics. Mainstream. 32, 18, Sept. 8, 
1994; 3 - 5 . 
This paper deals with the urge for a change was manifested last year when 
the UNP was defeated in the most important and densely populated western state 
and Chandrika, as the SLFP leader, become its chef minister. The same trend 
manifested this year also in the south the traditional stronghold of the UNP. The 
new People's Alliance government which has the support of the comminutes and 
Trotskyites and has communist minister Avill be carefiilly watched so far as it 
economic policies are concerned. It has already declared that there will be no 
reversal of the liberalisation policies of the previous governments. 
173. CABRAAL (Nivard Ajith). Local Self Government : Sri Lanka Experience. 
Liberal Times 7,4, Apr. 1999; 19-23. 
This article stress that, what needs to be done, quickly and effectively in 
Sri Lanka, is the strengthening of the governance structure and the introduction of 
a development focus to the local councils. There should also be a sense of 
accountability placed upon the local authorities to work towards tangible 
improvement of the areas, as against maintenance work only. The work done by 
local councils have appeared to many as being mere attempts at maintaining the 
status quo of the city or village at best, or responding weakly to complaints of rate 
payers, at worst. The new Sri Lankan local self-government programmes, at least 
at the Colombo Municipal Council, appear to be on a sound footing. But, as with 
any initiative which is in its fledging stage, it has to be nurtured and promoted if it 
is to succeed in the longer term. 
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, ISSUES 
174. SUBRAMANIAN (T.S.). Sri Lanka : Contradictions and doubles peak. 
Frontline 17,14; July 21, 2000,129-31. 
This article deals with the doublespeak of the Tamil Nadu parties in the 
national democratic alliance on the Sri Lanka issue came sharply into focus once 
again at a conference of the Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, one of 
its constituents. There was a slight change in the stand of MDMK general 
secretary Vaiko, who has 'consistently' supported the separatist Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). He said in liis valedictory address "We are not asking the 
Vajpayee government to balkanise in Sri Lanka. 
, , , CONFLICT, LTTE, SINHALESE. 
175. RAMACHANDRAN (Shastri). Sri Lanka : Challenge of the Tiger Trap, 
Mainstream 38, 22; May 13, 2000; 4 - 6. 
This article deals with the last 15 years of the Tamil Sinhala conflict in the 
island republic which looks like a tear-drop just off the tip of peninsular India, the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam may have been largely confined to the jungles 
of northern and eastern Sri Lanka. They may be prisoners of their militarized, 
brutalized and violence - driven pursuit for a separate homeland called Eelam. 
But they have no less effectively trapped the government of Sri Lanka and India, 
with both being hard put in either tame the Liberation Tigers or bring them to the 
negotiating table on the terms of these governments. 
, , , PARTIES, role of 
176. MENON (Amamath K.). Sri Lanka: Cause to celebrate. India Today 17, 2; 
Jan.31, 1992; 151. 
This paper deals with the Sankranath brought more that its usual cheer for 
Sri Lankan's this year 1992. In a magnanimous gesture. President Ranasinghe 
Premadasa declared Sankarnathi a national festival for the first time, kicking off 
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the harvest festival with government sponsored celebrations accompanied by all 
the hoopla. Some of the festival cheer was reflected in the Premadasa camp too. 
On January 2, the embattled President completed the first-half of his six year term, 
having survived some serious the seats to his government. Even the economic 
downturn showed signs of recovery following moves to relax controls " In 1989 
we were described as a country without a future. Now we have the most liberal 
economy in Asia and are brimming with success:. In other development, Gamani 
Jayasurya, who resigned from the Premadasa Cabinet in 1987, to protest the Indo-
Sri Lankan accord. 
177. JAY ARAM (P.). Controversial choices : Opposition leaders challenge governors' 
decisions in Sri Lanka. India Today. 18, 12; June 30,1993; 131. 
This article deals with the Sri Lankan's were having a sigh of reUef of the 
provincial council elections having been held as scheduled - despite the 
assassination of President Rana Singhe Premadas and opposition leader Lalith 
Athulath Mudali the country was heading for yet another stormy political 
confrontation. The systematic way in which the new President, D.B. Wijetunga, 
has gone about dismantling the most controversial act of his autocratic 
predecessor appeared to have soothed the feeling of the electorate. For 
Bhandaranaike and her be leagued SLFP, the results came as a great relief. 
178. JAYARAM (P.). Sri Lanka : Madame President. India Today 19,22; Nov.30, 
1994; 97. 
This paper deals with the history of Lankan President Chandrika 
Bhandaranaike Kumaratunga wanted to create that's one ambition she can tick off 
on her check-list. Less than three months after being elected Prime Minister of Sri 
Lanka, she has also been democratically elected as the country's President and 
thus become the first women to hold the post. The subsequent nomination of her 
mother, Sri Mavo Bhandarnaike to the post of Prime Minister, creates another 
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historical first. Peace with the LITE a major PA manifesto promise may be a 
bigger problem. After one round of talks, the government was forced to suspend 
discussions with the LTTE after Dissanayake's assassination cast a poll of 
suspicion over the whole process. And though Kumartunga's second victory is 
being seen as an even bigger mandate for peace some are still sceptical. 
179. JAYARAM (P.), Sri Lanka : Over to the people. India Today 19,14, July 31, 
1994; 91. 
This article stresses that the Sri Lankan President D.B. Wijetunga's sudden 
decision to dissolve Parliament and hold elections six months ahead of schedule 
has not only caught the opposition napping, it has taken over his ruling United 
National party (UNP) by surprise. The President's detractors say he opted for 
early general elections as he was unsure of winning against the ailing yet 
formidable Srimavo Bhandaranaike, the SLFP - led people's Alliance's (PA) 
presidential candidate. Equally daunting is her daughter Chandrika, who may step 
into her mother's shoes if she is unable to contest. The possibility of the SLFP 
returning to power after 17 years of undiluted UNP Sway has set alarm bells 
ringing among the business community. A prospect Wijetunga, for one, is not 
likely to relish at all. 
180. VAASANTHI (M.). Offering the olive Branch : Kumaratunga and the LTTE take 
halting steps towards the negotiating table. India Today 19,18; Sept. 30, 1994; 
165. 
This paper deals with the ever since Kumartunga's People's Alliance 
coalition assumed office in mid August, offers of negotiation leading to peace 
have been flowing fast and talk in both the Tamil strongholds and among the 
majority Sinhala terns as much to peace as it does to the crucial presidential 
elections due to November. Though Kumaratunga claims that people voted her in 
on democracy and anti-corruption issues, the fact that solving the crises was a 
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major manifesto promise, that moderate Tamil parties tend support to her in 
parhament to maintain her majority, and that Sri Lanka bleeds off close to a 
quarter of its revenue on civil war costs and that 1,500 people have died since 
1993, all indicate its importance. 
POLTICAL SETTLEMENT 
181. ZOMPETTI (Joseph P.). Reading postcolonial identity : The rhetoric of 
devolution from Sri Lanka's President, Chandrika Kumaratunga. Howard Journal 
of Communication. 8,2, Apr. - June 97; 161 - 78. 
This article stresses despite the seemingly benevolent gesture of the recent 
devolution accord by president Kumaratunga, Sri Lanka is till in the midst of 
ethnic turmoil. Given Sri Lanka's history, any rhetorical analysis of the situation 
must consider the possible effects of colonialism on the island's current state of 
affairs. By reflecting on the devolution speeches given by President 
Kumaratunga, this article argues that a postcolonial perspective best frames the 
current historical moment in Sri Lanka in terms of Kumaratunga" desperate 
rhetorical attempts at a political settlement. This article concludes that 
Kumaratunga's rhetoric perpetuates Sinhalese domination over the Tamil 
minority, that understanding Sri Lankan rhetoric is crucial for understanding the 
current conflict as a whole and that a post colonial rhetorical analysis reveals the 
overall cultural and political dynamics underling the current Sri Lankan conflict. 
role of 
182. SLATER (Richard), Approaches to strengthening local government ; Lessons 
from Sri Lanka. Public Administration and Development. 17, 2; May 97; 
251-65. 
This article sets out to describe recent approaches to strengthening local 
government within the frame work of the World Bank's Municipal Management 
Program (198501995) in Sri Lanka. The article examines a number of 
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innovations adopted within the program that are of general relevance to the task of 
strengthening local government through the developing world. Existing structures 
and functions remain relatively weak, but a number of important innovations have 
been introduced to assist with the process of strengthening local resource 
mobilization and improving performance in service delivery, and enhancing 
certain aspects of accountability, particularly those areas concerned with the 
allocation and use of public funds. Since a number of these innovations have 
wide applicability to the process of local government strengthening and reform, it 
is hoped that this article will demonstrate the practical relevance of certain key 
innovations for practitioners and policy makers elsewhere. 
TROOPS, TIGERS 
183. SPAETH (Anthony). Sri Lanka : The Tigers Triumphant. Time 155,19, Aug. 19, 
1999; 19. 
This paper states that the war in Sri Lanka has long and hot. At least 
60,000 people have been killed in nearly 18 years of fighting between government 
troops and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or LTTE, which wants an 
independent Tamil homeland in nort:hem and eastern Sri Lanka. Peace talks have 
never gone anywhere, largely because of the LTTE's intransigence. Even when 
the pitched battles have simmered down, the Tigers have kept up a campaign of 
brutal bombing and assassinations. Now the action has returned to the battlefield, 
and the LTTE looks ascendant. Sri Lanka's ability to hold the peninsula is 
doubtful; 10,000 government soldiers failed to defend. Elephant Pass from 4,000 
Tigers, and thousand of troops retreated northward. 
, , RESPONSES 
184. SAMARANAYAKE (Gamini). Patterns of political violence and responses of the 
government in Sri Lanka, 1971 - 1996. Terrorism and Political Violence 11, 1, 
Spring 1999; 110-22. 
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The main objective of this article is to examine the causes and pattern of 
insurrections and the responses of governments. Social expansion and lack of 
economic and political development have created guerrilla organizations such as 
the Janatha Vimukti Peramuna (JVl*) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE). Consequently, the polity of Sri Lanka has been confined to the left wing 
insurgency and ethnic insurgency respectively. The paper identifies the lack of a 
national policy as a major factor, It recommends a viable conflict resolution 
mechanism also with political reforms as a solution to the problem of violence. 
, HIGHER EDUCATION, PROBLEMS 
185. Mattnews (Bruce). University education in Sri Lanka in context. The political 
consequences of deteriorating standards. Pacific Affairs. 68, 1; Spring 95, 
77 - 94. 
This paper deals with the post-secondary education in Sri Lanka's several 
University campuses is in crises. Apart from being under-funded and neglected 
for years by the state, the universities are also plagued with serious internal social 
problems. These diminish the quality of their programs and impair the 
preparation f the graduating student. This paper examines several pertinent issues, 
such as the impact of the ethnic and social class "quota" admissions system, the 
backlog of admission resulting from the closure of the universities for nearly three 
years in the late 1980s, 
, , HUMAN RIGHTS, FEMINIST MOVEMENT 
role of 
186. HENSMAN (Rohini). Feminist movement in Sri Lanka : The potential and the 
necessity. Contemporary South Asia. 5,1; March 96; 67 - 74, 
This article deals with the contrary to the argument that Third World 
Countries can not afford to respect human rights, Sri Lanka demonstrates the 
opposite. The destructive and brutal ethnic war is a disastrous set back to the 
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development process, and is partly a consequence of gender relations. A society 
which tolerates male violence in the home and does not teach boys to value and 
practice caring and hurtling is likely to produce man capable of participating in 
destructive and brutal politics. Thus a socialist feminist movement which fights 
against authoritarianism and for a just social division of labour is an essential 
condition for development and can become a reality of women struggle in the 
public sphere for the values they uphold in the private sphere. 
, REGIONAL PROBLEM 
187. HYNDMAN (Patricia). Sri Lanka : A study in microcosm of regional problems 
and the need for more effective protection of human rights. Denver journal of 
International Law and Policy 20,2; Winter 92; 269 - 303. 
This article deals with over the last decade events in Sri Lanka have 
reflected many of the human rights issues and problems of the Asian region: 
Outbreaks of violence with ethnic, religious and political overtones; increasing 
numbers of arbitrary arrests, tortures, murders and disappearances; encroachment 
of the lands of indigenous peoples; discriminatory practices against minority 
sectors of the community, and transmigration scheme which exacerbate ethnic 
tensions. The independence of the judiciary and lawyers has been threatened. 
The executive government has assumed ever widening powers and increasingly 
the military and police forces are not held accountable for their actions. 
, , INDIA role of 
188. SWAMY (Prakash M.). Sri Lanka ; Fishing for trouble. India Today 19, 10; May 
21, 1994,155. 
This article deals with Indian poachers face the ire of the Lankan Navy. 
While Sri Lankan and Indian foreign ministers patting each other on the back for 
the satisfactory state of their diplomatic relations last fortnight, there was a rather 
ugly blot on the idyllic landscape. Actually, it's a dot on the map called 
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Katchthivu, a tiny island about 14 nautical miles from Rameshwaram in Tamil 
Nadu. In the past three years, it has become a bloody battleground between Indian 
fisherman poaching in the Palk Strait and the Sri Lankan Navy. All that changes 
with the ethnic strife in Sri Lanka and the increasing movement of LITE militants 
and the smuggling of diesel and petrol from Tamil Nadu. 
, INDIAN GOVERNMENT, role of 
189. GUNURATNA (Rohan). Sri Lankan Logjam. Nation And The World 9,208; 
June, 16,2000; 17-20. 
This paper deals with the open secret that America has an eye on the 
facilities the naval base in Trincomalee can provide. But here again the Vajpayee 
Government is speaking with a forked tongue. Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh 
has virtually contradicted Brijesh Mishra by stating that India will not 'fire fight' 
Sri Lanka. More than a month after the 'Tigers' went on the rampage, the Sri 
Lankan logjam shows no sign of being broken. The statement is the result of the 
compulsion that dictate the behavior of the major giant in the neighbourhood, 
India, which finds itself adrift in a sea of confiision. 
, ,IPKF, INDIA, role of 
190. SINGER (Marshal R.). New realities in Sri Lankan politics. Asian Survey. 30, 
40; April, 90; 409-25. 
This paper is related to the signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan accords in July 
1987, the Presence of the Indian aimed forces (IPKF - Indian Peace. Keeping 
Forces) in Sri Lanka has created new political realities with regards to long-
standing opposition and conflict between the Tamils (21% of the population) and 
the Sinhalese (71%). In its failure to destroy the Tamil militant group (LTTE), the 
Indian army faced demands by president Premadasa to leave the country. 
Following the decision of the Indian government to pull out of Sri Lanka, conflict 
persists, and the Sri Lankan government continues to face problems with the JVP 
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(Janatha Vimukhti Peramuna, People's Liberation Front) a movement reflecting 
the degree of dissatisfaction among the "Post-Sinhala Only" generation, as well as 
the LITE, and rumors of armed Muslim minorities. 
, LBBRALISATION, ECONOMY, 1992 
191. SAHADEVAN (P.). Sri Lanka in 1992; A year of "mixed" results. Strategi 
Analysis 16,4; July 19193; 473 - 91. 
This article states that the process of liberalization of the Sri Lankan 
economy continued, albeit at a slow pace throughout 1992 in order to qualify for 
an uninterrupted flow of World bank and IMP assistance to boost its battered 
economy. If the projections made in 1992 prove to be accurate, it will be a highly 
credible economic performance for a country which has not only suffered a severe 
drought but is also afflicted by a debilitating civil war. The ending of 1992 has 
unfolded gloomy prospects for the restoration of peace in the island. With 
resignation of the Tamil groups from discussion bodies, the peace process has 
broken down. 
, , MEDLVTION, use of 
192, BRETHERTON (Di). Mediation process for Sri Lanka. Pacific Research 9, 3, 
Aug. 96; 12-4. 
This paper stresses that, the mediation is an inter disciplinary area and has 
become a widely accepted concept in a number of contexts. This paper explores 
some of the factors which would need to be taken in to account by a mediator 
working towards resolution of conflict in Sri Lanka. Consideration is given to the 
question of whether mediation techniques developed in North America might 
validly be transported to such a different cultural milieu end the question of why 
previous peace initiatives have failed is raised. Drawing on theory previous 
research and practical experience of peach work in Sri Lanka, the author reflects 
on how a third party might approach the business of mediating in Sri Lanka in a 
158 
Annotated Bibliography 
culturally sensitive, and hence effective manner, and outlines a frame work for 
constructing the context in which mediation might occur. The paper recommends 
a multi-layered team approach which respect the strengths of Sri Lankan culture 
and builds on existing peace initiatives. 
, MILITARY ASSISTANT, EVDU role of 
193. SUBRAMANIAN (T.S.). Sri Lanka : Against assistance. Frontline. 17, 10; May 
26,2000; 16-20. 
This article deals with the Indian should not send troops or arms to the 
Jaf&ia peninsula to help the beleaguered solders of the Sri Lanka army - this was 
the unanimous response of political parties in Tamil Nadu to initial reports that 
new Delhi was considering Colombo's request for military assistance after the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LLTE) overran major army camps and was 
poised for an assauh on JafiEha. DMK president M. Karunanidhi made a distinction 
between the state government's stand on the question of protecting Tamils in Sri 
Lanka. Tamil Nadu would give no room for any extremist organisation r its 
violence activities he said. 
, , , CONFLICT, CRISES, LTTE, JAFFNA 
194. BHARGAVA (G.S.). Going Berserk over India's Policy on Sri Lankan Crises. 
Mainstream 38, 23; May 27,2000; 31-2. 
This paper says that word has not been said on the raging military conflict 
in the Jaffna peninsula of Sri Lanlc. The reference is to the statement of the 
Foreign Minister of the island republic, Lakshman Kadirgamar, that censorship of 
news would breed rumors and alarmist reporting of the fighting. Except that some 
Indian newspapers and T.V. channels did not need the fig leaf of censorship to go 
berserk. Stray samples : soon after the LTTE had overrun Elephant pass, the 
Indian air chief was flying to Colombo. That was when the LTTE intensified its 
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psychological warfare while being forced to unleash conventional war on the 
defenders of Jaffna. 
, RELAITY, MULTICULTURALISM 
195. SILVA (K.M. de). MulticulturaUsm in Sri Lanka : Historical legacy and 
contemporary political reality. Ethnic Studies Report. 15,1; Jan. 97; 1-44. 
This paper deals with the current ethnic conflict and sporadic violence in 
Sri Lanka leads many foreign observers to assume that it is all the resuh of a lack 
of conmiitment to multi-culturalism by the state and by the numerically dominant 
Sinhales majority. Muhi-culturalism however has a longer history and much 
deeper in the island than it as in some western societies which proclaim 
themselves centers of muhi-culturalism. Departures from the support of multi-
culturalism came under western colonial rule, especially under the Portugues and 
the Dutch. In striking contrast those parts of the island which remained under 
local rulers maintained the traditional multiculturalism of which religious 
tolerance was an integral feature. 
, , NATIONAL CRISES 
196. KUMARATUNGA (Chandrika). Sri Lankan President's Devolution Package. 
Mainstream 11, 56; Aug. 19,1955; 5-6. 
This article stresses that the aspiration of the entire Sri Lankan populace is 
that the current national crisis, centered around the North and the East, be brought 
to a peacefiil, just and honourable settlement ushering in an era of tranquillity and 
harmony. This crises has for the last few decades, drawn the entire Sri Lankan 
peoples without discrimination, be they Sinhala, Tamil, Muslim or Burger, to the 
point of ruin, impacting adversely on all aspects of our national life. The ultimate 
consequence of this debilitating conflict is that a poll of gloom is cast over the life 
of the nation. 
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, NATIONALISM, CULTURE 
197. SPENCER (Jonathan) Writing within. Anthropology, Nationalism, and culture. 
Current Anthropology 31, 3 ; June 90,283 - 300. 
This paper deals with the post-poll reaction of the UNP has been of some 
comfort to political observers. While dismissing the possibility of joining the 
government as 'very unlikely', the UNP said that it would consider providing 
'outside support' on specific issues in order to end the conflict. Also apparent in 
the UNP's response was its perception that there was an imminent threat frame the 
LTTE to the island's political leadership. Wickremasinghe told press persons that 
as long as the present situation continued, the threat would remain. 
, , TAMIL and SINHALA, 1948 - 83 
198. STOKKE (Kristian). Sinhalese and Tamil Nationahsm (in Sri Lanka) as Post-
Colonial political projects from "above", 1948 0 1983, Political Geography, 17,1; 
Jan 98; 83-113. 
This article examiners Sinhalese and Tamil nationalism in Sri Lanka in the 
period from independence in 1948 to the rise of militant Tamil Separatist 
nationalism in the early 1980s. The argument is that Sinhalese and Tamil 
nationalism represent Post-Colonial Political projects where nationalist material 
and discursive practices have been initiated by segments of the dominant class for 
the purpose of mobilization within political alliances. In the early post colonial 
period, this politics of alliance ensured a degree of political participation and 
social redistribution, and as, such served it defuse ethnic and class tensions. In the 
late post colonial the neglect of the material and discursive practices of the ethnic 
lass alliances and particularly the strategic government alliance undermined the 
legitimacy of the political system and led to a radicalization of Tamil Nationalist 
demands in the 1970, and the emergence of militant Tamil nationalism from 
below in the 1980s. 
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CULTURE, 1968 
199. PFAFFENBERGER (Bryan). Political construction of defensive nationalism: The 
1968 temple-entry crises in Northern Sri Lanka. Journal of Asian Studies. 49,1; 
Feb,90; 78 -,96, 
This paper deals in the unique dynamic of caste tension, rehgious reform, 
and the political construction of defensive nationalism in the Jaffna peninsula -
centre of Tamil culture in Sri Lanka - are of a decidedly modern vintage. 
Complex Patterns of social and economic change brought Jaffiia's castes to the 
point of internecine war by 1968 when several hundred mainly "untouchable" 
"minority Tamils" Sat in non-violent protest before the gates of Jafifha's most 
orthodox Hindu temple in the village of Maviddapuram. Jaffiia's religious reform 
movement had contradictory implications for the peninsulas social system; it 
played in the hands of conservative velar interests, and also provided and 
ideological basis for untouchable temple entry. The handling of the conflicts by 
the leading Tamil Political party, the Federal Party (FP), through its program of 
defensive nationalism created electoral unity, albeit chemical, without really 
devoting any attention to the fundamental issues of social and economic in quality 
within the Tamil community itself 
, , NATIONALITY, CRISES, INDIA role of 
200. DENISH (Roy). Sri Lanka: Back on the Brink. India Today 34, 35; May 15, 
2000; 34-7. 
This article deals with the LTTE knocking at the doors of Jaffea peninsula, 
Kumaratunga presses the panic button, even seeking outside help to fight the 
Tamil rebels. Columns of tigers commandos backed by heavy artillery and 
armour were punching corridors through the army's defence lines located in the 
eastern and western axis of the A9 highway, dubbed the highway to death. The 
LTTE's push towards Jaffna and its savage attacks on military installation forced 
President Chandrika Kumaratunga to virtually declare a state of emergency. 
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Putting Sri Lanka on a war footing she announced tough measures to battle the 
Tamil rebels and put a complete censorships on the media under the public 
security act which came into effect. 
PARLIAMENTRY ELECTION, 
GOVERNMENT, 1994 
201. DeSAMRASINGHE (S.W.R. A.) 1994 parliamentary elections in Sri Lanka : A 
vote for good governance, Asian Survey. 34,12; Dec. 94; 1019 - 34. 
This article stresses the Sri Lankan elected a new government on 16 
August 1994 and a left-of-center people's Alliance (PA) coalition replaced the 
administration of the right-of-center United National Party (UNP) which had 
governed Sri Lanka for 17 years. The PA deputy leader, Chandrika Bhandaranaike 
Kumaratunga, became the new prime minister, making hr the third south Asian 
women prime minister currently holding office. One of the most significant 
features of this general election was that it signaled the conclusive takeover of Sri 
Lanka's political leadership by the post-World War II generation. The PA 
presented itself as a party with a fresh and youthful leadership that stood for 
"change", related primarily to issue of democracy and governance. The PA also 
criticized the excessive centralization of power under the executive presidency 
established by the UNP government in 1978, and promised to repeal the 
constitution and reestablish a British style parliamentary from the government. 
The campaign was marred by considerable violence, f which Sri Lankan elections 
have always had their quota. However this year such actions were minimal as 
compared with other recent elections. There was virtually totally total press 
freedom during the companion and television also played an important role. The 
ongoing ethnic war in the North-East affected the election in many ways. Now 
the new government has an opportunity to make a fresh start in finding a lasting 
resolution of the ethnic conflict. 
163 
Annotated Bibliography 
, PEACE, AGREEMENT, 1987 
202 RUPESINGH KUMAR. Sri Lanka. Peace Keeping and peace building Bulletin 
of peace proposals. 20,3; Sept. 89; 335 - 50. 
This paper states that Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement of 1987 has removed 
the state of armed violence and war between the two protagonists (the Sri Lankan 
stab and the Tamil politico-military organizations), thereby opening the way for 
conflict management. However, by resolving this issue, it has generated conflicts 
from within the Sinhalese themselves. The state itself needs to become on 
instrument of conflict management in a multi-ethnic plural society. This means 
transforming the Sri Lankan policy into a democratic state, restructuring the 
economy and the social relations which govern the society. 
, , PEACE PROCESS 
203. SAHADEVAN (P.). Internalized peace process in Sri Lanka. Bliss Journal. 16, 3, 
July 95; 310-45, 
This paper deals with the Sri Lankan conflict has been paved with cease-
fire, brokered agreements, understandings and ruptures issuing from both 
government and Tamil insurgent caps. After the Indo-Sri Lanka peace of 1987 
was broken, three 1992 efforts at peace making were openly rejected. The 
appointment of People's Alliance party leader Chandrika Kumaratunga as prime 
Minister in November 1994 was seen as an event which could rekindle hope and 
provide new energy to the flagging peace initiative. The PA government and the 
LTTEE exchange proposals in early 1995, but a solution favourable to all parties 
has prove to be elusive. 
, , , LITE & SINHALESE, 
PROBLEMS and PROSPECTS 
204. SHAHEEN AKHTAR. Peace process in Sri Lanka ; Problems and prospects. 
Regional Studies 15, 1; Winter, 96-97; 3 - 62. 
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This article stresses that ever since the people alliance led by president 
Chandrika Kumaratunga took over in 1994, it has given top priority to a politics 
solution of the Tamil- Sinhala ethnic conflict. After a short lives truce with the 
LTTE which is spearheading the struggle for a separate Tamil State, the Sri 
Lankan Army launched a massive military offensive and captured Jaffna 
peninsula, the LTTE stronghold. The Sinhalese hailed the military victory but it 
only forced the LTTE to return to guerrilla war fare and filed to bring it to the 
negotiating table. Any solution of the conflict without the participating of the 
LTTE are not on the horizon although moderate Tamil forces hope that a channel 
of dialogue with the outfit can be opened through a natural third party. 
, MILITARY, role of 
205. KARUNATILLAKE (Waruna). Sri Lanka : The last War Unto Peace. Outlook 
30, 21; June 5, 2000; 49-53. 
This article deals with Norway and the US getting involved, diplomatic 
activity to find a negotiated political settlement to the Lankan crises has picked 
up. But despite the hectic activities in Oslo, Colombo and New Delhi, analysts 
believe the negotiations will not take off until the rebel military offensive in the 
Jaffiia Peninsula ends. And obviously, the outcome of the battle would have a 
major bearing on the peace talks. "Nothing is going to happen on the peace front 
until the situation in Jaffiia settles down", says a US diplomat in Colombo. The 
Tamil rebels have kept up their pressure on government troops and are gaining 
ground daily. 
, , , PROBLEMS and PROSPECTS 
206. SHAHEEN AKHTAR. Peace process in Sri Lanka ; Problems and prospects. 
Regional Studies 15,1; Winter, 96 - 97; 3 - 62. 
This paper deals with ever since the peoples Alliance let by President 
Chandrika Kumaratunga took over in 1994, it has given top priority to a political 
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solution of the Tamil Sinhalese ethnic conflict, After a short lives tmce with the 
LITE which is spearheading the struggle for a separate Tamil State, the Sri 
Lankan Army launched a massive military offensive and captured Jafftia 
peninsula, the LTTE stronghold. The Sinhalese hailed the military victory but it 
only forced the LTTE to return to guerrilla warfare and failed to bring it to the 
negotiating table. Any solution of the conflict without the participation of the 
LTTE is fragile and practicable. Negotiation with the LTTE are not on the 
horizon although moderate Tamil forces hope that a channel of dialogue with the 
out fit can be opened through a natural third party. 
, POLITICAL PARTIES role of 
207. GHOSE (Partha S.). Sri Lanka ; The devolution debate. Mainstream 37, 22, May 
8, 1999; 9-12. 
This paper deals with the any student of Sri Lankan politics knows that 
both the dominant parties of the island, the UNP and the SLFP, have the same 
constituency to represent, notwithstanding the face that the UNP has a Rightist 
image and the SLFP a left-of-the-centre. This is the Sinhalese-Buddhist 
constituency. The more fierce the war with the LTTE gets, the more consolidated 
this constituency becomes. To an average Sinhalese the specter of his broken 
pearl is not an academic question it is as real as his faith. In that sense the LTTE 
probably has a political logic in not abandoning its armed struggle and not 
entering into a dialogue with the government. 
, , POST-ORIENTALISM 
208. ROGERS (John D.). Post-Orientalism and the interpretation of pre-modem and 
modern political identities : The case of Sri Lanka. Journal of Asian Studies. 53, 
l,Feb.94; 10-23. 
This paper states that rejects the essentiahst nature of these categories and 
argues, rather, for a process of constantly changing identities. While agreeing that 
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the modern state has shown increasing abilities to manipulate and utilize 
essentialist categories, he conclude "the establishment of an essentialist sociology 
of knowledge was an important watershed in South Asian politics but its 
importance is some time overstates he is critically of what he sees as the excesses 
of Foucaluhion claims the post-orientalist position, but still finds much of value in 
the approach and calls for carefiil empirical investigation of the shifting patterns 
of identify in Sri Lanka life both in the 20* century and the pre-colonial era. 
, PUBLIC ENTERPRISS, PRESPECTIVE 
209. WEERAKOON (Thilaka S.). Public enterprise pathology : Sri Lanka's experience 
in perspective. Asian Journal of public Administration. 17, 2, Dec. 95; 303 - 21. 
This article examines the relationships between parliament, government 
and public enterprises. The study investigates the hypothesis Mascarenhas that 
poor performance of public enterprises may be due, at least in past, to the policy 
inefficiency of governments. A qualitative analysis of the control mechanisms 
instituted by government to monitor and control these enterprises is conducted. 
The analysis and the author's experience as a chief executive in the public 
enterprises system in Sri Lanka supports Mascarenhas reasoning. Policy 
inefficiency is an important issue for countries which continue to make 
considerable use of public enterprises. 
, , RAJIV GANDHI, ASSASSINATION, LITE. 
210. KRISHNAKUMAR (Asha). Sri lanka : Some questions in Tamil Nadu. Frontline 
17,11; June 9, 2000; 22-25. 
This article stresses that the Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 
(MDMK) Chief Vaiko figured as a controversial witness I the Rajiv Gandhi 
assassination case tried by the special court. This is clear from the judgement 
which recorded Vaiko's non-cooperation with the prosecution when it come to 
providing evidence on the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). He denied 
167 
Annotated Bibliography 
in court most of the statements he reportedly made earlier when examined by the 
Inspector of Police Ramesh, in the course of the investigation into the 
assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. He feigned ignorance about having identified the 
book; Tamil National Question and Indo-Sri Lankan accord', or his article titled 
'Prabakaran though of suicide before the signing of LTTE'. 
RAW and INDIAN INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCIES role of 
211. MANCHANDA (Ritu). Raw in Sri Lanka : Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka, The 
role of India's Intelligence Agencies, Economic andPolitcal Wekly. 17, 31, May 
8,1993,921-24, 
This paper deals with the happens when in a democracy foreign policy 
becomes a captive to covert intelligence operators. The Iran-Contra affair is the 
obvious example, an object lesson on the risk of intelligence agencies hijacking 
the diplomatic process. Closer to home there is Pakistan's Inter Service 
Intelligence (ISI), a virtual autonomous power center which s accused of directing 
a 'proxy war' in India. The Colombo documents lend impressive credibility to 
Gunaratna's painstaking piecing together of what the founder of RAW, R.N. Kao, 
is quoted as having described as India's 'disaster' of a policy of training and 
arming the LTTE. But it is an uneven patchwork of press reporters, interviews and 
the classified documents. 
, , REFUGEE 
212. SHETTY (Kavitha). Sri Lankan Reiligee ; The right moves. India Today 17,4, 
Feb. 29, 1992,69-81. 
This article deals with the homecoming without hurrahs. But as the 
second batch of Sn Lankan refijgee landed in Trincomalee last forthnight bringing 
their coun to 1,273 —fears of damping innocent people in a virtual war zone were 
gradually evaporating. The future is still uncertain. But the refugees relief at 
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coming home is palpable. The optimism is justified. Of the first batch more than 
90 percent have returned to their villages, mostly in Manner and Trincomalee 
districts. And as many as 60 percent of the second batch, which arrived on 
January 5, have been resettled. After covering the 44-hour navy and coastguard 
escorted ship ride from Madras to Trincomalee, the refugees are taken to the 
Uppuvelli transit camp nearby, where they are housed temporarily in hotels, 
deserted when the fighting began. Once home, the refiigees receive a 
rehabilitation package worth Sri Lankan Rs.21,000. 
, RELATION, INDIA 
213. SUVRATHAN (P.I,). Basic needs strategies of Sri Lanka and Kerala, Asian 
Survey. 38, 8, Apr. 93; 61 - 9. 
This paper deals with the Sri Lanka and Kerala both have been cited as 
examples of remarkable achievement in the areas of expectation of life, literacy 
and heahh standard despite their having comparatively low levels of income. 
Here an attempt is made to identify the factor that both economies have in 
common. The performances of these economies in three sectors have been 
studies: 1. Education 2. Health 3. Public distribution. Apparently both Kerala and 
Sri Lanka have paid a price in terms of the growth of productive sectors of the 
economics. A vigorous government policy with regard to family planning seems 
to be essential for a significant reduction in the birth rate. 
, , ,IPKF role of 
214. PHADNIS (Urmila). Sri lanka : After IPKF pull-out. Mainstream 28, 24; Mar. 
31, 1990; 5-6. 
This article deals with the withdrawal of the IPKF from Sri Lanka brings 
to an end, to all intents and purposes, a murky phase in Indo-Sri Lankan relation 
and will hopefully remove frame the agenda of Sri Lankan politics India baiting 
which had virtually become the trend setter for the Sri Lankan approach to India. 
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Does this mean that one can foresee in the near future a re-ordering of Indo-Sri 
Lankan relations on the rational basis of reciprocity for the mutual benefit of the 
two countries ? Tempting as it may seem to be sanguine on this score, it would be 
imprudent to assume a dramatic change toward better Indo-Sri Lankan relation. 
This is because there are yet a number of imponderable before it can be said that a 
setting has begun to emerge where in the two countries could shed their 
inhabitation for a more forthright interaction between them. 
, , RELIGION, HINDU MYTHOLOGY, SUA 
TEMPLE 
215, KATAKAM (Anupma). Sri Lanka : Over a temple of Sita, Frontline. 17, 8; Apr. 
28, 2000; 56-60. 
This article deals with the controversy surrounds a temple built in Nuwara 
EUiya, a Tamil dominated plantation area in Sri Lanka, at the site believed by 
some people to be where Sita remained in Ravana's custody. Nuwara Eliya, the 
picturesque Sri Lankan hill station known for its fine quality tea, has seen a 
growing traffic of visitors to what tourist brochures term "the only Sita temple in 
the world". The recently constructed complex, which is patterned on the 
modernized south Indian temple, is set in idyllic countryside beside a clear stream. 
Adjacent to it is another new temple dedicated to Hanuman, the monkey-god, who 
according to mythology was instrumental in rescuing Sita fi^om Sri Lanka. 
, , TAMH. CRISIS, IPKF 
216. BULLION (Alan). Indian peacekeeping force in Sri Lanka. International 
Peacekeeping 1,2; summer 94; 148-59. 
This paper deals with the deployment of the Indian Peace keeping Force 
(IPKF) in Sri Lanka between 1987 and 1990, is examined here in relation to the 
long-established principles that peacekeeping is conducted impartially, by 
consent, with minimum force, and on multilateral basis frequently under the 
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authority of the UN. Although it has been argued that the IPKF intervened in Sri 
Lanka by consent, as a consequence of the Indo Sri Lankan Accord of July 1987, 
the political and strategic background of the Tamil crisis indicates that the 
intervention reflected India's policies as the regional hegemonic power. The 
intervention also representation a fundamental departure from the traditional 
parameters of peacekeeping in terms of the EPKF's lack of impartiality and the 
level of force which was used. However, this case study has much salience in the 
past-cold war security environment, marked as it is by internal disputes which 
provide refresh challenges to the role of the UN and the norms of peacekeeping. 
REFUGEES, TAMIL NADU role of 
217. PANNEERSELVAN (A,S.). Sri Lanka : Sanctuary Denied. Outlook 30,19; May 
22, 2000; 28-30. 
This paper stresses that the contingencies of national politics have conspire 
to force the DMK, a d Dravidian party, to take a position that contradicts and 
completely undermines its long held and much cherished pro Eelam stance. With 
M. Karunanidhis party in power in Tamil Nadu one would have expected a huge 
influx of Lankan Tamil refiigees from Jaffna. But the DMK now that it is part of 
the NDA led Union government is no longer as sympathetic to their Tamil 
breather in Jaffiia as they once used to be Every efforts is being made to prevent 
the Lankan refugees from landing in Tamil Nadu. 
, ,WAR and PEACE 
218. SAMBANDAN (VS.). Sri Lanka: Of terror and peace. Frontline 17, 7, 
Apr. 14,2000; 57-60. 
This paper deals with the Sri Lanka heads towards another attempt to solve 
its ethnic conflict and usher in peace, the signals are mixed and the imponderables 
have come to the force. The talks between the government and the opposition on 
the proposed constitutional changes started on a positive note, but two events -one 
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internal and the other external-struck a jarring note. The Sri Lankan government 
proceeds with it peace initiatives, meanwhile busting an Liberation Tigers of 
Eelam (LTTE) bid to unleash terror in Colombo. Carnage of unimaginable 
proportion was averted by an alert passer-by who drew the attention of armed 
policeman to suspicious movements in an overgrowth. 
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